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Most of the academic literature on violence in Nigeria 
is qualitative. It rarely relies on quantitative data 
because police crime statistics are not reliable, or not 
available, or not even published. Moreover, the training of 
Nigerian social scientists often focuses on qualitative, cultural, and political issues. There is thus 
a need to bridge the qualitative and quantitative approaches of conflict studies.
This book represents an innovation and fills a gap in this regard. It is the first to introduce a 
discussion on such issues in a coherent manner, relying on a database that fills the lacunae in 
data from the security forces. The authors underline the necessity of a trend analysis to decipher 
the patterns and the complexity of violence in very different fields: from oil production to cattle 
breeding, radical Islam to motor accidents, land conflicts to witchcraft, and so on. In addition, 
they argue for empirical investigation and a complementary approach using both qualitative and 
quantitative data. The book is therefore organized into two parts, with a focus first on statistical 
studies, then on fieldwork.
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Foreword 
The challenge of managing violent conflicts in Nigeria has been complicated by 
the dearth of accurate and reliable data on the incidence and impact of violence. 
Conflict management institutions and actors do not have access to information on 
the number of incidents of violence, the number of deaths due to violence, and 
the amount of property lost as a result of violence. The result is that policy and 
practice on conflict management and peacebuilding are based on assumptions 
and speculations about such numbers. Consequently, it is a challenge to assess 
the impact of initiatives to prevent and manage violent conflict. This challenge 
was apparent to the designers of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Pro-
gramme (NSRP) as they sought to set baselines for the interventions considered 
useful for addressing violent conflicts in Nigeria. There was no national database 
that tracked, collated, and disseminated information on violent conflict in a sys-
tematic way. During the search for baseline data, the designers of the NSRP 
came across a promising initiative which tracked incidents of violent deaths in 
the country. However, the initiative was based in a Paris institute and initiated by 
the French Africanist and political scientist Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos. 
There were no indications that Nigerian actors and institutions were aware of the 
database or used its data for research and policy purposes. 
It was against this background that NSRP decided to support the development 
and domestication of the Nigeria Watch project. Funding for the project, which is 
an initiative of the UK Department for International Development, facilitated the 
transfer of the Nigeria Watch database to the University of Ibadan. As a result of 
NSRP support, the database is now domiciled in Nigeria and maintained by Ni-
gerian researchers and data analysts. It has also correspondingly become more 
accessible to more Nigerians. The NSRP support to Nigeria Watch has also 
aimed to facilitate use of the data collated for research. Consequently, grants 
from NSRP have supported research which has used the Nigeria Watch database 
to explain different aspects of violent deaths in Nigeria. This book is the product 
of some of the grants awarded to young Nigerian scholars interested in the study 
of violence. It applies qualitative and quantitative data to explain the incidence 
and impact of violence. By combining qualitative and quantitative data for analy-
sis, the chapters in the book provide well-grounded empirical bases for analysis 
and conclusions. The qualitative studies help us to understand the statistics by 
shedding more light on the facts behind the figures. We congratulate Dr. Marc-
Antoine Pérouse de Montclos and his colleagues at IFRA and Nigeria Watch for 
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their work on this publication, and it is hoped that this book will serve as a cata-
lyst for more systematic studies of violence in Nigeria. 
 
Dr Ukoha Ukiwo 
Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) 
Abuja 
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Introduction: Arguments for a qualitative and  
quantitative analysis of violence in Nigeria 
 
 
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos  
 
 
At first, some of the reports appeared frightening but, in the course of time, I got used to 
alarms that no longer made any serious impact on me. It is debatable whether or not 
familiarity with serious security reports, helps the President or any Chief Executive 
in his administration. 
Former Nigerian President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, 
commenting on the daily bulletins of the National Security Organisation.1 
 
 
Nigeria has a reputation for being a very violent country. In 2014, it was consid-
ered to be the seventeenth most fragile state in the world, and it was ranked 151 
out of 162 countries in the Global Peace Index, a multidimensional report on vio-
lence, security, and criminality.2 This is a cause for alarm, and researchers obvi-
ously have a role to play in the private and public debates on insecurity. Howev-
er, many academics claim that crime is on the rise without relying on any data 
other than some scattered evidence. Most of the literature on violence in Nigeria 
is qualitative. It rarely relies on quantitative data for a simple reason: police 
crime statistics are not reliable, or not available, or not even published. Moreo-
ver, the training of Nigerian social scientists often focuses on qualitative, cultur-
al, and political issues. The French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA) has 
been a pioneer in promoting research on urban violence in Nigeria, yet there is 
still a need to bridge the qualitative and quantitative approaches of conflict stud-
ies. 
This book fills a gap in this regard. First, it underlines the necessity of a trend 
analysis to decipher the patterns and the complexity of violence in very different 
fields: from oil production to cattle breeding, radical Islam to motor accidents, 
land conflicts to witchcraft, and so on. Secondly, it argues for a complementary 
approach using both qualitative and quantitative data. Statistics, as such, are in-
ert, of little use, and prone to manipulation; they require an empirical investiga-
tion to make sense.3 Thus, statistics cannot be accurate if they are not cross-
                                                 
1  Shagari, Alhaji Shehu (2001), Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve - An Autobiography, Ibadan, 
Heinemann Educational Books, p. 327. 
2  See: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index 
See also: http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf. 
3  Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, Elizabeth Minor & Samrat Sinha, ed., Violence, statistics, and 
the politics of accounting for the dead, Dordrecht, Springer, 2016. 
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checked and enriched by fieldwork studies. Moreover, it is the qualitative and 
intuitive understanding of violence that helps to build a coherent database of in-
cidents and develop reliable analysis. 
This book is therefore organized into two parts, with a focus first on statistical 
studies, then on fieldwork. With the support of the Nigerian Stability and Recon-
ciliation Programme (NSRP), the contributors each received a grant from IFRA 
to write their chapters. Their work uses a database that has archived reports of 
fatal incidents and monitored human security in Nigeria since 1 June 2006. Es-
tablished on the campus of the University of Ibadan, the project is called Nigeria 
Watch and celebrates its tenth anniversary with the release of this book. It relies 
on a thorough reading of the Nigerian press and reports from human rights organ-
izations to compile and record fatalities on a daily basis, including deaths result-
ing from accidents. The purpose of the project is to address the general lack of 
data with regard to violence in Nigeria and its victims. 
Indeed, crime statistics in Nigeria are inadequate. While posing an important 
problem in Nigeria and being often used rhetorically for political gains by offi-
cials, the evolution of violence in the country has never been properly quantified. 
Since the military era, the Nigerian security forces have remained secretive and 
reluctant to release data on their operations. Regarding the Boko Haram insur-
gency since July 2009, for instance, the military have arrested and killed many 
people but refused to return the bodies to the families so as to avoid the possible 
initiation of legal proceedings against the security forces.4 In August 2012, they 
also instructed the mortuaries in Maiduguri, the birthplace of the sect, not to 
maintain records, possibly in an effort to conceal the high rate of deaths in deten-
tion.5 As for Boko Haram, the insurgents usually conceal the bodies of their dead 
combatants so as to maintain the myth of their invincibility. 
In such a difficult context, the Nigeria Watch project aims to compile data 
consistently and over the long term in order to identify dangerous areas in Nige-
ria and to interpret the trends, patterns, and changes in violence, based on an 
analysis of the data collected. However, it does not claim to be exhaustive. 
Moreover, its sources often differ when it comes to the number of casualties.6 
Because it relies on the media, Nigeria Watch does not cover equally the Nigeri-
an territory either, as shown in the second part of this book. It is thus important to 
be aware of the limits of quantitative studies. Generally speaking, Africa is ac-
                                                 
4  Amnesty International (2015), Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands. War Crimes Commit-
ted by the Nigerian Military, London, Amnesty International, p. 74. 
5  In the same vein, the Burundi Red Cross was pressed in May 2015 to stop publishing communiqués 
on the number of casualties resulting from the military repression of demonstrations against the in-
cumbent president. 
6  In the online system, figures are updated whenever a new source provides a different report, which 
explains why trends may change slightly according to the current state of data when they are accessed. 
Any errors in the following chapters remain the sole responsibility of the authors. 
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customed to poor numbers shaping how decisions are made.7 Except for a few 
countries, population and economic data are often unreliable. Moreover, statistics 
are frequently subject to political manipulation and bias. Finally, they can be ig-
nored even by institutions that live off statistics. In a recent report, for instance, 
the World Bank and the French Development Agency speculate on a “rise in vio-
lence and conflict in West Africa since 2010”, when the figures they published 
actually show a dramatic decline of fatalities from organized violence since 
1998-1999.8 
The most populated country in Africa is of course affected by these issues. In 
Nigeria, the numbers of inhabitants, internally displaced people, Muslims, Chris-
tians, victims of terrorism and of the security forces are all disputed to produce 
electoral rolls, negotiate a share of the so-called national cake, complain about 
ethnic marginalization, ‘alert the international community’ … or claim that Allah 
or Jesus is the winner! As early as 1966, for instance, Odumegwu Ojukwu inflat-
ed the number of Igbo people killed or displaced by pogroms in the North, so as 
to justify the secession of the Eastern Region in 1967.9 The Catholic fathers, who 
supported the rebels, also claimed that the monthly death toll of the Nigerian 
blockade against Biafra was exceeding 750,000 people in 1968, a statement that 
would have resulted in 9 million fatalities in just a year, almost the total number 
of inhabitants living in the area.10 Even today, the body count of war victims is 
still a hotly debated issue in determining whether or not the atrocities and delib-
erate starving of civilians were a genocide.11 Likewise, the Boko Haram uprising 
                                                 
7  Jerven, M. (2013), Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What 
to Do about it, Cape Town, UCT Press, 208 pp. See also Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A., E. Minor & S. 
Sinha, eds, (2015), Violence, Statistics, and the Politics of Accounting for the Dead, Dordrecht, 
Springer, p. 160.  
8  Marc, A., N. Verjee & S. Mogaka (2015), The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa, 
Washington DC, World Bank, pp.1 & 10. 
9  Gould, M. (2011), The Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War, 1966-1970, London, IB Tau-
ris, p. 47, 142 & 203; Niven, R. (1970), The War of Nigerian Unity, 1967-1970, Totowa (N.J.), Row-
man and Littlefield, p. 93. 
10  Mok, M. (1969), Biafra Journal: A Personal Report on a People in Agony, New York, Time-Life 
Books, p. 95. 
11  Going beyond militant points of views, Lasse Heerten and Dirk Moses argue that, in fact, an accusa-
tion of genocide would be difficult to sustain on behalf of an invented group like Biafra, which in-
cluded non-Igbo minorities such as the Ogoni, who themselves claimed to be victims of a genocide 
perpetrated by the Igbo. Moreover, Igbo people living in Nigeria outside Biafra were not exterminated 
during the war; in the same vein, survivors within the Biafran enclave were not killed after the end of 
the war. The accusation of an intention to destroy Biafra or Igbo people by starvation through block-
ade is also difficult to sustain, because the Biafran authorities rejected offers to enable the delivery of 
supplies that did not suit their military objectives. Ironically, fearing that genocide was taking place or 
would occur if Biafra lost, Western support of Biafran resistance and thereby prolongation of the war 
dramatically increased the civilian losses that the secession and foreign aid were intended to prevent. 
Finally, most genocides intend to expel and eradicate a group; yet the government of Nigeria aimed to 
preserve a federation by including the Igbo against their will. See Heerten, L. & Moses, D. (2014), 
The Nigeria-Biafra War: Postcolonial Conflict and the Question of Genocide, Journal of Genocide 
Research 16(2-3): 169-203. 
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has been a matter of contest. Some Biafra militants thus argued that in 2012 a 
total of 3 million Igbos were stranded in the city of Kano because of the threats 
of the jihadist group on Christian minorities in the North.12 In a city which is 
predominantly Hausa, this figure is actually higher that the total number of in-
habitants (2,830,000) reported by the 2006 census. 
Politics is not the only cause of interference with statistics; humanitarian ad-
vocacy also plays a role. As long as they can impress the public, many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) do not care much about accurate numbers. 
For instance, one of them claimed that Boko Haram killed 1,000 people in 2010-
2013, a figure that a few pages later in the same report was stated to be 7,000.13 
In most cases, the media and human rights NGOs do not distinguish between the 
victims of the sect and the victims of the security forces. The total number is pre-
sented as the body count of those killed only by Boko Haram. A report for the 
European Parliament thus confused the two categories to claim that the sect 
killed over 22,000 people between July 2009 and July 2014, supposedly ‘a con-
servative estimate’ and including 2,000 deaths in 2014.14 In fact, even the author-
ities in Borno acknowledged that over 1,000 people lost their lives because of the 
government military repression in July 2009.15 Except for a few incidents, Boko 
Haram was then silent until it attacked the central prison of Bauchi in September 
2010. In other words, the European Parliament’s ‘guesstimates’ meant that in 
2011-2013 alone, the insurgents killed an average of 6,000 people per year, an 
impressive figure that was never corroborated by field reports. 
In comparison, the detailed data of Nigeria Watch gave a total number of vic-
tims of the conflict as 685 in 2011; 1,482 in 2012; 3,004 in 2013; and 11,811 in 
2014, the year when military operations fully developed. The perpetrators of the 
killings could not be identified in many cases, but the security forces were clearly 
responsible for a large number of them. Investigations have shown that they ex-
tra-judicially executed more than 1,200 suspects, while at least 7,000 died in mil-
itary detention between 2011 and 2015, including 4,700 in 2013 as a result of ill-
treatment alone: torture, starvation, extreme overcrowding, suffocation, and deni-
al of medical assistance.16 This is notwithstanding some 1,200 people who were 
                                                 
12  See for instance Ebiem, O. (2014), Nigeria, Biafra and Boko Haram. Ending the Genocides Through 
Multistate Solution, New York, Page Publishing, p. 66. 
13  Barkindo, A., B. Tyavkase Gudaku & C. Katgurum Wesley (2013), Our Bodies, Their Battleground. 
Boko Haram and Gender-Based Violence against Christian Women and Children in North-Eastern 
Nigeria Since 1999, Harderwijk, Open Doors International, Nigeria’s Political Violence Research 
Network, pp. 9 & 13. 
14  Barna, J. (2014), Insecurity in Context: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Brussels, European Par-
liament, p. 9. 
15  Galtimari, Usman Gaji, ed., (Oct. 2009), Report of the Administrative Committee of Inquiry into the 
Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State, Maiduguri, Borno State, 5 vols. 
16  Amnesty International (2015), Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Commit-
ted by the Nigerian Military, London, Amnesty International, pp. 4, 58 & 86. 
501890-L-bw-ASC
5 
 
arrested and disappeared. As for Boko Haram, it killed some 6,800 people from 
January 2013 to March 2015, mostly civilians according to Amnesty Internation-
al. The organization had to rely on individual witnesses to assess the situation. Its 
figure included 1,350 civilians killed in more than 100 attacks in 2013, over 
4,000 in 230 raids in 2014, and 1,500 in the first three months of 2015; but an 
appendix to the report listed precise details only for 817 civilians killed as a re-
sult of 46 bomb attacks from January 2014 to March 2015.17 
Structure of the book 
The chapters of this book are evidence-based and are illustrated by maps drawn 
by Hugo Lefebvre. They do not speculate on ‘guesstimates’, relying instead on 
hard facts. In the first part, the authors use statistics extracted from the Nigeria 
Watch dataset to analyse the trends and patterns of violence during a period of 
eight years, from 1 June 2006 to 31 May 2014. The media and decision makers 
usually focus on terrorism. In Nigeria, however, the killings perpetrated by Boko 
Haram and the security forces occur mainly in three out of 36 states: Borno, 
Yobe, and Adamawa. The rest of the Nigerian Federation follows another pat-
tern, in which accidents appear to be the major cause of violent death. Nation-
wide perceptions are not so different in this regard. In March 2015, a survey by 
NOI Polls (an organization founded by the former managing director of the 
World Bank, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala) revealed that Nigerians identified ‘Sick-
ness’ (26%), ‘Poverty’ (24%), and ‘Motor accidents’ (16%) as leading causes of 
death. 
In the Chapter 1, based on a sample of 15,090 fatalities in eight years, Vitus 
Ukoji thus analyses the magnitude of fatalities resulting from road accidents. Ni-
geria is ranked second in the world for the rate of such accidents, and the roads 
are one of the main causes of fatalities in the country. Because of its large popu-
lation, Lagos is the most affected state. Nationwide, more people (55%) die in 
the South, which has more registered vehicles, than in the North (45%). Howev-
er, the capital city Abuja records a high ratio of fatalities resulting from motor 
accidents compared with the number of its inhabitants, as this city has more ve-
hicles registered per capita. 
Accidents are also a major cause of death in the oil industry. When it comes to 
what is the economic backbone of Nigerian industry, the media usually focus on 
violent protests against transnational corporations like Shell. From 2006 until the 
government amnesty of 2009, the uprising of the Movement for the Emancipa-
tion of the Niger Delta (MEND) was indeed striking, with sabotage, pipeline 
                                                 
17  Amnesty International (2015), ‘Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill’. Boko Haram’s Reign of Ter-
ror in North-East Nigeria, London, Amnesty International, pp. 9, 26 & 32. 
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blasts, terrorist attacks, and kidnappings. Yet Adeola Adams shows in Chapter 2 
that oil distribution is much more lethal than oil production. The reasons are not 
difficult to understand. First, oil production is restricted to a few states in the Ni-
ger Delta area, while oil distribution activities cover the whole nation. Moreover, 
oil production deals essentially with crude oil, which is less volatile than the 
highly inflammable refined products involved in oil distribution. Finally, oil dis-
tribution has a strong link with tanker and road accidents, which are rated as one 
of the main contributors to fatalities in Nigeria. 
In this respect, it is no coincidence that the most deadly incident ever recorded 
by Nigeria Watch was a pipeline explosion and a fire of refined products that 
killed 628 residents in Lagos in December 2006. Before that, such accidents had 
already devastated many areas. Pipeline explosions killed 150 people at Atlas 
Creek Island in Lagos State in May 2006; 120 in the village of Amiyi-Uhu near 
Umuahia in Abia State in June 2003; and 250 and 200 in Jesse near Warri in July 
2000 and October 1998, respectively. These incidents often involve the Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which is in charge of refineries and oil 
distribution all over the country, as in Amiyi-Uhu. Interestingly enough, such 
disasters occur both in rural and urban areas. 
Typically, however, fatal incidents caused by other issues follow very differ-
ent patterns in towns and in the countryside. From a methodological point of 
view, one of the problems is also that the media often under-report news in rural 
areas. In Chapter 3, Philip Ademola Olayoku thus had to analyse fatal conflicts 
related to cattle grazing from a small sample of 111 cases in eight years. He 
shows that clashes between pastoralists and farmers are usually related to land 
disputes. Most of these clashes involve Fulani cattle breeders. Such cases are 
more prevalent in northern Nigeria, yet they record a higher number of casualties 
in states like Plateau, Benue, and Cross River. Interestingly, these clashes reveal 
no cyclic pattern; contrary to conventional wisdom, they follow no season and 
can occur at any time of the year. 
In fact, some cultural patterns of violence also transcend the rural-urban di-
vide. Beliefs in witchcraft or religious allegiances concern peasants and city 
dwellers alike, yet with some formal differences related to the landscape and the 
way of life. In Chapter 4, Akinpelu Babajide Adedotun investigates deaths at-
tributed to sorcery, cultism, and ritual killings, including the lynching of suspect-
ed sorcerers. Women and children, he shows, constitute an important proportion 
of the victims, even if men and adults still represent the majority. However, the 
study reveals that witchcraft accounted for only 1% of the total number of fatali-
ties reported in the Nigeria Watch database during the period under review. 
Moreover, most deaths attributed to sorcery and cult societies occurred in the 
southern part of the country. In the North, eight states did not experience any rit-
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ual killings. As for the link between politics and cult societies, it remains vague 
and nebulous. Like many Africans, Nigerians actually tend to overemphasize 
sorcery as a major source of misfortune and fear. 
Religion is another issue that affects both rural and urban dwellers. In Nigeria, 
many observers believe that there is a ‘clash of civilizations’ between Muslims in 
the North and Christians in the South. However, Akinola Ejodame Olojo shows 
in Chapter 5 that fatal incidents between rival Islamic groups are more prevalent 
than those between Muslims and Christian organizations. A second major point 
is that violence involving religious groups is not always caused by religious is-
sues. Many fatal incidents recorded by the Nigeria Watch database between Is-
lamic and Christian groups are not related to religious issues. Thirdly, it remains 
inconclusive whether or not more Muslims than Christians (or vice versa) are 
killed because of violence in general in Nigeria. Finally, the Western media 
frames violence in Nigeria as being mainly inter-religious, while lethal incidents 
between rival Islamic groups are largely under-reported. 
The Boko Haram crisis has certainly exacerbated the fear of a war of religion. 
Yet the state security forces are also very much involved in the war on terrorism 
in north-eastern Nigeria. In Chapter 6, Super Odomovo Afeno shows that the 
intervention of the police and the army often exacerbates a situation and results 
in more people being killed. Between June 2006 and May 2014, for instance, the 
Nigerian security forces caused fatalities in 59% of the lethal incidents in which 
they intervened throughout Nigeria. Killings by the police were more numerous, 
while the army caused more fatalities per incident. Also, the security forces in-
tervened more often in the South, but caused more fatalities in the northern part 
of the country. 
Invisible violence: Rural case studies and fieldwork 
Many factors may lead to lethal violence, and this book does not aim at review-
ing them all. Lack of space also forced us to leave aside other working papers of 
the Nigeria Watch project, which can be accessed online and which deal with 
such topics as violence against women, land disputes, maritime piracy, clashes 
within and between political parties, electoral struggles, the role of oil compa-
nies, and population pressure in the Niger Delta.18 Whatever the case, research on 
lethal conflicts and accidents certainly requires qualitative investigation. Field-
work and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders are even more necessary 
when fatal incidents are not reported by the media, especially in remote rural are-
as that are difficult to access. The Nigeria Watch database, for instance, has no 
                                                 
18  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?html=12 
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records of lethal violence in some of the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of 
the Nigerian Federation, either because these LGAs are very peaceful or, more 
probably, because they are not covered by the media.19 
Hence, the second part of this book investigates ‘invisible’ violence through 
four case studies, two each for the South and the North. In the relevant LGAs, all 
rural, surveys were conducted to document violence-related deaths during the 
same time frame as the period covered by the previous chapters based on the sta-
tistics of the Nigeria Watch dataset from 1 June 2006 to 31 May 2014. Their 
findings complement the quantitative studies of the first part of this book. 
In Chapter 7, Joachin Uche Okanume Survey begins with a survey of vio-
lence-related deaths in Aninri and Isi-Uzo LGAs of Enugu State. These areas are 
predominantly inhabited by farmers and traders; however, their pattern of vio-
lence is not very different from the other regions of Nigeria if we make an excep-
tion for the North-East and the Boko Haram crisis. In Aninri, for instance, the 
majority of fatal incidents result from motor accidents, while crime is the second 
leading cause of fatalities. In the case of Isi-Uzo, crime is the leading cause of 
fatalities. Lack of development partly explains these differences locally, as Isi-
Uzo has almost no roads. This lack of development also provides a clue to the 
reluctance of the national press to report news in rural LGAs that have no eco-
nomic value, lack urban centres, and are difficult to access, such as Isi-Uzo. 
In Chapter 8, Hammed Abodunrin studies Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs of 
Osun State. Residents, he finds, do not consider these areas to be violent; howev-
er, some fatal incidents were reported over land disputes, police clashes, and per-
sonal attacks. Like most regions of Nigeria, motor accidents accounted for the 
majority of violent deaths in Egbedore and Ifedayo, mainly because of bad roads, 
according to respondents. Interviews conducted with journalists in Osun also re-
vealed a number of reasons for the media not adequately covering such rural are-
as. There were claims of bad roads, poor transportation services, and irregular 
salaries, which hindered the ability of journalists to visit remote parts of the state. 
In addition, journalists pointed to the lack of community newspapers and the dif-
ferent media house styles, which saw some stories as not weighty enough to 
make national news. Finally, they stressed the uncooperative attitude of security 
operatives in regard to releasing information. 
In Chapter 9, Adam Alqali takes us to the north of Nigeria to investigate lethal 
violence in Baure, Ingawa, Kurfi, Mani, and Matazu LGAs of Katsina State. His 
research reveals 37 fatal incidents in unreported cases of violence, which resulted 
                                                 
19  By 1 November 2014, these were the following: Udung Uko and Urue-Offong/Oruko (Akwa Ibom); 
Kwaya Kusar (Borno); Nafada (Gombe); Auyo, Gagarawa, Kaugama, and Yankwashi (Jigawa); 
Ingawa and Matazu (Katsina); Sakaba (Kebbi); Bassa, Igalamela-Odolu, and Mopa-Muro (Kogi); To-
to (Nassarawa); Ifedayo (Osun); Gudu and Gwadabaw (Sokoto); Ussa (Taraba); and Karasuwa, 
Machina, Nguru, and Yunusari (Yobe). 
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in 104 deaths between 2006 and 2014. Accidents, again, were the main cause of 
fatalities. In order of prevalence, road accidents were responsible for 64% of the 
deaths, followed by drowning (13%), famer-pastoralist clashes (7%), building 
collapses (5%), murders (4%), fire outbreaks (3%), animal attacks (2%), explo-
sions (1%), and electrocutions (1%). Yet these incidents did not make news 
headlines. For Alqali, the political economy of the media in Nigeria explains this 
gap because private owners underpay journalists and see news organs as political 
platforms to manipulate the unsuspecting masses, to the detriment of poor and 
marginalized groups in rural areas. 
Finally, in Chapter 10, Arshad Munir and Akinola Ejodame Olojo document 
violence-related deaths in Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela LGAs of Sokoto State, 
and in Sakaba LGA of Kebbi State. With a total of 1,047 fatalities in the areas 
under review between 2006 and 2014, data obtained from 1,083 questionnaires 
revealed a very high prevalence of lethal incidents in a rural region of north-
western Nigeria which is usually seen as quite peaceful compared with large cit-
ies such as Kano, Kaduna and, of course, Maiduguri. Gudu actually recorded the 
highest number of fatalities and incidents, while Sakaba had the lowest. For the 
period under review, the most frequent cause of fatal incidents was cattle grazing, 
followed by political clashes. Religion, which is often perceived as a major factor 
of conflict, contributed quite insignificantly to the overall level of violence in the 
four LGAs, with a few incidents involving the Yan Shi’a brotherhood, the Tija-
niyya Sufi order, and the Yan Izala movement. In conclusion, the study demon-
strates that, just as in the urban centres of Sokoto and Kebbi, there are many fatal 
incidents that go unreported in rural areas. 
Reporting, recording, and monitoring thus remain a challenge to properly un-
derstanding violence. In the current context, the ten-year old Nigeria Watch pro-
ject should indeed continue and develop further, pending the support of its part-
ners. There is no reason to stop it, because records are always necessary to assess 
the evolution of human security when it comes to homicides, accidents, massa-
cres, terrorist attacks, and so forth. Moreover, the Nigeria Watch project can pro-
vide an interesting alternative to citizens who have no access to unpublished or 
unreliable police statistics. 
 
Dr Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos 
Senior Researcher, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, Paris 
Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London 
PRIO Global Fellow (Peace Research Institute in Oslo) 
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1 
Trends and patterns of fatal road 
accidents in Nigeria (2006-2014) 
 
 
Vitus Nwankwo Ukoji 
 
 
Abstract 
The incidence of fatal road accidents in Nigeria is staggering. Trend analysis of 
fatal road accidents between June 2006 and May 2014 using Nigeria Watch da-
tabase shows that 15,090 lives were lost to fatal road accidents in 3,075 events. 
The highest number of fatalities occurred in 2013 (2,061 deaths), a 2.8% in-
crease over the 2012 record of 1,652 deaths. However, the probability of a high 
fatality record in 2014 remains high considering the 964 deaths already record-
ed between January and May 2014. On the national scene, Lagos recorded the 
highest number of fatalities, while FCT (Abuja) has the highest relative number 
of deaths per 100,000 population. These findings are explained by the large 
population and continuous urbanization of Lagos and by the number of regis-
tered vehicles in the FCT (Abuja). On the regional level, a trend analysis shows 
that more people died in fatal road accidents in the South than in the North. 
Among other factors, a greater number of motor vehicles, the volume of oil 
distribution, and the occurrence of highway criminal activities explain why 
there are more fatal road accidents in the South than in the North. 
Introduction 
The 19th century industrial revolution resulted in some fundamental changes in 
the transport sector1 and provided more flexibility of movement, speed, and tim-
ing. Since then, there has been an upsurge in both human and vehicular motor 
movement, a situation that has also resulted in more fatal road accidents. The 
worst-hit are developing countries, a circumstance confirmed by Tawia Addo-
Ashong, World Bank Global Road Safety Facility Coordinator, when she said 
that 1.2 million die yearly from road traffic accidents.2 
                                                 
1  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport 
2  Favour Nnabugwu, 2014, 1.2 M Dead in Road Accidents – World Bank chief, Vanguard, June 15. 
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A study carried out by Chen thus show that the fatality rate in African coun-
tries ranges from 10-fold to more than 100-fold that in the United States.3 Also, 
Lagarde reported that Africa has an average rate of 28.3 per 100,000 population-
road traffic mortality compared with 11 in Europe. 4  Sub-Saharan African 
Transport Policy, in its report, quoted an increase of road fatalities in Africa by 
350% between 1990 and 1998.5 Most of those affected by fatal car accidents are 
young people. One may wonder why a less motorized Africa has such a high rec-
ord of fatal road accidents.  
Concerns about the rising incidence of fatal road accidents propelled stake-
holders, including the United Nations (UN) Assembly, into seeking means to 
curb road fatalities. On 11 May 2011, the UN adopted the period 2011–2020 as 
the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety, during which all efforts will concen-
trate on stabilizing and then reducing global road traffic fatalities by 2020. Ac-
cording to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, lives will be saved through 
this decade of action.6 Following the declaration by the UN in 2011, the Federal 
Road Safety Commission (FRSC) in Nigeria set out to adopt and domesticate the 
UN action plan by developing a number of programmes suitable for every road 
user in the country. 
Despite integrated efforts towards reducing fatal road accidents, Nigeria still 
remains one of the worst-hit countries. With a human population of approximate-
ly 167 million, a high level of vehicular population estimated at over 7.6 million, 
and a total road length of about 194,000 km (comprising 34,120 km of Federal, 
30,500 km of state, and 129,580 km of local roads),7 the country has suffered 
severe losses to fatal car accidents. Its population density varies in rural (51.7%) 
and urban areas (48.3%), and this translates into a population–road ratio of 860 
persons per sq km, indicating intense traffic pressure on the available road net-
work.8 Undoubtedly, this immense pressure contributes to the high number of 
road traffic accidents in the country (FRSC 2012). 
Nigeria is ranked second-highest in the rate of road accidents among 193 
countries of the world.9 Oladepo and Brieger (1986) argued that three-quarters of 
                                                 
3  Chen, G. (2010), Road Traffic Safety in African Countries – Status, Trend, Contributing Factors, 
Counter Measures and Challenges, International Journal of Injury Control and Safety Promotion 
17(4): 247-255. 
4  Lagarde, E. (2007), Road Traffic Injury Is an Escalating Burden in Africa and Deserves Proportionate 
Research Efforts, PLoS Medicine 4(6): 967-71 
5  Ibid. 
6  A speech at the launch of the event, UN Secretary General by Ban Ki-Moon on May 11, 2011 during 
the United Nations Assembly. 
7  Sumaila, AbdulGaniyu Femi, 2013. Road Crashes Trends and Safety Management in Nigeria, De-
partment of Transport Management Technology, Federal University of Technology, Minna. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Agbonkhese, O., G.L. Yisa, E.G. Agbonkhese, D.O. Akanbi, E.O. Aka & E.B. Mondigha (2013), 
Road Traffic Accidents in Nigeria: Causes and Preventive Measures. Civil and Environmental Re-
search, ISSN 2224-5790 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0514 (Online), Vol. 3, No. 13. 
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all accidents on Nigerian roads involve fatalities.10 Aside from the Boko Haram 
crisis, accidents are currently by far the main cause of violent death in Nigeria.11 
The WHO adjudged Nigeria the most dangerous country in Africa with 33.7 
deaths per 100,000 population every year.12 According to their report, one in eve-
ry four road accident deaths in Africa occurs in Nigeria. The WHO survey and 
the FRSC report of 5,693 fatal road accidents in 200913 leave no doubt about the 
dangerous situation on Nigerian roads. 
The causes of fatal car accidents in Nigeria have been categorized into human, 
mechanical, and environmental factors. According to Umar, the human factor 
accounts for up to 90% of accidents, while the mechanical and environmental 
factors contribute the other 10%.14 Human factors include visual acuteness, driv-
er fatigue, poor knowledge of road signs and regulations, illiteracy, health prob-
lems, excessive speeding, drug abuse, and over-confidence while at the steering 
wheel. Among the mechanical factors that lead to fatal car accidents are poor 
vehicle maintenance, tyre blowouts, poor lights, un-roadworthy vehicles, and 
broken-down vehicles without adequate warning to others on the road. The envi-
ronmental factors include heavy rainfall, Harmattan winds, sun reflection, heavy 
wind, pot-holes, and untarred roads. These factors have independently and/or 
collectively contributed to the high rate of fatal road accidents in Nigeria. 
The repercussions of such accidents have been colossal. Despite the happiness 
and change of quality of family lives associated with owning a vehicle, its pos-
session has left many families bereft of their breadwinners or loved ones.15 Ac-
cording to Adekunle, the socio-economic costs of road traffic accidents in Nige-
ria are immense, and the direct costs of traffic casualties can perhaps be under-
stood best in terms of the labour lost to the nation’s economy.16 This was further 
developed by Pratte, who argued that persons injured in accidents on Nigerian 
highways and streets no longer participate in the economic mainstream, and this 
amounts to a loss of labour of millions of person-years to the nation.17 
In February 1988, the Federal Government established the FRSC through De-
cree No. 45 (1988) to reduce road mishaps. This was later amended by Decree 35 
(1992) and is referred to in the statute books as the FRSC ACT cap 141, Laws of 
                                                 
10  Oladepo, O. & R. Brieger (2006), Road Traffic Accidents: Applying the Brake to a Killing Tree. 
11  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A., Nigeria Watch: Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006–2014). 
12  WHO 2013 Report on Accidents in Africa. 
13  FRSC (2009). Traffic Digest, A Transport Digest Publication of PRS Department. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Dr. Murtala Muhammad Umar, Road Transport Accidents: Causes, Effects and Prevention, General 
Hospital Zurmi, Zamfara State. 
16  Adekunle, J.A. (2010), Road Traffic Accident Deaths and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. 
Int. Rev. Bus. Soc. Sci. 1(5): 47-60. 
17  Pratte, D. (1998), Road to Ruin: Road Traffic Accident in the Developing World, NEXUS 13: 46-62. 
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the Federation of Nigeria (Nigerian Constitution 1999).18 To achieve its objec-
tive, the commission compiles comprehensive data on road traffic accidents, in-
cluding injuries and deaths - unlike Nigeria Watch database, which deals only 
with violent deaths, including those caused by accidents. It is therefore impera-
tive to draw conclusions after a comparative analysis of data from the FRSC and 
Nigeria Watch. 
Contexts of road accidents in Nigeria 
Different circumstances precipitate fatal car accidents in Nigeria. Understanding 
these contexts (political and socio-economic) gives one a better understanding of 
why road accident has remained a leading cause of death in the country.  
 
Political contexts 
Fatal road accidents in Nigeria cannot be directly attributed to politics. However, 
party activities, governance, budgetary allocations, contract evaluation, and so on 
have a direct impact on the rate at which accidents occur. The attempts of gov-
ernment ministries and parastatals to reduce the number of accidents have usually 
been frustrated by poor funding. The Federal Ministry of Works and the FRSC 
suffer from apparent severe budgetary constraints, leading to insufficient human 
and material resources and untimely acquisition of safety equipment. Further-
more, bureaucratic logjams and politicization of contract awards are rife with 
irregularities and inflated costs. This leads to situations where road contracts are 
not properly executed. 
Government functionaries and party leaders have been identified as protago-
nists in fatal road accidents in Nigeria. The indiscriminate use of sirens, coupled 
with high-speed driving by political public office holders, including governors 
and their convoys, has caused several road traffic accidents. A renowned Nigeri-
an academician, Professor Iyayi, died in an accident that involved the convoy of 
Kogi State Governor Captain Idris Wada, who on 28 December 2012 was in-
volved in another fatal accident along the Lokoja-Ajaokuta Road, which killed 
his aide de camp, Assistant Superintendent of Police Idris Mohammed. Similarly, 
the convoy of Governor Oshiomole of Edo State was involved in a gruesome car 
accident, leading to the death of three reporters, while returning from a party 
function in April 2012 where some members of the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) were being received into the now defunct Action Congress of Nigeria 
(ACN). In the same year, three political aides of Governor Al-Makura of Na-
                                                 
18  Agbeboh G. U. & Osabuohien-Irabor Osarumwense (2013), Empirical Analysis of Road Traffic Acci-
dents: A Case Study of Kogi State, North-Central Nigeria, Department of Mathematics, Ambrose Alli 
University, Ekpoma, Nigeria. 
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sarawa State were killed in a multiple car crash involving the governor’s convoy 
along the Gadabuke-Keffi Road in the state. Governor Abdul Aziz Yari was in-
volved in a fatal car accident in 2012 that claimed the life of a police officer at-
tached to his team. In Katsina in 2011, the aide de camp to State Governor Ibra-
him Shema and four others died in a road accident that involved the governor’s 
convoy, just 48 hours after two people died when their vehicle was involved in 
an accident while travelling in the convoy of Niger State Governor Babangida 
Aliyu for a campaign rally. The list is likely to be added to if nothing is done to 
manage convoys’ recklessness and careless driving. 
 
Economic contexts 
The rapid development of comprehensive road transportation is crucial to the 
economy of every nation. Opportunities to acquire and sell a variety of commodi-
ties necessary for industrial and manufacturing systems are expanded by a well-
coordinated transport system. Oni (2004) argued that transport is a key element 
in the social and economic development of any nation. The restrictive nature of 
the waterways in Nigeria, the pitiful condition of the rail system, and the inability 
of the average Nigerian to afford the high cost of air travel make road transporta-
tion preferable in the country. In 2006, 644,387 vehicles, including government 
motor cars and motorcycles, private motor cars and motorcycles, and commercial 
motor cars and motorcycles, were registered nationwide. The number fell in 2007 
to 612,867 but increased in 2008 to 746,814 and to 777,835 in 2009. In 2010, 
712,938 vehicles were registered.19 Over 70% of the total movements of the reg-
istered vehicles in the country and about 80% of the freight movements take 
place on the road. 20 The over-dependence on road transportation worsens the 
condition of roads, involves huge pressure on motorists, and causes many fatal 
road accidents. 
The discovery of oil in Nigeria opened new frontiers of economic engagement. 
Statistics from the National Bureau for Statistics (NBS) (2010) show that the 
crude petroleum sub-sector accounts for over 80% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange. 
The distribution of refined oil products across the country has been a thorn in the 
side of many Nigerians. In 2011, the FRSC reported that Nigeria had an average 
of approximately 5,000 tankers involved in wet cargo haulage, moving about 150 
million litres of fuel, and 2,500 ‘trailers’ in dry cargo plying Nigeria’s roads dai-
ly.21 Kayode also revealed that between 2007 and June 2010, a total of 4,017 
tanker/trailer crashes were recorded on Nigerian roads, with a yearly average of 
1,148 crashes, monthly average of 96 crashes, and a total of 4,076 persons killed 
                                                 
19  National Bureau Of Statistics (2009), Annual Abstract Of Statistics. 
20  FRSC (2011), Traffic Digestion 
21  Ibid. 
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in such crashes involving tankers and trailers.22 Due to the highly inflammable 
nature of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), fatal accidents involving petrol tankers 
have usually been lethal. 
Aside from the carnage of fire explosions involving petrol tankers, articulated 
vehicles have also significantly contributed to fatal road accidents in Nigeria. 
Trucks and trailers transport agricultural goods and industrial equipment to vari-
ous locations by road. According to statistics from the NBC (2010), over 60% of 
the Nigerian population are engaged in agriculture.23 In 2006, about 99,030 met-
ric tons of major agricultural crops were produced in Nigeria. The number fell in 
2007 to 97,183 metric tons and in 2008 to 95,097, then increased again in 2009 
to 96,050 and to 115,424 in 2010.24 Transporting these products in trucks via 
roads plagued with pot-holes and congestion has caused several fatal road acci-
dents. 
In pursuit of extra profit, commercial vehicle owners task their drivers with 
generating more profit, a situation that leads to careless driving and driver ex-
haustion. According to Olusiyi, most commercial drivers are paid daily wages of 
N1,000-2,500, depending on the city and the type of vehicle, a wage which driv-
ers consider meagre. After daily or weekly accounting, such drivers are left with 
low incomes, which cannot adequately sustain them and their families.25 Under 
such circumstances, vehicles are not properly maintained. The risk of being in-
jured, according to Agbonkhese et al. (2013), increases exponentially with speed, 
and the severity of accidents depends on the transfer of kinetic energy at im-
pact.26 In an attempt to increase their productivity and therefore remuneration, 
drivers tend to drive as fast as possible in their poorly maintained vehicles. The 
result is more accidents and more fatal accidents. 
 
Social contexts 
Poverty remains a circumstantial factor in the occurrence of fatal road accidents 
in Nigeria and may not be directly linked to it. Poor housing conditions, social 
isolation, overloading of passengers in slum areas, insecurity in public places, 
and several other variables explain why the risk of fatal road accidents remains 
high among low-income earners in Nigeria. Their living conditions are in sharp 
contrast with those of their richer fellow-citizens, who reside in metropolitan are-
as with overhead bridges, secured playgrounds, and greater traffic control and 
                                                 
22  Kayode Olagunju, 19 October 2010. Corps Commander Corps Transport Standardization Officer, 
Federal Road Safety Corps, National Headquarters, Pmb 125, Abuja, Nigeria. 
23  National Bureau for Statistics (2010). 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ipingbemi, O. (2008), Socio-Economic Characteristics and Driving Behaviour of Commercial Drivers 
in Southwestern Nigerian Cities. Lyon, CODATU (Cooperation for Urban Mobility in the Developing 
World), 5 pp. 
26  Ibid. 
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safety measures. Christie argued that a link between social deprivation and high 
accident rate may be explained in terms of increased exposure to hazardous envi-
ronments.27 This assumption was expanded by Abdalla, who argued that the cas-
ualty rates among residents from areas classified as relatively deprived are signif-
icantly higher than among those from relatively affluent areas.28 Schools located 
within slum areas lack overhead bridges, and pupils and pedestrians are left at the 
mercy of careless drivers. Instances were seen in Anambra and Lagos, where 
school children were crushed to death while trying to cross an expressway. When 
parents cannot afford the huge fees paid by high-income earners, they have to 
send their children to slum schools, where they are exposed to fatal road acci-
dents 
Population density is another social factor that influences the frequency of fa-
tal road accidents in large cities. Slum areas are mostly congested with peoples 
and vehicles. Lack of space is worsened by the abandonment of car wrecks along 
the roads. When drivers scramble for space, they often cause fatal road accidents 
when they manoeuvre around obstacles or other road users. Safety measures are 
ignored and people are killed. The cities of Lagos, Kano, Rivers, and Ibadan fre-
quently experience fatal road accidents owing to their high number of inhabitants 
and socio-economic activities. 
Personal relationships, family issues, and financial problems are elements that 
increase the frequency of fatal road accidents. A driver’s capacity to attend to 
hazards is essentially defined by his state of mind. Phone conversation while 
driving, social interaction, and peer influence undermine drivers’ sense of judg-
ment and the speed of their responses. These in-vehicle distractions increase the 
likelihood of entirely missing critical events such as changes in traffic lights.29 
Furthermore, drivers who are in the grip of negative emotions and stress arising 
from factors in their social backgrounds exhibit a high level of distraction, expe-
rience impaired observation skills, and fail to read road signs. Such distractions 
frequently lead to fatal accidents. 
Comparing FRSC data on fatal road  
accidents with Nigeria Watch data 
The FRSC, as mentioned earlier, was established in 1988 as a result of the con-
tinuous increase in the number of fatal road accidents in Nigeria. It has the aim of 
                                                 
27  Christie, N. (1995b), Social, Economic and Environmental Factors in Child Pedestrian Accidents: A 
Research Review. Transport Research Laboratory, Project Report 116. 
28  Abdalla, I.M. (1997), Statistical Investigation and Modelling of the Relationships Between Road Ac-
cidents and Social Characteristics. PhD Thesis, Napier University. 
29  Hancock, P.A., M. Lesch & L. Simmons (2003), The Distraction Effects of Phone Use During a Cru-
cial Driving Maneuver. Accident Analysis and Prevention (35) 501-514 
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reducing road traffic crashes and creating a safe motoring environment. 30 To 
achieve these objectives, the commission relies on research. It has built a strong 
database on road crashes with a view to putting the findings to use to achieving 
safer roads. Using information and communication technology (ICT) for effec-
tive surveillance to capture and monitor data has been transformed into evidence-
based facts to address road problems. The commission regularly publishes briefs 
in its Road Mirror.
Figure 1.1 FRSC and Nigeria Watch records of fatalities caused by road accidents 
(2007-2013)
The Nigeria Watch online database has performed a similar task to the FRSC 
since the former’s establishment in June 2006. Unlike FRSC’s operation of a 
more advanced database on both fatal and non-fatal road accidents, however, Ni-
geria Watch focuses only on accidents that involve at least one death. Between 
2006 and 2013, the FRSC recorded 41,118 deaths from road accidents, while Ni-
geria Watch recorded only 14,300. Despite these differences and a more restrict-
ed dataset, Nigeria Watch helps to monitor the trends and patterns of reported 
                                                 
30 FRSC (2007), An article on FRSC Establishment Act. www.frsc.gov.ng. 15 December 2007. 
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fatal road accidents because it records more details on each accident recorded 
than the official statistics of the FRSC. 
Methods and materials 
Nigeria Watch data focus on reported accident cases involving at least one death 
between June 2006 and May 2014 in ten Nigerian daily newspapers. The data 
exclude non-fatal injuries. Road accidents fall under a broad category of acci-
dents involving cars, buses, tankers, lorry/trailers, bicycles, tricycles, and trains. 
Extracting data that relates to the above-mentioned categories requires an event-
by-event analysis. General causes of violent deaths within the period under re-
view were analysed in order to identify the most deadly violent event. To estab-
lish the trends in fatal road accidents, secondary data was collated from the 
FRSC and compared with Nigeria Watch’s data. Fatal road accidents were 
grouped by year, region, state, city, severity index, and most dangerous route. 
The essence of categorizing the data extraction was to establish the patterns of 
fatal road accidents nationwide. Also, the relative number of deaths was calculat-
ed in order to determine the probability of someone dying from road accident per 
100,000 population. The severity index was calculated by comparing the number 
of people killed with the number of fatal crashes. Search results were generated 
from the Nigeria Watch database and exported to Excel for classification. The 
results are presented in bar charts and frequency distribution tables. 
 
Methodological challenges 
Despite the consistency in news reportage in Nigeria, there is a probability that 
some fatal car accidents, especially those that occur in rural villages, are not re-
ported. This challenge calls into question the validity of the records of fatal road 
accidents when compared with FRSC data, which usually have triple the num-
bers found in the Nigeria Watch data on fatal road accidents (Figure 1.1). 
Causes of violent deaths in Nigeria 
Many Nigerians have lost their lives in violent events. Such events cut across 
regions and ethnic identities. Figure 1.2 shows the main causes of violent deaths 
between June 2006 and May 2014. 
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Figure 1.2 Cumulated figures of violent deaths in Nigeria, by cause (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Approximately 61,090 people lost their lives in 14,087 events nationwide dur-
ing the period under review.31 In order of public importance, accidents of various 
types, including road accidents, recorded the highest number of deaths in total, 
followed by crime, political violence, ethno-religious matters, and economic is-
sues. Apart from the Boko Haram crisis in the North-East, accident is thus the 
main cause of violent deaths in Nigeria. Over 15,000 lives were lost to fatal road 
accidents involving cars, buses, tankers, and others articulated vehicles in 3,075 
events between June 2006 and May 2014. Data from Nigeria Watch show that 
Lagos State recorded the highest number of fatalities, with 1,543 car accident 
deaths, followed by Edo with 1,201 deaths, and FCT (Abuja) with 1,026 deaths. 
While fatal car accidents had declined in Lagos in 2014 up to the end of May, 
Abuja still has the highest relative number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Mapping of fatal road accidents in Nigeria 
It is thus relevant to study the trends in car accidents. This mapping covers the 
period between June 2006 and May 2014. Lagos State recorded 620 crashes; 
Edo, 177; and FCT (Abuja), 348. While the highest number of fatal car accidents 
occurred in Lagos, Abuja had the highest relative number of deaths per 100,000 
population, as can be seen in Map 1.1 and 1.2. 
  
                                                 
31  This figure is lower than the total number of casualties tabulated for each cause of violence in Figure 
1.2. This is because fatalities can result from several causes, and hence some duplicates in Figure 1.2. 
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Map 1.1 Fatalities caused by road accidents in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
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Map 1.2 Fatality rates related to road accidents in Nigeria, per 100,000 inhabitants  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
Fatal road accidents by vehicle type 
Different vehicles are involved in fatal car accidents. Figure 1.3 shows the cate-
gorization of such vehicles. 
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Figure 1.3 Vehicle types and road accidents in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014)
The results in Figure 1.3 show a total of 921 bus crashes between June 2006 
and May 2014, including 142 in 2007, 133 in 2008, 109 in 2009, 110 in 2010,
127 in 2011, 11 in 2012, and 144 in 2013. Luxury and mini-buses are the most 
preferred means of travel for inter-city transportation in Nigeria, and fatal acci-
dents involving them are the most prevalent on highways. Second in order of 
prevalence were accidents involving lorries and trucks, with 833 fatal crashes. 
About 15% (127) of such crashes occurred in 2013. Undoubtedly, lorries and 
trucks are crucial to the economic growth of the nation. Most agrarian communi-
ties in Nigeria rely on trucks and lorries to ferry their agricultural products to cit-
ies. Like buses, accidents involving trucks and lorries are reported mostly on the 
highways.
Car crashes are third in order of prevalence. Cars are popular means of intra-
city transportation in Nigeria. While many of them are registered for private use 
and for use as city cabs, others are used for inter-city transportation. However, 
poor maintenance and inability to observe safety measures often lead to fatal ac-
cidents. Between June 2006 and May 2014, there were 808 incidents of fatal car 
accidents. Accidents involving cars are reported mostly in metropolitan areas.
Results in Figure 1.3 also show that 270 fatal crashes involving tankers oc-
curred between June 2006 and May 2014: 16 in 2006; 30 in 2007; 37 in 2008; 18 
in 2009; 45 in 2010; 22 in 2011; 25 in 2012; and 60 in 2013. By the end of May 
2014, 17 crashes had so far been recorded for that year. Although the rate of 
tanker crashes may seem low, the impact is usually severe. Most victims are 
killed by fire outbreaks and explosions, and most crashes involving tankers occur 
on highways and roads close to farm tanks and depots.
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Aside from tanker crashes, commercial motorcycle (popularly called okada) 
accidents were frequent in states that still permitted their operation. There were 
216 motorcycle crashes reported between June 2006 and May 2014, including 25 
in 2006, 41 in 2007, 32 in 2008, 18 in 2009, 14 in 2010, 27 in 2011, 17 in 2012, 
and 25 in 2013. Most motorcycle accidents occur in slum areas with less access 
to good roads and affordable cars. The severity index of motorcycle accidents is 
often high due to poor safety measures by riders and passengers. 
Severity index of fatal road accidents in  
Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
The intensity of fatal road accidents varies from state to state. After comparing 
the number of people killed with the number of fatal crashes, states are ranked by 
a low, medium, or high severity index (Table 1.1). 
 
 
Table 1.1  Severity index of fatal road accidents, by state (June 2006-May 2014) 
Group Rank State 
A 
Low 
(0.00-2.99%) Ebonyi, Lagos 
B Medium 
(3.00-5.99%) 
FCT, Ekiti, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Plateau, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Kwara, 
Osun, Cross River, Taraba, Ogun, Abia, Nasarawa, Oyo, Anam-
bra, Sokoto 
C High 
(6.00% and over) 
Imo, Jigawa, Benue, Niger, Edo, Gombe, Borno, Ondo, Enugu, 
Kano, Kaduna, Rivers, Zamfara, Kogi, Katsina, Kebbi, Adama-
wa, Yobe 
Severity index = number of people killed / number of fatal crashes 
 
 
Ebonyi and Lagos states ranked low (0.00-2.99%) in the severity index of fatal 
road accidents that occurred between June 2006 and May 2014. Ebonyi had a 
severity index of 2.4% from 51 deaths in 21 crashes, while Lagos had a low se-
verity index of 2.5% from 1,590 deaths in 620 crashes. States that are ranked 
medium (3.00-5.99%) include FCT (Abuja), Ekiti, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Plateau, 
Bauchi, Bayelsa, Kwara, Osun, Cross River, Taraba, Ogun, Abia, Nasarawa, 
Oyo, Anambra, and Sokoto. Those ranked with a high index (6.00-8.99%) are 
Imo, Jigawa, Benue, Niger, Edo, Gombe, Borno, Ondo, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, 
Rivers, Zamfara, Kogi, Katsina, Kebbi, Adamawa, and Yobe. Highest in this cat-
egory is Yobe State, with a severity index of 11.4%. 
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Monthly analysis of fatal road accidents in Nigeria  
(June 2006-May 2014) 
Festive periods and environmental factors are major contributors to fatal car ac-
cidents in Nigeria. Hence, some months are regarded as more dangerous than 
others. Table 1.2 presents the monthly analyses of fatal car accidents in Nigeria 
within the period under study. 
 
 
Table 1.2 Number of violent deaths in Nigeria caused by road accidents, per month  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
Month 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
January n/a 135 184 85 183 130 117 121 190 1,141 
February n/a 150 168 97 152 193 181 143 200 1,284 
March n/a 203 142 148 327 160 197 101 294 1,572 
April n/a 118 101 180 160 129 131 346 127 1,292 
May n/a 107 258 210 131 119 86 116 153 1,180 
June 66 152 66 90 154 133 39 96 n/a 796 
July 258 62 193 113 232 149 282 174 n/a 1,463 
August 110 120 158 111 171 146 158 182 n/a 1,156 
September 200 198 161 174 95 126 147 185 n/a 1,286 
October 104 145 72 187 104 167 90 162 n/a 1,031 
November 173 112 150 59 108 286 78 164 n/a 1,130 
December 251 300 224 275 188 101 146 270 n/a 1,754 
           
Total 1161 1802 1877 1729 2004 1839 1652 2061 964 15,090 
 
 
In order of decreasing number, 1,754 deaths occurred in the month of Decem-
ber; 1,572 in March; 1,463 in July; and 1,292 in April. These results show that 
fatal accidents happen more often during festive and seasonal periods. Christians 
celebrate Christmas in December and Easter in April or March. Within these pe-
riods, people travel to celebrate with their loved ones. According to Tumes Syl-
vanus Dalop, accidents and deaths are higher during these ‘EMBER’ months be-
cause of the various festivities lined up during this period, which involve much 
more travelling than usual. 32 This is a period when commercial drivers make 
more money through overloading and excessive speeding, among other factors.  
In 2013, for instance, December recorded the second-highest number of 
deaths, with 270 deaths in 76 incidents. The period was marked by various eco-
nomic activities, including transportation of cattle from the North to the South. 
Approximately nine persons died in an auto crash that involved two articulated 
                                                 
32  Vanguard 2012 interview with the past Sector Commander of the FRSC, Mr. Tumes Sylvanus Dalop, 
on EMBER months of road traffic accidents 
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vehicles carrying passengers and cows.33 The traffic pressure on the road during 
the seasonal period increased fatal car accidents. Evading bad portions of the 
road led to fatal car accidents nationwide. In Sokoto, ten people died in an auto 
crash involving two J5 mini-buses. One of the vehicles had attempted to dodge 
pot-holes and the driver suddenly lost control.34 Another incident happened in 
November 2013 along the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway, where a multiple accident 
claimed 23 lives.35 The crash occurred when a tanker loaded with petrol lost con-
trol and rammed into trailers parked by the roadside, igniting an inferno that 
burnt other vehicles trapped in the pile-up. 
Similar conditions apply to the Easter period. On 3 April 2013, for instance, 
70 people died after a double-decker bus, a haulage truck, and a petrol tanker 
collided along the Benin-Ore Expressway. The tanker exploded and killed most 
people on board the bus.36 Two days later, a multiple accident involving a Dan-
gote cement-laden trailer, a tanker, and a luxury bus led to the death of 60 per-
sons in Edo. The bus lost control and rammed into the trailer and the trailer into 
the tanker. The victims were burnt beyond recognition. Approximately ten mo-
torcycles and 15 shops were destroyed by the fire.37 On the same day in Anam-
bra, another multiple accident involving a trailer, two mini-buses belonging to 
the Rivers State Transport Company (RSTC), and two other vehicles claimed 25 
lives.38 Within a space of two days, 155 lives were lost on the road. 
Finally, a total of 1,463 persons died in fatal road accidents in the month of Ju-
ly between June 2006 and May 2014. July is the peak of the rainy season, when 
road markings are less visible, bridges collapse, trees fall, and rivers flood. 
Daily analysis of fatal road accidents  
in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
Figure 1.4 shows that 2,468 people died in 481 crashes on Mondays from June 
2006 to May 2014. This was followed by Sundays, with 2,425 deaths in 477 fatal 
road accidents, and Saturdays, with 2,269 deaths in 465 crashes. These results 
confirm the assumption that more accidents happen during weekends and Mon-
day (when people return to work). Weekends are marked by several religious and 
social activities that lead to huge pressure on the roads and often lead to fatal ac-
cidents. Party activities, night clubbing, and other social events occur mostly dur-
ing weekends. With limited driving experience, most youths engage in drunk 
                                                 
33  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=12859&rang=2 
34  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=12871&rang=3 
35  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=12990&rang=4 
36  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=11317&rang=1 
37  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=11124&rang=2 
38  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=12573&rang=3 
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driving, a situation that frequently leads to fatal road accidents. Smart et al. noted 
that limited driving experience, night-time driving, and fatigue are particular 
risks for young men.39 Using data from the University of Port Harcourt, Eke et 
al. found that 70% of fatal accidents in Port Harcourt occur during the week-
ends.40 People who travel back on Sundays to resume official duties on Mondays 
increase traffic volume and fatal road accidents. As for commercial drivers, they 
often try to recoup weekend expenses when they overload passengers and over-
speed to complete more trips.
Figure 1.4 Fatal road accidents by days of the week (June 2006-May 2014)
State analysis of fatal road accidents in 
Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014)
Although fatal car accidents are a nationwide calamity, the frequency and intensi-
ty varies from state to state. This section analyses the trends in fatal car accidents 
by state (Figure 1.6 and Table 1.3).
                                                 
39 Smart, D., S. Vassallo, A. Sanson, S. Cockfield, A. Harris, W. Harrison & A. McIntyre (2005), In:
The Driver’s Seat: Understanding Young Adults’ Driving Behaviour. Melbourne: Australian Institute 
of Family Studies.
40 Eke, N., E.N. Etebu & S.O. Nwosu (2000), Road Traffic Accident Mortalities in Port Harcourt, Nige-
ria. Anil Aggrawals Internet J. Forensic Med. Toxicol. 1(2).
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Figure 1.5 Number of violent deaths in Nigeria caused by road accidents, by state  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Data collected by Nigeria Watch show that Lagos has the highest number of 
fatalities on the national level with 1,579, followed by Edo with 1,129 deaths, 
and by FCT (Abuja) with 1,046 deaths. On the other hand, Ebonyi (51 deaths), 
Taraba (68 deaths), and Akwa Ibom (91 deaths) recorded far fewer fatal road 
accidents. 
 
Lagos State 
The number of Lagos residents is contested. According to the 2006 census, its 
population stands at 9,013,534, contrary to the state government’s parallel count 
of 17.5 million.41 A recent World Bank demographic trend analysis reported that 
the Lagos State population growth rate of 8% has resulted in its capturing 36.8% 
of Nigeria’s urban population, which is estimated to reach 49.8 million people.42 
In this context, fatal car accidents are a challenge, with 212 deaths reported in six 
months in 2006; 260 in 2007; and 306 in 2008. However, there was a large re-
duction in road accident fatality rates, with 156 and 68 deaths in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively. The figure went up again in 2013, with 119 deaths, but was moder-
ate in the first five months of 2014 (Table 1.3). 
 
 
                                                 
41  http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagelinks.php?p=6 
42  http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagelinks.php?p=6 
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Table 1.3 Yearly breakdown of road accident deaths in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
Abia 0 28 12 3 1 5 57 42 5 153 
Adamawa 0 0 54 10 39 13 30 12 2 160 
Akwa Ibom 3 17 0 3 5 8 26 22 7 91 
Anambra 36 22 30 78 98 35 69 96 28 492 
Bauchi 23 17 69 24 65 124 88 76 19 505 
Bayelsa 1 30 19 4 0 3 3 34 10 104 
Benue 19 51 12 66 18 68 40 48 4 326 
Borno  0 21 13 45 17 12 18 18 11 155 
Cross River 34 21 54 10 10 10 6 26 18 189 
Delta  44 82 181 39 184 44 62 112 50 798 
Ebonyi  2 3 5 4 5 1 3 21 7 51 
Edo  47 88 164 196 11 208 85 210 120 1,129 
Ekiti 0 20 11 4 8 8 24 21 11 107 
Enugu  0 5 2 40 61 44 27 35 30 244 
FCT 48 80 159 120 198 134 87 162 58 1,046 
Gombe  20 15 19 24 40 27 5 23 0 173 
Imo  26 21 71 33 17 14 20 30 7 239 
Jigawa 1 24 23 14 6 10 13 32 37 160 
Kaduna  43 186 24 32 28 17 48 50 18 446 
Kano  36 16 31 102 49 48 13 50 28 373 
Katsina  36 80 8 64 52 121 50 83 10 504 
Kebbi  11 0 1 10 36 38 3 43 7 149 
Kogi  33 70 58 208 172 89 86 64 56 836 
Kwara 39 29 34 50 34 21 47 43 22 319 
Lagos  212 260 306 148 236 156 68 119 74 1,579 
Nasarawa  4 64 12 29 2 7 10 19 20 167 
Niger  21 18 40 37 94 70 13 51 48 392 
Ogun 82 95 87 105 92 86 227 182 28 984 
Ondo  67 81 59 34 148 106 53 20 15 583 
Osun  13 88 75 14 9 27 29 28 27 310 
Oyo  177 23 41 77 59 114 67 107 53 718 
Plateau  4 9 31 33 18 32 10 40 0 177 
Rivers  43 97 51 11 55 15 174 30 0 476 
Sokoto  8 44 38 12 46 8 28 19 32 235 
Taraba  5 9 20 11 5 1 5 6 6 68 
Yobe  6 36 38 13 62 88 40 50 78 411 
Zamfara 17 52 25 22 24 27 18 37 18 240 
           
Total 1,161  1,802 1,877 1,729 2,004 1,839 1,652 2,061 964 15,090 
 
 
Ikeja, the capital of Lagos State, recorded the highest number of deaths from 
car accidents. Most lives were lost in the Ikeja axis of the Lagos-Ibadan Ex-
pressway (Table 1.4). The strategic location of the area places it at the centre of 
fatal car accidents, with a record of 266 car accident deaths. Another route that 
has claimed many lives is the ever-busy Oshodi-Apapa Expressway. Oshodi is 
one of the most populated areas of Lagos State, with major industries located in 
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the LGA. Within the period under study, 180 persons died in fatal car accidents. 
The expressway is a major link to Tin Island, where most companies involved in 
oil distribution are located. The presence of these companies has kept Apapa, 
Mainland, Island, and Eti-Osa continuously busy with commercial activities. Oil 
pipelines cut through many residential areas in Lagos State. Distribution of PMS, 
a major cause of deaths along Apapa/Mile 2/Oshodi Expressway, has always 
been ongoing. The volatility of such refined products makes it fatal each time 
tankers have accidents. In May 2008, for instance, an explosion occurred after a 
bulldozer hit an oil pipe and approximately 100 people were killed by fire, in-
cluding many school children.43 Aside from oil companies, other protagonists, 
such as government security agencies, have caused fatal road accidents in the 
state. In a bid to evade harassment by the police, commercial bus drivers cause 
fatal accidents. In addition, the police mount road blocks that have caused several 
fatal road accidents. Approximately 54 people died in October 2010 in a multiple 
road accident caused by a police checkpoint on Shangisha Bridge, between the 
Toll Gate and Berger Bus Stop near Otedola Housing Estate.44 
 
 
Table 1.4 Summary of fatal car accidents in Lagos, by LGA and route  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
LGA  No. of deaths Most dangerous routes 
Amuwo/Odofin 9 Satellite Town 
Epe 49 Lekki-Epe Road; Epe/Ibeju Expressway 
Ibeju/Lekki 49 Lekki/Epe 
Ifako-Ijaye 28 Abeokuta Expressway 
Kosofe 48 Lagos-Ibadan Expressway; Ketu, Mile 12 
Mushin 28 Agege Motor Road; Ladipo 
Ojo 58 Lagos-Badagry Expressway 
Shomolu 41 Ikorodu Road; Gbagada Expressway 
Lagos Mainland 29 Third Mainland Bridge 
Lagos Island 44 Obalende 
Ikorodu 148 Ikorodu Expressway 
Surulere 55 Apapa-Oshodi Expressway; Ojuelegba 
Oshodi-Isolo 180 Oshodi-Apapa Expressway 
Ikeja 266 Lagos-Ibadan Expressway 
Eti-Osa 62 Lagos-Epe Expressway 
Badagry 143 Badagry Expressway; Eko Bridge 
Apapa 72 Apapa-Oshodi Expressway; Tin Can Island 
Alimosho 150 Igando Road; Lagos-Abeokuta Expressway 
Agege 97 Lagos-Abeokuta Expressway 
Ajeromi-Ifelodun 23 Ajegunle 
   
Total 1,579  
 
                                                 
43  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=3502&rang=1 
44  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=6634&rang=2 
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However, the administration of Governor Fashola (2007-2015) has achieved 
reasonable success in the reduction of road accidents in Lagos State. Lagos State 
Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA) was created to reduce deaths, inju-
ries, and economic losses from road accidents by employing modern traffic man-
agement techniques. The agency is empowered, among other things, to relocate 
tankers to industrial parks, impound tankers and cars parked indiscriminately, 
and ensure strict compliance with safety measures. 
 
Edo State 
Edo State recorded the second-highest rate of fatal road accidents in Nigeria be-
tween June 2006 and May 2014, with 1,129 deaths in 177 accidents. There were 
210 deaths in 2013; 208 in 2007; 196 in 2009; 164 in 2008; and 120 between 
January and May 2014. The strategic nature and location of Edo State as a major 
link to the South West, South-South, South East, and North Central place it on a 
list of states with a high risk of fatal car accidents. The state also serves as a ma-
jor terminal to most drivers travelling to different parts of the country. Table 1.5 
shows the distribution of fatal car accidents in Edo State within the period under 
study. 
 
 
Table 1.5 Summary of fatal car accidents in Edo, by LGA and route  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
LGA No. of deaths Most dangerous routes 
Akoko-Edo 46 Okene-Abuja Expressway 
Egor 1 Benin-Ore Road 
Esan Central 12 Benin-Okene Highway 
Esan North-
East 
10 Irrua Benin Road 
Esan South-
East 
1 Iruekpen Road 
Esan West 20 Benin-Auchi Road 
Etsako East 19 Benin-Auchi Road 
Etsako West 24 Ekpoma Road 
Iguegben 4 Benin-Auchi Road 
Ikpoba-Okha 23 Benin-Oluku By-Pass 
Oredo 419 Benin-Ore-Lagos Road 
Orhionmwon 33 
Benin-Lagos Expressway; Benin–Auchi Road; Benin-
Asaba Road 
Ovia North-
East 176 Benin-Ore Road 
Ovia South-
West 286 Benin-Lagos Expressway 
Owan-East 5 Ora-Ihievbe-Warrake Road 
Uhunmwonde 50 Benin-Asaba Expressway 
TOTAL 1,129  
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Oredo LGA recorded 419 deaths from 83 crashes; Ovia South-West had 286 
deaths from 20 crashes; and Ovia North-East had 176 deaths from 24 crashes. 
Benin-Ore Expressway remains the most dangerous route in the state. In April 
2013, for instance, an accident that involved a cement-laden Dangote trailer, a 
tanker, and a luxury bus along the route led to the death of 60 persons.45 The bus, 
after bursting a tyre, rammed into the trailer, which in turn rammed into the tank-
er, and the 60 victims were burnt beyond recognition within minutes. Approxi-
mately ten motorcycles, 16 vehicles, and 15 shops by the roadside were also de-
stroyed by the fire. 
Another dangerous route in Edo State is the Benin-Auchi-Okene Highway. 
This route connects the state with Kogi and serves as a major route for persons 
travelling to the South West. The traffic volume on the road makes it the second-
most dangerous route within the period under study. In 2009, for instance, an 18-
seater bus collided with an oncoming trailer along the highway and killed 15 
people.46 However, the recent reconstruction of some roads in the state by the 
Federal Government is expected to be a form of palliative measure to reduce the 
incidence of fatal car accidents in the state. 
 
FCT (Abuja) 
Table 1.6 shows the distribution of fatal road accidents in FCT. FCT recorded the 
third-highest death toll, with 1,046 lives in 348 fatal road accidents between June 
2006 and May 2014, most of which occurred along the Abuja-Kubwa and Abuja-
Lokoja routes and within the urban settlements.47 Abuja Municipal recorded the 
highest number of fatal car accidents in the period under review, with 344 deaths, 
followed by Kwali with 248 deaths and Abaji with 212. While road accidents are 
widely distributed in FCT (Abuja), the municipal area accounted for 34% of the 
total road accident fatalities in the state, followed by Kwali (23%), Abaji (21%), 
and Gwagwalada (18%). Roads in Kuje were very peaceful, with just one death 
in one incident within the period under study.  
Reasons for the high rate of fatal accidents in FCT (Abuja) can be narrowed 
down to the good state of roads and the number of registered cars in Abuja. The 
Abuja-Kubwa-Zuba route, awarded for construction in 2012 by the Federal Gov-
ernment of Nigeria, is the best and widest in the country, with ten lanes. Motor-
ists, however, are ignorant of the dangers associated with smooth roads and have 
little consideration for safety measures. There is so much confidence among road 
users that the slightest brush leads to altercations and tailgating. Secondly, there 
                                                 
45  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=11124&rang=1 
46  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=5153&rang=1 
47  The breakdown of Table 1.6. gives a lower number of fatalities (1,026) because the figures reported 
for some accidents were rounded up. 
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has been a large increase in the number of vehicles plying the roads in the city, 
with consequent traffic chaos. Understandably, this led to a ban on the use of 
mini-buses for commercial purposes and the restriction of motorcycles and tricy-
cles to the outskirts of the city.48 
 
 
Table 1.6 Summary of fatal car accidents in FCT (Abuja), by LGA and route  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
LGAs  No. of deaths Most dangerous routes 
Abaji 212 Abuja-Lokoja Highway 
Abuja Municipal 344 Abuja-Kubwa-Zuba, Airport Road; Abuja-Nyanya-Keffi 
Bwari 39 Abuja-Zuba Expressway 
Gwagwalada 182 Abuja-Lugbe-Gwagwalada Road; Abuja–Lokoja Highway 
Kuje 1 Kuje Expressway 
Kwali 248 Abuja-Lokoja Highway (Yangoji) 
   
Total 1,026  
Analysis of fatal road accidents in Nigeria  
by region and geo-political zone 
Nigeria is broadly divided into North and South. The North is comprised of Kogi, 
Niger, Benue, Kwara, Plateau, Nassarawa, FCT, Taraba, Borno, Bauchi, Ada-
mawa, Gombe,Yobe, Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Jigawa, and Kat-
sina states. The South comprises Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Abia, Anambra, Akwa 
Ibom, Bayelsa, Edo, Cross River, Rivers, and Delta states. Others are Oyo, Ogun, 
Lagos, Ondo, and Osun states. 
Based on the 2006 census, the nation’s population is 140 million. Kano is the 
most populated state in the North, with 9,383,682 inhabitants, while FCT (Abuja) 
has the lowest population, with 1,405,201. The population of southern Nigeria is 
dominated by Lagos (9,031,534), while Bayelsa is the least populated state, with 
1,703,358. 
Results in Figure 1.6 show that 8,288 (55%) of people who died in fatal road 
accidents were in the South and 6,792 (45%) were in the North.49 In the South, 
many people died on the Lagos-Ibadan, Benin-Ore, and Enugu-Port Harcourt 
expressways prior to recent renovations. In the North, FCT (Abuja) has one of 
the best road networks in the country. Yet good roads also entail over-speeding 
and a high risk of fatal accidents. The number of registered vehicles also deter-
mines the frequency of fatal road accidents. According to the NBS, in 2007 a 
                                                 
48  http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/city-news/30374-abuja-a-city-of-good-roads-several-accidents 
49  The figures reported for some accidents were rounded up. 
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total of 387,338 (76%) of all vehicles were registered in the South and 122,804 
(24%) in the North (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.6 Number of violent deaths in Nigeria caused by road accidents, by region 
(June 2006-May 2014)
Figure 1.7  Number of motor vehicles registered in Nigeria (2007)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2009); Annual Abstract of Statistics (2009)
Oil distribution by tankers is also an important factor in the incidence of road 
accidents in the South. Tankers are usually rocked by fire explosions when they 
crash on the roads. Several commuters have lost their lives in such incidents, es-
North45%South55%
Regional fatal accident statistics
North122,804(24%)
South387,338(76%)
Registered vehicles
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pecially along the Lagos-Sagamu-Ibadan Expressway, the East-West Road in 
Rivers State, and the Benin-Ore route in Edo. The failure of the government to 
renovate the railway system has led to increased pressure on oil distribution 
companies to use road transportation. 
Furthermore, rampant criminal activities on the expressways have caused sev-
eral fatal road accidents in the South. The South is home to different networks of 
criminal gangs, and motorists are both robbed and forced to lie on the tarred 
roads, only to be crushed by oncoming vehicles. In some cases, they are chased 
into fatal accidents. On 1 August 2008, 30 Igbo traders were robbed in Ijebu Ode 
along the Benin-Ore Expressway. They were forced to lie face down on the road 
and eventually were crushed to death by an oncoming trailer.50 Similarly, 32 bus 
passengers were victims of a robbery, during which they were forced to lie on the 
road and were crushed to death by an oncoming luxury bus.51 Such fundamental 
and structural issues in the South have always made the North a safer area with 
respect to the number of fatal car accidents in Nigeria. 
When death figures from road accidents in the six geo-political zones of Nige-
ria are compared, South-West recorded the greatest number of deaths (4,239) and 
was followed by North Central (3,242). This result is unsurprising given the im-
mense contribution of Lagos and Oyo states (South West) and FCT (Abuja) and 
Kogi states (North Central) to fatal road accidents. 
Population, rural-urban migration and fatal  
road accidents in Nigeria 
Urbanization has taken a huge toll on the population in Nigeria in terms of fatal 
road accidents. The nation is one of the countries in the developing world with a 
high rate of rural-urban migration and fast-growing cities. Although growth is a 
global phenomenon, 90% of growth in urban population worldwide occurs in 
developing countries and places intense pressure on urban infrastructure, particu-
larly transportation.52 In this context, very large metropolitan areas like Lagos, 
Kano, Ibadan, Kaduna, and Port Harcourt face congestion problems that often 
occur when traffic pressure is increased in the transport systems. A high number 
of accidents happen owing to the general impatience and ill-tempered nature of 
road users and to conflicts between pedestrians and those using other means of 
road transport in the cities.53 
 
                                                 
50  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=5121&rang=4 
51  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=8168&rang=10 
52  Rodrigure, J. (2009), The Geography of Transport Systems, 2nd edition. New York: Routledge. 
53  Ogunsanya, A.A. (1993), Directions in Urban Transport Studies in Nigeria. In: Ikya, S.G., ed.,. Urban 
Passenger Transportation in Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books (Nig.) Plc. 
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Table 1.7 Population of main cities and number of deaths caused  
 by road accidents (June 2006-May 2014) 
City City population 
No. of deaths caused by road 
accidents 
Lagos  8,029,200 1,579 
Kano 3,248,700 373 
Ibadan 3,078,400 718 
Kaduna 1,458,900 446 
Port Harcourt 1,053,900 476 
Source: National Population Commission, 2006; Nigeria Watch, 2006-2014 
 
 
Lagos, the most populous city in Nigeria, is the second-fastest-growing city in 
Africa and the seventh in the world.54 Rural-urban migration, immigration, un-
employment, inadequate social amenities, and the lack of urban planning explain 
infrastructural decay, including the poor road transportation system, and account 
for the 1,579 road accident deaths between June 2006 and May 2014. By con-
trast, Kano is much less affected by such accidents because its inhabitants are 
relatively poor and there are fewer cars on the road (Table 1.7). 
In order of importance, Ibadan, capital city of Oyo State, is the third-largest 
metropolitan area in Nigeria, after Lagos and Kano. It recorded the second-
highest number of car accident deaths (718) within the period under study. Iba-
dan, mostly seen as the centre of administration of the old Western Region, con-
sistently witnesses massive rural-urban migration from neighbouring communi-
ties. The state has a network of dual-carriageway roads, including the Ojoo-
Sango-Mokola Road, the Ring Road-Orita-Challenge-New Garage route, and the 
recently completed Dugbe-Eleyele-erico Road. Most of the accident deaths that 
occurred within the city were on these roads. 
Port Harcourt, another major city in Nigeria, recorded 476 road accidents fa-
talities between June 2006 and May 2014. The city is an epicentre of the oil-
related activities of a large number of multi-national and local firms. Hence, oil 
distribution has been a major threat to the city, when one considers the effects of 
tanker accidents, explosions, and fire outbreaks. Aside from oil-related activities, 
Port Harcourt is known for its bustling night activity and entertainment industry. 
Late-night driving, under-age driving, and drunk driving are factors that have all 
contributed to the number of fatal road accidents in the state. Finally, the volume 
of trade within the city due to its proximity to Aba, the commercial centre of 
Abia State, increases the volume of traffic pressure from traders flocking in and 
out of the state. This high traffic volume often causes fatal road accidents. 
                                                 
54  World’s Fastest Growing Cities and Urban Areas from 2006 to 2020, by CityMayors.com 
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Conclusion 
This study has examined the trends in road accidents in Nigeria between June 
2006 and May 2014. After studying the causes of violent deaths in Nigeria from 
an overall point of view, fatal road accident was discovered to be the main cause 
of violent fatalities, apart from the Boko Haram insurgency. Different contexts 
precipitate fatal car accidents in Nigeria. Understanding these political and socio-
economic contexts provides a better insight into why road accident has remained 
a leading cause of death in the country. The distribution of fatal car accidents 
among the 36 states and the FCT shows that Lagos State recorded the highest 
number of fatal car accidents, but is less dangerous in terms of the calculated se-
verity index. Abuja is more dangerous when compared with its relative number 
of inhabitants. Results further showed that regional variations exist in the fatality 
rates from road accidents, with more deaths occurring in the South than in the 
North. The results also established that state and city population estimates, num-
ber of registered vehicles, and trade volume are among the variables that deter-
mine the fatality rate of road accidents in Nigeria. Finally, it appears that road 
maintenance remains an issue because criminal gangs take advantage of bad 
spots on the highways to rob travellers, causing fatal car accidents in the process. 
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Abstract 
Most studies on oil-related violence in Nigeria have unwittingly concentrated 
research efforts on oil production in the Niger Delta region. An attempt is made 
in this paper to demonstrate that oil distribution contributes more to fatality in 
Nigeria than oil production. Using the Nigeria Watch database as the primary 
source of data, the paper asserts that although the aggregate death figures at-
tributed to the oil sector are lower than cases like road accidents, crime, and 
politically-cum-religiously motivated killings, the number of violent deaths 
recorded between June 2006 and May 2014 in relation to oil distribution is tri-
ple the number related to oil production. While oil distribution accounted for 
4,575 deaths, oil production events led to 1,550 deaths; therefore, oil distribu-
tion has a far more lethal impact on the country than oil distribution. Apart 
from Kebbi and Zamfara, all the states of the Nigerian Federation have wit-
nessed at least one fatal incidence from oil distribution, whereas oil production 
cases occur mainly in Anambra, Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, and Imo. 
The reasons are not difficult to understand: oil production is restricted to a few 
states in the Niger Delta area, while oil distribution activities cover the whole 
nation. Moreover, oil production deals essentially with crude oil, which is less 
flammable than the highly inflammable refined products involved in oil distri-
bution. In addition, oil distribution has a strong link with road accidents, which 
are rated as one of the main contributors to fatalities in Nigeria. In the final 
analysis, to understand the pattern and dynamics of fatalities in the oil sector, 
more research efforts need to be devoted to oil distribution. 
Introduction 
On 26 December 2006, a pipeline explosion at Abule-Egba in Agege LGA in 
Lagos claimed the lives of more than 600 persons. In a related development, a 
series of deadly clashes between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and militants in War-
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ri South and Warri South West LGAs in Delta State on 13 May 2009 culminated 
in the deaths of some 593 victims. Such volatile outcomes and lethal conse-
quences are usually associated with oil-related violence in Nigeria. Although oil 
violence may not be the major cause of fatal incidents in the country, its occur-
rences, especially those that have to do with oil distribution, have continued to 
trigger violence of frightening proportions at various levels. Perhaps one im-
portant question to ask is why such an important sector is associated with fatal 
incidents of such magnitude? One reason is that Nigeria’s economy relies heavily 
on crude oil, and hence it is only to be expected that commercial activities around 
oil become intense and highly competitive. In fact, most international businesses 
in the country are driven by the oil factor. The nation’s oil has attracted a con-
tested platform of intense power plays by forces within and without the state 
frontiers. According to Obi (2005: 187): 
Oil as a source of power and wealth is central to Nigeria’s federalism. It exerts a lot of in-
fluence by defining the object of power and by its dialectically being a source of wealth, pov-
erty, unity, intense competition, and conflict. This manifests at the levels of oil production 
and distribution. 
A second reason is found in the ‘oil curse’ thesis, which has been sufficiently 
appraised in the literature and still continues in a primitive economy like Nige-
ria’s. The argument is that the rise in oil production and the inevitable oil boom 
have a tendency to precipitate socio-economic instability-and ultimately violence 
(Ikelegbe 2005). However, this amounts to an over-simplification of the problem, 
and it is necessary to probe beyond the oil curse theory and investigate the role of 
oil production and distribution in the complex matrix that makes violent incidents 
frequent.1 It is even more imperative considering the policy summersaults that 
the sector has witnessed in recent times. For instance, the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB), which seeks to achieve a robust and comprehensive reform in the dwin-
dling oil sector, has reached an advanced stage. The matter therefore calls for a 
deeper analysis of the issues to enable policy options at a scientific level to be 
potent enough to remedy the degenerating situation. 
In retrospect, the oil industry has been a magnet for major stakeholders with 
various political and economic interests across the country. Although issues of 
politics, ethnicity, and religion are known to be volatile in Nigeria, oil-related 
violence also impacts significantly on the social environment. Previous analyses 
of oil conflicts in Nigeria have unduly concentrated research efforts on oil pro-
duction within the locale of the Niger Delta (Ikporukpo 2002; Obi 2005; Ogbog-
bo 2005; Guichaoua 2009; Akpabio & Akpan 2010). But as the main findings of 
this paper will suggest, the frequent movement of oil products to different parts 
                                                 
1  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014), Oil Curse, State Instability, and Violence in Developing Coun-
tries: Theoretical Lessons for Nigeria, Ibadan, IFRA-Nigeria, epaper no. 33, 37 pp. 
501890-L-bw-ASC
43 
 
of Nigeria on the country’s dilapidated roads makes large numbers of fatalities 
likely. Fatalities associated with oil production are largely limited not only in 
terms of their concentration in the core oil-producing states in the Niger Delta 
(with a few cases in Kogi because of a border dispute with Anambra), but also in 
that we are dealing with a non-flammable product: crude oil. The inflammable 
nature of refined oil, on the other hand, and the poorly maintained tankers that 
often convey these products predispose oil distribution to causing large-scale vio-
lent fatalities.  
The intention of this paper is to dissect the gamut of activities that account for 
the contours of violent incidents within the oil sector from 2006 to 2014, with a 
focus on oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria. The data for the paper is 
extracted from the Nigeria Watch database. The patterns of violent events that 
relate to oil distribution and production nationwide are illustrated with the aid of 
charts and maps to show important trends. In order to advance the central themes 
of this paper, two probing questions are instructive: Why is oil distribution more 
fatal than oil production in Nigeria? Why do stakeholders-authorities, NGOs, 
scholars, and security professionals-concentrate more on issues that involve oil 
production? 
This paper has been carefully structured to provide adequate responses to 
these pertinent questions. This first section introduces the paper by presenting the 
general outline of the discussion. The next section takes a critical look at the po-
litical, economic, and social contexts of oil distribution and production, exploring 
their historical evolution since 1956 and their transformation after 2009. The 
third section discusses the methodological approach of the research and further 
addresses some specific issues that concern oil production and distribution. The 
fourth section presents the key findings, and the paper ends with a Conclusion. 
Political, economic and social context  
of oil distribution and production in Nigeria 
It is important to situate the subject of this paper within the political, social, and 
economic milieu of oil production and distribution in Nigeria. To achieve this, 
this section of the paper is divided into two sub-sections. The first attempts to 
explore the historical background to the oil industry in Nigeria. Here, the evolu-
tionary trends since the colonial period, especially from 1956 when oil was first 
discovered in Olobiri, through the military era, when the major infrastructure of 
oil was established, are briefly discussed. The second sub-section covers issues 
that emerged in post-2009 oil governance in Nigeria. 
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Historical background since 1956 
Before Nigeria assumed its current ‘petrostate’ status, it had always operated as a 
purely agrarian economy. The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 led British co-
lonial policy in West Africa to switch from trade in humans to appropriating ter-
ritories for mass production of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, and pea-
nuts. In the Niger Delta region, which was then home to the Bonny, Brass, Kala-
bari, Itsekiri, and Aboh people, it was the booming oil palm business that attract-
ed the colonialists to the area (Falola 2009). By 1886, the Royal Niger Company 
had successfully secured a charter from the British government to formally ad-
minister the area as a protectorate (the Oil Rivers Protectorate) of the British 
Crown. This charter empowered the company to govern and administer justice in 
the region in the manner it deemed fit, and it did not hesitate to use this machin-
ery to consolidate its stronghold for maximum economic gains. These activities 
later ushered in a full-scale colonial government, which effectively imposed Brit-
ish foreign rule on the conquered territories in 1901. As the clamour for inde-
pendence increased in the 20th century, a unique dimension to the political econ-
omy of the colonial state emerged when crude oil was discovered in Olobiri by 
Shell-BP in 1956. 
The first oil export was achieved in 1958, spurring the nation’s economy to 
grow at a tremendous rate. By the early 1970s, revenue accruing from oil had 
become the main source of state income. The consequence was that the previous 
gains recorded in the agrarian sector suffered a serious setback, as attention was 
shifted principally to oil exploitation. According to Obi (2005), the discovery of 
crude oil in commercial quantities in Oloibiri in 1956 played an important role in 
the country’s leap from a cash-crop-based to an oil-based economy. In the 1970s, 
the nation invested heavily in oil infrastructure through the construction of refin-
eries, storage depots, and pipelines. Subsequently, refineries were built in Port 
Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna, while storage depots were installed in Aba, Enugu, 
Ore, Yola, Satellite Town (Lagos), Makurdi, Ilorin, Suleja, Kano, Gombe, 
Gusau, Minna, Jos, and Mosimi to facilitate the processes of oil distribution (Eke 
& Enibe 2007). 
The tasks of oil production and distribution lie with both public and private 
business efforts. While the public agencies are represented by the Nigeria Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its two subsidiaries, the Department 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Au-
thority (PPPRA), private investors include those referred to as Independent Mar-
keters (IMs) and Major Oil Marketers (MOMs). The MOMs dominate the market 
and include Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc, Total Plc, MRS Nigeria Plc, Conoil Plc, Afri-
can Petroleum Plc, and Oando Nigeria Plc. In fact, the concept of independent 
marketing appeared first in the lexicon of the oil industry in 1978 when there was 
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a need to bring indigenous investors into the framework of the oil business. Ac-
cording to Edoreh (cited in Ehinimen & Adeleke 2012), there were over 1,000 
registered IMs in 1979, and by 2010 there were about 7,948 IMs operating in 
various locations across the country. The MOMs have also successfully estab-
lished more than 2,218 outlets in various locations around the country. Despite 
this marked difference, however, the MOMs still manage to control well over 
60% of the market.
Figure 2.1 Physical flow of products: Retail route used by Major and Independent Marketers 
in Nigeria
Courtesy of NNPC/PPMC Bulletin (cited in Ehinomen & Adeleke 2012)
The distribution of petroleum products, which is the movement of refined pe-
troleum from refineries to the final users across the country, is a crucial and at the 
same time a complex component of the production process (Figure 2.1). Accord-
ing to Nothingham (2004), the distribution component of the petroleum value 
chain holds the most promise for domestic initiatives. The Pipeline and Product 
Marketing Company (PPMC) is tasked with wholesale supply, distribution, and 
marketing of petroleum products in Nigeria. There is a complex network of over 
4,000 km of pipelines connected to more than 21 oil depots across the country. 
There are also more than 20 marine tankers used to ferry heavy products from 
coastal refineries in Warri and Port Harcourt to places like Lagos, where there is 
a high demand. The situation has worsened in light of the fact that most of the 
pipelines suffer from leaks owing to lack of maintenance and, of course, the ac-
Major and Independent Marketing Companies’ 
Retail Outlets (Filling Stations)
Final Consumers of Petroleum 
Products in Nigeria
NNPC Refineries Imported Products
Major Oil Marketers’ Depots
& 
PPMC Depots
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tivities of vandals and thieves. This has left marketers with no other option but to 
resort to the use of tankers and trailers to transport the products. These practices 
have spelled doom for the booming sector. 
Although the arrival of the oil economy significantly increased the revenue 
base of the state, it did not translate into a good life for the majority of the popu-
lation. Citing Sala-i-Martin and Subranain’s analysis of the inherent paradox of 
the oil wealth, Guichaoua (2009: 18) wrote: 
In Nigeria, the GDP per capita in 2000 was roughly the same as in 1970. But the proportion 
of the population living on less than a dollar a day went from 36% to 70% over the same pe-
riod. However, between 1965 and 2000, per capital oil revenue increased from $33 to $325. 
At the same time, income inequalities exploded. In 1970, the top 2% of income earners made 
as much as the bottom 17%; in 2000, the income of this top 2% was equivalent to the income 
of the bottom 55% combined. 
According to Obi (2005), two main factors explain this unfortunate develop-
ment. First, the partnership between the Nigerian state (through the NNPC) and 
oil multinationals is such that oil production in Nigeria since the 1970s is marred 
by distrust and high-level technical irregularities on the part of the oil companies. 
As the multinationals are solely responsible for the oil production processes, the 
actual volume of production has always been shrouded in secrecy. The Federal 
Government is basically a collector of oil rents but lacks the technical know-how 
to monitor and supervise oil production. Hence, the government merely relies on 
transnational corporations to determine the revenue accruing from oil production. 
This arrangement gives ample space for the government to be short-changed in 
this closed system of operation. Secondly, the distribution of oil wealth under the 
control of the ruling elites has further exacerbated the problem. Violent crises 
have erupted in many parts of the Niger Delta as a result of the sheer misman-
agement and misallocation of oil proceeds. This argument is often situated within 
the oil curse discourse, which considers the discovery of petroleum to be associ-
ated with violence, corruption, abject poverty, and under-development 
(Ikpurukpo 2002). 
The period of the oil boom also coincided with the militarization of politics. 
By virtue of their centralized command system, the various military regimes ap-
propriated the resources of regions/states, including the oil in the Niger Delta, to 
strengthen their grip on political power and to perpetuate their anti-populist 
agendas. Consequently, the derivation principle2 suffered a severe setback as pa-
rochial greed assumed centre stage in government affairs. Emphases for the shar-
ing of national resources were placed on equitable development, special needs, 
                                                 
2  ‘Derivation’ is the notion of allocating a certain percentage of revenue amassed from oil and gas to the 
resource-producing states or region. It was ingrained in Nigeria’s federal system prior to independence 
in 1960. However, the derivation formula had dropped from an initial 50% to as low as 1% in 1990s, 
as a result of military autocracy. It is currently a 13% share of oil proceeds. Derivation also featured as 
the most controversial issue in both the 2005 and the 2014 constitutional conferences in Nigeria.  
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and the population (Oputa Panel Report, cited in Ojakorotu & Olawale 2009). 
Hence, the Niger Delta region became an arena of dangerous protests against the 
perceived marginalization arising from the imperfections of the nation’s federal 
arrangement. This phenomenon has been described as ‘the minority question’ in 
Nigeria (Osaghae 1995). The painful effects of the military’s imposed economic 
policies, the most famous of which was the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) 
that held sway in the 1980s, further ignited civil unrest among minorities and an 
array of civil society groups. Since the character of the military is to by-pass con-
stitutional solutions and subvert the supremacy of the general will, it resorted to 
extra-judicial and violent means to press home legitimate demands by minority 
groups across the country (Osaghae 1998). The problem of oil exploration in the 
Niger Delta can also be understood in this context. Again, in Osaghae’s (ibid. 13) 
opinion: 
The militant character of the Ogoni uprising, the high proportion of officers from minority, 
especially Middle-Belt, groups in military coups, the resort to rioting rather than the court of 
law by many minorities in the north, and the increasing use of sabotage of strategic oil in-
stallations by aggrieved minorities of the oil areas, are to be explained in this light. 
For Pérouse de Montclos (2012: 536): 
[...] the struggle for regional control of oil resources is certainly political, as the militants 
advocate the so-called derivation principle and oppose the federal character of the Nigerian 
Republic, whereby richer states (in the South) are supposed to fund the poorer (in the Mus-
lim North). 
These protests, which usually played out on different platforms, including 
counter-military coups, led the military government to adopt two strategies to 
deal with the problem. First, there were some adjustments in government policies 
to soothe the aggrieved. For instance, the failed coup of Major Gideon Orkar in 
1990 led not only to an increase in the derivation allocation to the oil-producing 
states from 1.5% to 3.0%; it also led to the establishment of the (now defunct) 
Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 
in order to ensure that the resources allocated to the areas were properly managed 
(Osaghae 1998). Secondly, the military government usually responded through 
state repression, which is germane to most dictatorial regimes in the world. This 
was the case in 1995, when renowned environmental crusader Ken Saro Wiwa 
and eight other Ogoni activists were extra-judicially murdered by hanging. 
 
Pre- and post-2009 scenarios 
The attainment of democracy on 29 May 1999 after protracted military rule did 
not appease the violent protests that had enveloped the Niger Delta region. Per-
haps the freedom of expression that democracy offers was taken to the extreme 
when armed groups began to mobilize and challenge the very foundations of the 
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Nigerian state. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), founded by 
Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo, and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), created by 
Ateke Tom, led more than 100 other smaller armed groups to violently engage 
the Federal Government and multi-national oil companies in a ‘war of attrition’. 
Asari’s NDPVF launched a series of attacks on oil wells and installations, dis-
rupting oil production. The militant groups also attempted to control oil resources 
through oil bunkering, an exercise that involves tapping pipelines. 
By September 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria under President 
Olusegun Obasanjo had declared a full-scale war on the militants. The crisis 
worsened and Shell had to withdraw its personnel from two oil fields, causing oil 
production to be cut by 30,000 barrels a day. The crackdown on militants contin-
ued until 2008. The Joint Military Task Force combed the area and raided 
hideouts of militants in the creeks. In 2005-2006, the involvement of the most 
sophisticated armed group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Del-
ta (MEND), also contributed significantly to reducing oil output. MEND’s activi-
ties in the region extended to kidnapping for ransom and sea piracy. In other in-
stances, it became part of the political machinery for dealing with local opposi-
tion in the 2011 elections (Pérouse de Montclos 2012). These unwholesome ac-
tivities have caused thousands of residents to flee their homes and hundreds of 
people to lose their lives. In June 2009, the Federal Government declared its in-
tention to grant an amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants as a way of 
restoring peace to the volatile region. The late Head of State, President Musa 
Yar’Adua, signed the amnesty programme, which officially began in October 
2009. Before then, militants were given a 60-day period to surrender their weap-
ons in exchange for training and rehabilitation. 
Methodological issues  
Coming to terms with a statistical analysis of fatal deaths within the province of 
oil production and distribution requires that I clarify two important methodologi-
cal issues. This is because the study of violence remains one of the most complex 
and contested areas of research. The domain of violence was, for instance, ex-
tended by Galtung (1969) to include ‘structural violence’, that is, physical or 
psychological injuries that may arise from unjust social and political relations. 
Hence, one of the methodological questions that this research raises is how to 
measure the intensity of violence without having to overstate the problem. The 
second pertinent question relates to how the data sources can be representative 
enough without violating the credibility of the research findings. First, it is al-
most impossible to exhaustively measure the weight of violence that attends cas-
es of oil production and distribution in Nigeria, especially as this involves gener-
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ating consistent numerical data that will stand the test of time. What seems 
achievable under such conditions is to streamline the focus of the research to the 
numbers of deaths. Focusing on the body count helps to identify violent incidents 
that record at least one death. On the second issue, the research examined only 
open sources, which the Nigeria Watch database has so far provided generously 
with regards to its online data on fatalities in Nigeria. The police are grossly inef-
fective in the collation of reliable data for the purposes of accuracy and record 
keeping. The Nigeria Watch database is primarily based in a consistent manner 
on print media reports on violent incidents. It also cross-checks from other 
sources such as the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), human rights or-
ganizations, and other credible sources to provide a clear picture of events. The 
preferred media reports have been carefully selected to give the process a nation-
al spread. Although the database is limited in terms of coverage, it remains a po-
tent tool for trend analysis of events. Moreover, print media is the only credible 
open source that is consistent and accessible to the public. For all its shortcom-
ings, the Nigeria Watch database is able to highlight and underscore valid as-
sumptions about the violence associated with oil production and oil distribution 
in Nigeria. 
Key findings 
Major causes of violent deaths in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
Figure 1.2 summarizes the overall picture of fatalities within the period of this 
research (June 2006 to May 2014). It shows that crime, car accidents, religious 
clashes, political violence, fire explosions, and oil distribution are the main driv-
ers of fatalities in Nigeria. At present, the spotlight is on the Boko Haram insur-
gency as a cause of major violence in the country, and this violence is largely 
interpreted in the database as political and religious. In other words, oil distribu-
tion and production are not the main causes of violence. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to compare the figures in oil production with oil distribution. With 4,575 
deaths, oil distribution accounted for the sixth-highest number of violent cases in 
Nigeria. Oil production, which recorded 1,550 deaths, accounted for the tenth-
highest number. The combination of the two figures accounts for some 6,125 
deaths. 
 
Fatalities caused by oil distribution (June 2006-May 2014) 
Figure 2.2 shows there has been a downward trend in annual violent deaths in oil 
distribution, except in the years 2009 and 2012. In fact, 2009 had an exceptional-
ly high number of fatalities, with a staggering casualty figure of 1,089. The major 
event here was an outbreak of violence in Warri South and Warri South West 
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LGAs, where a fatal clash between soldiers and militants over illegal refineries 
and oil bunkering led to the loss of 593 lives. The fatality record of 957 in 2006 
was also extraordinarily high, bearing in mind that the figure covers just seven 
months (June-December). Road accidents and pipeline vandalism formed the 
main drivers of oil violent deaths in 2006. But it is important to note that the gen-
eral trend since 2006 has been one of decrease, aside from the aforementioned 
years (2009 and 2012). As a matter of fact, 2014 presented the lowest number of 
violent deaths (23), even though it must be admitted that the figure represents 
just the first five months of the year. One cannot readily offer a cogent explana-
tion for the marked variations in the fatality profile of the eight-year study, but 
what seems convincing is the fact that violent events are products of increasingly 
intense activities (both legal and illegal) around oil. A further study of the data-
base found that 2008 witnessed 122 fatal incidences, most of which revolved 
around the activities of the JTF. There were 40 deadly incidents in 2006, despite 
its only seven-month coverage. The years 2013 and 2014 witnessed 25 and five 
incidents, respectively. The case of 2014, with just five incidents, is partially un-
derstandable in that it covers just five months (January-May). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Annual number of deaths caused by oil distribution (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows that 34 states in Nigeria, including FCT (Abuja), have wit-
nessed fatalities in oil distribution. With the exception of Kebbi and Zamfara 
states, every state across the country has recorded at least one event of violence 
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due to oil distribution. Again, of the total number of 4,575 deaths attributed to oil 
distribution, over 1,200 cases were recorded in Lagos State alone, followed by 
Delta State with approximately 850 fatalities. Other high-risk states for violent 
death from oil distribution include Rivers, Edo, Oyo, Ogun, and Bayelsa. There 
are two fundamental issues that could explain this trend. First, states that have a 
high demand for PMS are most prone to fatalities. The level of demand for petro-
leum products can at times be determined by the population density and the level 
of industrial activities in the states. Lagos and Delta, for instance, fit perfectly 
into this context. Lagos sea-terminals provide the routes through which oil prod-
ucts and other heavy goods are imported into the country, to service the South 
West and some northern states. Hence, heavy traffic of trailers and light vehicular 
movements are common features on Lagos roads. The second point to make is 
the obvious fact that oil distribution activities are more fatal outside the states of 
oil production. For instance, the total death figure for oil production observable 
within the oil production areas is considerably less than 2,000, whereas 4,575 
fatal deaths occurred in the country as a whole as a result of oil distribution. The 
frequency of fatal events in oil distribution between June 2006 and May 2014 
also shows the high-risk states to be Bayelsa (99), Lagos (79), Delta (56), and 
Rivers (51). Oil spillage and the activities of the JTF are largely responsible for 
the frequency of violence in Bayelsa State. In Delta, road accidents that involved 
petrol tankers, kerosene explosion, pipeline vandalism, and piracy were major 
causes of fatal incidents. In Lagos, tanker explosions, road accidents, robberies at 
fuel stations, oil theft, and pipeline vandalism loomed large. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Deaths due to oil distribution, by state (June 2006-May 2014) 
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Map 2.1 shows that the incidents related to oil distribution cover virtually all 
parts of country, with Lagos and Delta representing the areas of highest casual-
ties. The Map also shows that only two states (Kebbi and Zamfara in the North-
West) did not have records of fatalities arising from oil distribution. 
 
 
Map 2.1 Fatalities resulting from oil distribution in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
When the cases per 100,000 inhabitants are mapped, Map 2.2 shows Delta as 
the most violent state, followed by Lagos and Rivers states. Normally, the abso-
lute figures concentrate on Lagos State as the most fatal in terms of frequency 
and intensity of the problem. However, the risk assessment analysis shows Delta 
as the most dangerous state for oil distribution because it has the highest relative 
violent death figures. 
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Map 2.2 Fatality rates resulting from oil distribution in Nigeria, per 100,000 inhabitants  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Fatalities caused by oil production (June 2006-May 2014) 
Between 2006 and 2014, oil production activities precipitated some marked inci-
dences of violence, mainly and quite obviously in the zones of extraction. As 
shown in Figure 2.4, there was a steady increase in the number of violent deaths 
recorded between 2006 and 2009, after which there was a sharp drop from 722 to 
70 deaths. The trend picked up again from 2012 to 2013 but witnessed another 
sharp drop to only one death related to oil production in 2014. Generally, oil pro-
duction has led to far fewer fatalities than oil distribution.  
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Figure 2.4 Violent deaths caused by oil production (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Since oil production activities take place mainly within the Niger Delta states, 
it is only logical that most of the violence is concentrated in this region. The oil-
rich states (Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Abia, Anambra, and 
Imo) present various degrees of fatalities arising from oil production activities 
(Figure 2.5). In terms of the frequency of incidents, Bayelsa was the most affect-
ed, with over 117 incidents recorded between June 2006 and May 2014, followed 
by Rivers and Delta states with 65 and 35 events, respectively. Some 14 deaths 
were observed in Kogi State due to frequent clashes over oil deposits at the bor-
der between Aguleri and Achewno communities in Anambra and Kogi states. 
However, it is possible that some of the violence documented in Anambra was 
also recorded in the cases that involved Kogi State. The aggregate death figure 
for oil production stands at 1,550. This is a far cry from the figure for oil distri-
bution, which accounted for 4,575 deaths in the same period. This is a clear indi-
cation that oil distribution activities are more deadly than those of oil production. 
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Figure 2.5 Number of deaths resulting from oil production, by state 
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
The data in Figure 2.5 can further be mapped to show the geographical con-
centration of oil production violence in Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Abia, Akwa 
Ibom, Imo, Anambra, and Cross River states (Map 2.3). Again, Delta State has 
the highest fatality profile in oil production, while Rivers, Bayelsa, Imo, Anam-
bra, Kogi, Cross River, and Abia states follow in that order. The issues that led to 
violence in those states also vary considerably. In Bayelsa, the issues revolve 
mainly around oil spillage and the clashes between the JTF and militants. JTF 
attacks and pipeline vandalism were also prevalent in Delta. Of particular note 
was a deadly encounter between the JTF and militants in May 2009, as noted ear-
lier, that claimed the lives of almost 600 people, including women and children. 
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Map 2.3 Fatalities resulting from oil production in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
The rate per 100,000 inhabitants of violent deaths related to oil production is 
shown in Map 2.4. From this analysis, Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers appear as the 
most dangerous states. This is not really surprising, considering the fact that they 
are the core oil-producing states of the Niger Delta. 
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Map 2.4 Fatality rates resulting from oil production in Nigeria, per 100,000 inhabitants  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Oil production versus oil distribution 
Perhaps the first point to make in this section is that oil causes fewer than 10% of 
the fatalities reported in violent incidents in Nigeria, much fewer than road acci-
dents, crime, and religious or political clashes. Figure 1.2 clearly illustrates this 
point by rating oil violence, that is, oil distribution and production combined, as 
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the sixth-highest cause of lethal violence in Nigeria. However, oil-related vio-
lence has been rather brutal in terms of intensity and national spread. An im-
portant fact is that oil distribution activities have a strong link with road acci-
dents. Most fatal accidents on the highways are indeed connected to the move-
ment of petroleum products to different parts of the country. The point was made 
earlier in this paper that the demand for PMS impacts on the number of violent 
deaths that are likely to occur in a particular location. Hence, locations such as 
Lagos, Delta, and Rivers states have always had high fatality cases because of the 
concentration of industries in these states.  
Secondly, from the analyses presented above, oil production and oil distribu-
tion differ with respect to their contribution to lethal violence across the country. 
Oil distribution is far more violent than oil production. This can be explained in a 
number of ways. In the first instance, the activities that involve oil distribution 
are nationwide, while oil production operations are restricted to the Niger Delta 
region, with a few cases in Kogi State because of its border problems with 
Anambra State. The impact of oil distribution on violence is therefore more 
widespread geographically. In fact, the only states that did not have incidents of 
oil distribution violence since 2006 are Kebbi and Zamfara (Figure 2.3). By con-
trast, oil production violence took place only in states such as Delta, Bayelsa, 
Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Anambra, Imo, and Kogi. 
Other factors that make oil distribution a more deadly operation than oil pro-
duction are worth mentioning. The point was previously made that oil distribu-
tion is closely tied to road accidents, which are one of the main causes of fatali-
ties in Nigeria. The dilapidated state of the roads, poor maintenance of tankers, 
and rampant reckless driving have made the movement of petroleum products to 
the various parts of the country dangerous undertakings. This point is germane 
considering the current comatose state of the Nigerian rail system and, of course, 
the fact that pipelines have become major targets for destruction by vandals and 
those creating oil bunkers. In addition, the poorly maintained status of most 
heavy vehicles (i.e. trailers being used to convey these products) makes oil dis-
tribution activities more prone to fatal incidents. Since petroleum products are 
highly inflammable, they easily cause lethal fire explosions whenever accidents 
involving petrol tankers occur. Taiwo (2013) listed mechanical, environmental, 
institutional, natural, and supernatural factors as responsible for road accidents 
on the highways (see also Bum 2012). All these variables come into play when-
ever petroleum products are distributed to different parts of the country. 
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Conclusion 
It is important to stress at this concluding stage that the multifarious violence that 
constantly besets the oil industry is not the main source of fatalities in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the oil industry is far from insignificant, and it also 
varies with respect to scope and intensity according to which aspect of the indus-
try we consider. One of the issues raised in this paper is the fact that oil distribu-
tion is considerably more deadly than oil production. The analyses also show that 
fatalities due to oil production are concentrated in the Niger Delta region, while 
those due to oil distribution are a nationwide affair. There is also a marked dis-
crepancy in both absolute and relative numbers of deaths for oil distribution and 
oil production. All these are pointers to the complex contribution of oil distribu-
tion to the violent incidences that frequently beset the oil industry. This paper 
advocates further empirical studies in order to gain more insights into the dynam-
ics of oil distribution and production in Nigeria. 
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Abstract 
Relying on the Nigeria Watch database data from June 2006 to May 2014, this 
study analyses the root causes, dynamics, evolution, and politicization of cattle 
grazing conflicts in Nigeria. After reviewing the historical, political, and socio-
economic contexts, it identifies the key actors in lethal rural violence from cat-
tle grazing to be herdsmen, farmers, community members, vigilantes, security 
operatives, government officials, and, in rare cases, religious leaders. The study 
also highlights the intensity and the time frame of such violence. No cycles 
were identified. The North Central region appears to be the hotbed of these 
conflicts, though the problem remains spread across different parts of the coun-
try and occurs at different times of the year. 
Introduction 
The recent classification of some Fulani herdsmen as Boko Haram collaborators 
by the Nigerian military and politicians (McGregor 2014) reveals the complexi-
ties of violent clashes between cattle breeders and sedentary agriculturalists 
across different parts of the country. The alleged involvement of camel pastoral-
ists from the Republic of Niger in some conflicts in the north-western and central 
regions of Nigeria also highlights the need to investigate the multidimensional 
causes and the politicization of a problem that spills over to neighbouring coun-
tries (Blench 2010; Krause 2011; Abbass 2012; Audu 2013; McGregor 2014). 
Blench (2010), for instance, analyses the relationship between herdsmen and 
farmers as an economic exchange of dairy products for grain, access to local 
markets, and the provision of manure on arable land while the cattle consume 
crop residues. However, he claims that religious and cultural factors, among oth-
                                                 
1  Thanks are owed to David Lamoureux and Conrentin Cohen for reading drafts of this paper. 
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ers, are key to peaceful relationships that became less cordial as the Fulani mi-
grated further south. This has led to several agitations in the past, notably by the 
Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), which advo-
cates for the social, political, economic, and cultural integration of Fulani in 
communities where they settle (Awogbade 1987). 
Climate changes, the migration further south, the growth of agro-pastoralism, 
the expansion of farming on pastures, the invasion of farmlands by cattle, assault 
on non-Fulani women by herders, blockage of stock routes and water points, 
freshwater scarcity, burning of rangelands, cattle theft, inadequate animal health 
care and disease control, overgrazing on fallow lands, defecation on streams and 
roads by cattle, extensive sedentarization, ineffective coping strategies, ethnic 
stereotyping, and the breakdown of conflict intervention mechanisms - these are 
usually identified by scholars as the root causes of such violence in rural areas 
(Folami 2009; Ofuoku & Isife 2009; Adekunle & Adisa 2010; Blench 2010; 
Odoh & Chigozie 2012; Solagberu 2012; Audu 2013, 2014; Bello 2013; 
McGregor 2014). In line with this, Abbass (2012) contends that the major source 
of tensions between pastoralists and farmers is basically economic, with land-
related issues accounting for the majority of the conflicts. This can then be situ-
ated within the broader context of the political economy of land struggle, tracea-
ble to a burgeoning demography in which there is fierce competition for fixed 
space to meet the demands of the growing population (Olabode & Ajibade 2010; 
Solagberu 2012). 
However, Blench (2010) has observed that ecological and economic determin-
ism may not capture the complexities embedded in the conflict contexts of these 
groups. Sellen (1996) also advocated for contextual analyses of ‘local socio-
ecological conditions’ and diversity of pastoral populations in accounting for 
their nutritional habits. Therefore, there is a need to overcome the socio-cultural 
stereotyping of the nomadic life and relate experiences to their contexts, while 
taking cognisance of the holistic functioning systems of local economies (Gefu & 
Gilles 1990). In more recent times, transhumant herdsmen coexist with agro-
pastoralists and farmers who have also taken to cattle breeding (Awogbade 
1987), and this has redefined their perceptions of and relationships with each 
other. Of these herdsmen, the Fulani are highly visible. Yet there are about 14 
other groups who practise pastoralist activities in Nigeria, including the Arabs, 
Kanuri, Kanembu, Shuwa, and Touareg (Braukamper 1996; Blench 2010). 
Within this context, it is pertinent that researchers engage the complexities of 
these relationships rather than jump to quick conclusions. From a methodological 
point of view, the problem is that violence from cattle rearing is not well report-
ed. In the past eight years, this violence accounted for 615 of the 61,314 fatalities 
recorded in the Nigeria Watch database. A major reason for this neglect may be 
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the location of the occurrence of incidents in rural and, sometimes, border areas 
that are neither easily accessible nor attractive to reporters. Journalists often pre-
fer to capture the ‘trendier’ news of insurgencies from Niger Delta militants or 
Boko Haram, which have taken the limelight and captured people’s interest. 
Moreover, stereotypes abound about the Fulani herdsmen, as issues related to 
their occupation are sensationally alluded to in political and religious contexts. 
However, this has in no way lessened the negative effects of fatalities from cattle 
grazing, as will be subsequently discussed in this study. Undoubtedly, the loss of 
human lives, land, animals, plants, and crops has many security, social, political, 
and economic implications, including an impact on livestock production in Nige-
ria (Folami 2009; Adekunle & Adisa 2010; Bello 2013). 
In this study, the focus will be on the Fulani because of the scope of their pas-
toral activities and their political visibility. The attacks by Fulani herdsmen have 
in recent years taken more sophisticated dimensions with the use of new types of 
weapons and communication devices. In consequence, the sedentary agrarian 
communities have resorted to self-defence through local vigilante groups (Ab-
bass 2012; McGregor 2014).2 This has further aggravated violence, with destruc-
tion of lives and properties. According to Fasona and Omojola in 2005, conflicts 
resulting from cattle grazing actually accounted for 35% of all reported crises 
between 1991 and 2005 in Nigeria (Adekunle & Adisa 2010). The North Central 
states of Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Benue have also been identified as the 
most affected areas in the country (McGregor 2014; Nigeria Watch Newsletter 
2014). 
Historical, political, and socio-economic context 
of pastoralist-farmer conflicts in Nigeria 
According to Azarya (1996), the Fulani pastoralists of West and Central Africa 
trace much of their current political, religious, and socio-cultural identity from 
the 18th and 19th century jihad, which sedentarized them within conquered com-
munities. The Fulani are said to originate from Senegambia, before spreading 
across some 20 states in West Africa and the Sahel, up to Western Sudan and the 
Central African Republic (Blench 1994; Shehu & Hassan 1995; Blench 2010; 
McGregor 2014). In Nigeria, they are the mainstay of the meat and milk industry, 
accounting for about 90% of cattle herd ownership, which makes up 3.2% of the 
country’s GDP (Abbass 2012; Koster & de Wolff 2012). They rear different spe-
cies of cattle, such as the Keteku, Muturu, and Kuri, but the Zebu is identified as 
                                                 
2  The adoption of vigilante groups is not specific only to Nigerians. Pastoralists in the north-western 
region of Cameroon also adopted this measure to check cattle theft (Manu et al. 2014). 
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the most common (Awogbade 1987; Iro 1994). They also supply skins, bones, 
and horns as complementary products. 
The pastoralist system involves young men who tend the herd, while the 
women cook and sell animal products in the markets.3 The elders, in their own 
stead, are in charge of developing and managing resources at the levels of the 
community and domestic units (Awogbade 1987; Iro 1994). Despite the devel-
opment and the centralization of the state dating back to the colonial era, these 
informal governing mechanisms have been key to understanding the challenges 
the pastoralists face with farmers, explaining their social stratification and their 
seemingly egalitarian nature (Dyson-Hudson 1990; Bradburd 1996; Okello et al. 
2014). 
From a historical point of view, certain scholars refer to the fact that conflicts 
resulting from cattle grazing have existed for as long as the practice of agricul-
ture (Blench 2010; Abbass 2012). In the Nigerian context, however, colonization, 
together with the fall of the Sokoto caliphate and the introduction of jangali (cat-
tle tax), marginalized the Fulani and dispersed them further towards the South 
(Azarya 1996; Okello et al. 2014). According to Ofuoku and Isife (2009), the 
advancement of farming through irrigation and the increased decimation of pas-
ture across the savannah also extended the scope of transhumance-related con-
flicts to the coastal zones which were more ecologically viable (Blench 2010). 
This evolution was complemented by the provision of affordable trypanocides, 
which provided a coping means for the herders in the tsetse-infested humid re-
gions of southern Nigeria (ibid.). Thus, the period from May to September, dur-
ing the rainy season, has been identified as the intense period of clashes between 
pastoralists and farmers over arable land, when the Fulani return northwards with 
their cattle as the vegetation begins to appear. These clashes result from the inva-
sion of arable land by the cattle during this peak season of crop production (Ad-
ekunle & Adisa 2010; Abbass 2012). 
The failure of the government in mediating such conflicts and setting up judi-
cial commissions cannot be underestimated because it pushes communities to 
take the law into their own hands. After the initiation of the first national live-
stock development project (NLDP) and the enactment of a grazing law by the 
Northern Nigeria Legislative Assembly in 1965, the authorities attempted to pro-
vide grazing lands in order to make the nomadic Fulani sedentary (Awogbade 
1987). In collaboration with organizations such as the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI), the objective was to enhance productivity and to de-
marcate 4,125 grazing lands across Nigeria, covering about 4.3 million ha, some 
                                                 
3  This market role of women makes them important channels of communication between their commu-
nities and urban centres, transmitting vital information about prices, disease outbreaks, and trade con-
ditions (see Shehu & Hassan 1995). 
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of the lands being equipped with boreholes, fences, fire breaks, veterinary ser-
vices, access roads, and dams (Awogbade 1987; Abbass 2012; Koster & de 
Wolff 2012). The predominant types of ranches were to be individually owned 
by farmers with large investments; there were few options for cooperatives and a 
collective management of the herds. Since 2009, grazing routes have also been 
marked out through Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau, Kastina, Bauchi, Abuja, Sokoto, 
and Adamawa. According to Abbass (2012), however, only 270 of these official 
grazing lands are functional. 
Cattle grazing and lethal violence: Analysis of  
trends across Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
During the past eight years, the Nigeria Watch database has recorded 615 violent 
deaths related to cattle grazing, out of a total of over 61,000 violent fatalities in 
Nigeria (Figures 1.2 and 3.1). The analysis that follows was undertaken with 111 
relevant cases, which were reported by the press across the 36 states of Nigeria 
from June 2006 to May 2014. It seeks to understand the frequency, the intensity, 
the patterns, and the geography of such violence, based on a study of 7 incidents 
in 2006, 9 in 2007, 6 in 2008, 13 in 2009, 9 in 2010, 15 in 2011, 17 in 2012, 27 
in 2013, and 8 as at May 2014. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Violent deaths in Nigeria caused by cattle grazing, per year  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
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In the second half of 2006, 22 deaths resulting from cattle conflicts were rec-
orded in the months of July (Imo and Kaduna), August (Zamfara and Rivers), 
and September (Kano, Delta, and Rivers). September accounted for the highest 
number of incidents per month (3), while Kano State was the most affected, with 
ten fatalities, followed by Rivers (five deaths in August and three in September). 
The main stakeholders involved were the police, the army, armed gangs, political 
groups, and communities, with victims on all sides. On 15 September 2006, for 
instance, soldiers were reported to have invaded the Elele Community in Rivers 
to avenge the disappearance of the cattle belonging to their ‘fellow northerners’; 
however, another report claimed these were herdsmen dressed in army uniform.4 
In 2007, the number of deaths resulting from cattle conflicts doubled to 54, 
spread across the months of January (Zamfara, Delta, and Osun), February (Ji-
gawa), March (Cross River), June (Kebbi), July (Rivers), and December (Borno 
and Zamfara). Different weapons were used, from guns in Delta5 to bows, ar-
rows, charms, cutlasses, and spears in Borno.6 The highest number of recorded 
incidents was in January, across Zamfara, Delta, and Osun. However, the highest 
number of casualties was recorded in Delta State, which accounted for 17 deaths 
as against 14 in Borno. The protagonists in the violence were usually armed 
gangs, the police, and communities. The Zamfara episodes in January and De-
cember also involved Fulani reportedly coming from the Republic of Niger. In 
most cases, the Fulani were perceived as aggressors, with allegations of rape and 
murder alongside those of destruction. However, in Kebbi, Jigawa, and Osun, 
they were portrayed as victims, with their villages razed by neighbours and their 
cattle either stolen or killed. 
In 2008, reported fatalities resulting from cattle conflicts dropped to 31, occur-
ring in the months of January (Jigawa), April (Anambra), July (Jigawa), Novem-
ber (Taraba), and December (Katsina and Jigawa). The highest number of inci-
dents (5) occurred in the North (Jigawa, Kastina, and Taraba). However, the 
highest number of fatalities accounted for was in Anambra, with nine casualties, 
followed by Taraba and Jigawa, with seven and six respectively. The stakehold-
ers in these clashes were largely Fulani herdsmen and farmers in community-
based conflicts. In all the reported cases, the Fulani were portrayed as aggressors 
because their cattle invaded farmland. 
In 2009, the number of fatalities more than doubled the figures of the previous 
year, with 83 deaths spread over the months of April (Benue), June (Plateau and 
                                                 
4  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=586&rang=1. Accessed 11 Sep-
tember 2014. 
5  Habu, I. (2007), 2 Policemen, 5 Others Die in Communal Clash. Daily Champion, 26 December 2007. 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=2936&rang=1. Accessed 9 Octo-
ber 2014. 
6  Musa, N. (2007), Seven Die in Borno Pastoralists, Farmers’ clash. The Guardian. 25 December 2007. 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/doc_acc/G2007-12-25.pdf. Accessed 9 October 2014. 
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Jigawa), July (Jigawa and Benue), September (Borno), October (Kebbi), Novem-
ber (Imo), and December (Nasarawa, Oyo, and Zamfara). June, July, and De-
cember had the highest occurrence per month, while 11 of the 13 reported cases 
took place in the North. Jigawa again recorded the highest number of incidents, 
with four reported cases between June and July. Nasarawa had the highest num-
ber of deaths (47) in the most sustained crisis, which lasted two days: in addition, 
mercenaries were allegedly hired from the neighbouring states of Taraba and 
Kogi. The reported case in Borno also reflected trans-border actors from the Re-
public of Niger and Chad; in this case, rebels dressed in military uniforms and 
armed with sophisticated weapons raided Fulani communities in Abadam and 
Mallam Fatori.7 
The 2010 incidents related to cattle grazing then dropped to 39 fatalities dur-
ing the months of January (Adamawa and Oyo), February (Ogun), April (Plat-
eau), May (Benue), June (Niger), July (Plateau), August (Adamawa), and Octo-
ber (Plateau). The highest number of reported incidents was two in January, 
while Niger State had the highest number of casualties (15). Out of a total of nine 
cases, seven occurred in the North. In Adamawa, where the international cattle 
market of Mubi attracted foreign robbers, the violence lasted for seven days. This 
particular case involved suspected Cameroonian armed bandits with sophisticat-
ed weapons.8 The use of sophisticated weapons and the portrayal of the Fulani as 
victims was also noted in a report on Plateau State by the spokesperson of 
MACBAN, when the Fulani clashed with Berom farmers and lost a young Fulani 
in addition to 30 cows.9 
The year 2011 saw a meteoric rise to 116 in the number of deaths resulting 
from cattle conflicts. These clashes occurred in January (Cross River and Plat-
eau), February (Benue and Plateau), April (Abuja), May (Plateau), June, (Nassa-
rawa and Benue), July (Imo), August (Plateau and Nasarawa), November (Kasti-
na), and December (Zamfara). The highest number of incidents was in February 
and June, with states in the North accounting for the majority of the reported cas-
es. The highest number of fatalities was recorded in Benue, with 38 in June and 
27 in February. However, of the 15 reported cases in that year, Plateau State ac-
counted for the highest number of occurrences with four incidents, while Benue 
and Nasarawa had three each. The most sustained violence lasted for five days in 
Benue, as against three in Nasarawa. The major cause of such conflicts was the 
invasion of farmland by cattle breeders, leading to attacks and reprisals from both 
groups. The high casualty figures recorded in Benue State were not unconnected 
with the spread of violence across different communities as people were dis-
                                                 
7  Musa, N. (2009), Bandits Attack Three Communities, Kill One. The Guardian. 20 September 2009, p. 
5. 
8  Onah, M. (2010), Trans-Border Bandits Kill 10 in Adamawa. ThisDay. 18 August 2010, p. 8. 
9  Lalo, M. (2010), Fulani Herdsman, 30 Cows Killed in Jos. Daily Trust. 21 October 2010, p. 2. 
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placed, and there was the alleged engagement of Fulani ‘mercenaries’ from Lake 
Chad, together with the use of sophisticated weapons, bulletproof vests, military 
uniforms, horses, and motorcycles.10 
The highest number of deaths resulting from cattle conflicts was recorded in 
2012, with the total number put at 128 during the months of January (Delta), 
February (Enugu, Taraba, and Nasarawa), March (Benue, Borno, and Delta), 
April (Nasarawa and Abuja), May (Nasarawa and Cross River), June (Taraba and 
Abuja), November (Jigawa), and December (Ogun). The highest number of inci-
dents was four in February, while the highest number of fatalities was recorded 
in Cross River, with 40 casualties in May, though Benue had a total of 30 deaths 
in March. Also, of the 17 recorded cases, the states of the North recorded 12, es-
pecially in Taraba and Nasarawa. The most sustained incident lasted for three 
days in Nasarawa and Benue, while the key actors included soldiers, the police, 
Fulani herdsmen, and local farmers. In Nasarawa, for instance, 50 armed Fulani 
were reported to have attacked a border town (Shatse) at dawn, and both sides 
claimed casualties, including the loss of 500 cows.11 Some cases were even more 
complex. In Delta State, it was alleged that armed herdsmen, dressed in uni-
forms, were confronted by locals after their cattle had destroyed farms, women 
were raped, and some headless bodies were found. Also, the military were re-
ported to have killed two persons in their bid to restore peace, though this was 
denied by their spokesperson. The search for northerners by indigenes for retalia-
tion then gave an ethno-political dimension to the crisis. Former Niger Delta mil-
itants joined the conflict, with other youths allegedly robbing travellers and over-
powering the police.12 
The total figure for the reported casualties resulting from cattle conflicts 
dropped slightly in 2013 to 115 deaths spread across the 12 months: January 
(Benue), February (Delta), March (Benue and Kaduna), April (Plateau, Delta, 
and Kogi), May (Zamfara, Nasarawa, and Benue), June (Zamfara, Nasarawa, and 
Kaduna), July (Benue and Oyo), August (Nasarawa), September (Benue), Octo-
ber (Benue, Jigawa, and Katsina), November (Kwara and Sokoto), and December 
(Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa). The two most deadly crises were recorded in Benue, 
with 20 fatalities in September and 17 in May. The longest clashes lasted two 
days in Delta (February) and Benue (September), while 22 of the 27 incidents 
took place in the states of the North. In Benue State, Idoma farmers took revenge 
on Fulani cattle breeders for the alleged destruction of harvested farm products 
and pollution of water, while Tiv farmers allegedly collected N150,000 to allow 
                                                 
10  Uja, E. (2011), 18 Killed in Dawn Raid of Benue Comminities. The Nation. 15 February 2011, p. 3. 
11  Joseph, H. (2012), 4 Killed in Renewed Farmers/Herders Feud in Nasarawa. Daily Trust. 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/doc_acc/DT2012-02-17h_2.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2014.  
12  O’Neil, S. (2012), Two Dead as Fulani, Indigenes Clash in Delta. The Nation.  
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/doc_acc/N2012-01-31p9.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2014. 
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cattle to graze in violation of the law which had abolished such land tax, leading 
to violent clashes and the displacement of women and children from the commu-
nity.13 In Kaduna, there was also a case of armed bandits killing soldiers and vig-
ilantes during an early morning raid, with thousands of Fulani fleeing their resi-
dences in the aftermath.14 
As at 31 May 2014, a total of 27 deaths were recorded for 201415 from eight 
reported incidents in the months of January (Oyo and Abuja), February (Delta), 
March (Taraba, Benue, and Ebonyi) and May (Kaduna). The highest number of 
cases was in March (4), and the highest number of fatalities (10) was in Taraba, 
also in March. The major actors involved were armed gangs, the communities, 
and the army, the latter being reported to have perpetrated ‘jungle justice’ against 
some Fulani herdsmen who were accused of carrying weapons and who were 
summarily executed in Saminaka, southern Kaduna State. In contrast to the usual 
patterns of clashes between herdsmen and farmers, the soldiers were clearly iden-
tified as the aggressors by representatives of both groups (the chairman of the 
local government council and the president of MACBAN).16 
Cattle grazing and lethal violence in Nigeria:  
A geographical analysis 
A geo-political analysis highlights that the ethno-religious identity of the actors 
engaged in cattle conflicts is quite significant. As shown in the graph and the 
maps (Figures 3.2, Map 3.1 and 3.2), northern Nigeria records the majority of 
fatal incidents (83 of 111), especially in Benue, Kaduna, Plateau, Kogi, Niger, 
and Nasarawa. These locations are mainly populated by the ‘Middle Beltans’, 
whose religious identity is often contrasted with that of Fulani Muslims. 
  
                                                 
13  Duru, P. (2013), Three Killed as Hedsmen, Idoma Farmers Clash. Vanguard. 28 January 2013, p. 7; 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/doc_acc/I2013-03-14.pdf. Accessed 9 October 2014 
14  Sabiu, M. (2013), Blood, Tears in Zamfara, Kaduna: IGP Deploys Armed Policemen. Saturday Trib-
une. 22 June 2013, p. 5. 
15  This number had risen to 40 as at 31 August 2014 from a total of 12 recorded incidents. 
16  Bashir, M. (2014), Soldiers Kill 6 Migrant Herders in Saminaka. Daily Trust. 23 May 2014, p. 8. 
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Figure 3.2 Violent deaths caused by cattle grazing in Nigeria,  
by state, cumulated figures (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Map 3.1 Fatalities caused by cattle grazing in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
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Map 3.2 Fatality rates caused by cattle grazing in Nigeria, per 100,000 inhabitants
(June 2006-May 2014)
In the North Central region, both the Hausa and Fulani are associated with the 
Islamic oligarchy and the 1804 jihad, in contrast to the indigenes who are pre-
dominantly Christian and perceive themselves as being marginalized. Thus, in 
Benue in 2013, irate youths invaded and destroyed the Sabo market because its 
Hausa traders were considered the kith and kin of the Fulani herdsmen. In the 
same vein, the Benue State government reported the Fulani aggressors directly to 
the Sultan of Sokoto in 2011. Indeed, many people of the Middle Belt champion 
and perceive their political cause as a resistance to the Hausa/Fulani ethnic con-
glomerations of northern Nigeria. Even if there were no explicitly religious caus-
es for the attacks, there is an underlying religion-based context of relationships 
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which contributes much to the formation of opposing identities. This historical 
and ethno-religious dimension makes the stakeholders in cattle conflicts vulnera-
ble to manipulation by politicians, both during elections and while these politi-
cians are in office. 
It is important, however, to note that in the North not every non-Hausa com-
munity is hostile towards the Fulani. In Kaduna State, for instance, the local gov-
ernment chairman of Saminaka proposed to petition the government on the mis-
conduct of soldiers who extra-judicially killed six herdsmen. The context of the 
involvement of the security forces is indeed very multifarious. While they are 
sometimes portrayed as aggressors, they also suffer casualties in quite a number 
of cases, such as in Kaduna in 2013 when armed (purportedly Fulani) bandits 
killed soldiers alongside some vigilantes. The aftermath, which led to the fleeing 
of Fulani from the area, is indicative of the expected terror from the military in 
retaliation for their casualties. In this regard, the involvement of local vigilante 
groups as security alternatives is quite indicative of the loss of confidence in the 
state, as the police are said to be incompetent while soldiers allegedly arm assail-
ants and provide them with uniforms for disguise. The border towns in Sokoto, 
Katsina, Kano, and Borno present a different case because they are easy entry 
points for foreign ‘mercenaries’, despite certain shared cultural and religious val-
ues between the stakeholders in violence. 
In the South-South, it is also pertinent to note the high number of casualties 
reported in Cross River. If northern states like Jigawa, Adamawa, Borno, Taraba, 
Plateau, and Katsina recorded more fatal incidents, the case of the Ikpanaya 
community in 2012 shows how a local land dispute can easily degenerate into 
violence and extend to cattle issues. Engaged to attack another community, the 
Fulani herdsmen were secondary stakeholders in this crisis. Thus, the fatalities 
recorded in Cross River State were not directly linked with grazing activities. But 
the herdsmen indirectly protected their interests by supporting the indigenes who 
granted them access to the land in dispute in return for products from their ani-
mals. In addition, there was a religious angle to the crisis, with the destruction of 
churches by the invaders. 
Whereas the South-South and the South East are predominantly Christian, such a 
scenario is very unlikely in the South West, where the Fulani are more assimilat-
ed. In the border towns of Ekiti, Oyo, and Osun, herdsmen are sometimes catego-
rized as either ‘Bororo’ or ‘Fulani Ilorin’; however, they are usually considered 
indigenes within the latter context. Moreover, among the Yoruba of the South 
West, it is not uncommon to observe siblings of different religious persuasion. 
This pluralism, together with a culture of tolerance, largely prevents the ethno-
religious manipulation of groups for political purposes, explaining the peaceful 
management of cattle conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in the region. 
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Cattle grazing and lethal violence in  
Nigeria: A temporal analysis 
Regarding the time frame nationwide, the data show that there has been an in-
crease in the number of deaths and occurrences of lethal violence resulting from 
cattle grazing since 2006 (see Figure 3.1 above). More specifically, reported in-
cidents significantly increased from 15 in 2011 to 27 in 2012, almost doubling 
the figures. The rising number of fatalities cannot be said to be directly connected 
to the sustained duration of the crises, as most of them did not last beyond a day, 
with a few exceptions in Katsina (eight days in 2008) and Adamawa (seven days 
in 2007). However, the increase in the number of casualties could be linked to 
the use of sophisticated weapons, which kill faster than the traditional Dane guns, 
machetes, spears, and arrows. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Violent deaths in Nigeria caused by cattle grazing, cumulative figures per month  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 shows that the months of June and December have the highest 
number of casualties within the period being considered. Yet fatal cattle conflicts 
do not stop after the rainy season, as claimed by Adekunle and Adisa (2010) and 
Abbass (2012). The inference to be drawn from this is that there is no cycle of 
violence, perhaps because of the increasing sedentarization of the herdsmen. In 
fact, cattle conflicts do not necessarily involve seasonal movements in search of 
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grazing lands; some of the conflicts result from reprisals during the night or at 
dawn in order to wreak havoc with minimal resistance. The mobilization of men 
disguised in army uniforms proves the premeditated readiness for these attacks. 
Sometimes, the problems are also related to the ‘invasion’ of border communi-
ties, as in Nasarawa in 2009, and may involve the engagement of foreign ‘merce-
naries’ from the Republic of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, as was reported in the 
case of the Mubi cow market in 2010. 
Conclusion 
This study has situated and analysed fatal incidents resulting from cattle grazing 
in Nigeria within its historical, political, and social contexts. Using the Nigeria 
Watch database data from June 2006 to May 2014, it has identified the major 
stakeholders as being communities of farmers and Fulani. State security agents, 
the political authorities, and local or foreign ‘mercenaries’ also played a role. The 
causes, however, were identified to be fundamentally economic and centred 
around land issues, showing that the creation by the government of grazing 
routes did not mitigate the problem. In the final analysis, the study revealed that 
violence from cattle conflicts was not restricted to specific periods of the year 
and occurred during all months, with the highest number of fatalities recorded in 
both the rainy (June) and dry (December) seasons. 
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Abstract 
As a result of the voracious appetite and interest of the average Nigerian in an-
ything metaphysical, the media tend to over-sensationalize the issues of witch-
craft and cult societies. Religious bodies also tend to overemphasize sorcery as 
a major source of misfortune and poverty, creating fear in the hearts of the 
common man. Relying on the Nigeria Watch database data recorded since 1 
June 2006, however, this study reveals that witchcraft accounted for only 661 
violent deaths in the last eight years, or 1% of the total number of fatalities re-
ported during the period under review. Moreover, most deaths attributed to 
sorcery occurred in the southern part of the country. The same pattern applies 
to cult societies, thereby illustrating a difference between the South and the 
North. In the North, eight states did not experience any ritual killings in the last 
eight years. Though the belief that politics is related to cult societies is strong, 
the number of violent incidences leading to deaths is low. Therefore, evidence 
of such a relationship remains vague and unproven. 
Introduction 
Nigerian newspapers report almost daily on incidences of witchcraft and occult 
activities. The aim of this research is thus to analyse the trends and patterns in 
which violent deaths attributed to sorcery and cultism occur in the country. The 
purpose is not to argue for or against the existence of occult powers. The research 
uses scientific and statistical description to shed light on the phenomena of 
witchcraft and cult societies according to the available data of the Nigeria Watch 
project, which has collected data since June 2006. 
The paper is divided into three parts. The next section provides a historical 
perspective of witchcraft and cult societies in the Nigerian political, economic, 
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and social context. The succeeding section provides data on locations where oc-
currences of ritual killings abound and explains why they are more prevalent in 
some parts of Nigeria. The last section analyses the role cult groups play in poli-
tics. As shown by the available data, political issues rank high in the causes of 
violent deaths involving cult societies. Further findings are discussed before a 
conclusion is drawn. 
African belief in witchcraft and cult societies: The Nigerian view 
An appropriate point to begin with is a definition of witchcraft. According to the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, witchcraft is ‘the exercise or invocation of supernatural 
powers to control people or events, typically involving sorcery or magic’. It is 
often associated with human beings who meet secretly in the night, indulge in 
cannibalism and wickedness, organize rites and rituals with ‘the Devil’, and per-
form black magic. Witchcraft is a global phenomenon that has existed for centu-
ries in nearly all societies of the world. 
According to Okon (2012): 
Witchcraft is a constant problem in Africa. Africans of all classes, poor and rich, illiterates 
and the educated classes, all have one or two bad experiences to say about witchcraft as a 
nefarious and destructive spirit that is hindering human and social development in the conti-
nent. [...] Africans have unconsciously developed witchcraft mentality - which is a perma-
nent condition of living helplessly in fear, intimidation, mental torture and spiritual insecuri-
ty. Witchcraft has not only weakened the social bond, but it has forced the African to em-
brace pseudo spirituality and diabolic religious rituals. Spiritual vigilance and protection 
against witchcraft attack has become a vital aspect of socialization in Africa. The average 
African child grows with the fear of witchcraft. 
Although the belief in sorcery predates colonial rule and interaction with 
Western civilization, new forms of cult groups have emerged in the face of ur-
banization. Violence by and against alleged witches represents but one aspect of 
a multifarious urban insecurity. Witchcraft today is also commoditized. It is a 
product on the market, whose power is increased through human sacrifices and 
reduced through ‘deliverance’. The modern witch is, in microeconomic terms, a 
rational economic agent motivated by non-satiation and greed (Essia 2012). 
Thus, the commercial distribution of human body parts involves sophisticated 
networks and relies on ‘abattoirs’ such as the ‘Ibadan house of horrors’, which 
was discovered in March 2014. Another contemporary dimension to the issue of 
witchcraft can be found in the new Evangelical and Pentecostal churches, which 
generally depict godliness and success in terms of overcoming the Devil. These 
movements have popularized the thinking that material fortune is universally 
available, but access to it is inhibited by the Devil, and all it takes to appropriate 
success is to get witches out of the way (ibid.). 
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Political context of witchcraft and cult societies 
Secret cult groups often interact with politics, although they are openly outlawed 
by Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution. Scholars refer to the fact that cult societies al-
ready played important roles in the governance of pre-colonial Nigeria, especial-
ly with the Ibo and the Yoruba in the South (Ellis 2008; Okunola & Ojo 2012). 
No such influence seems to have developed under the emirate system in the 
North. However, Olurode’s (1990) work on the Nupe people of Bida shows that 
cult societies existed in some parts of the North. In the South, the influence of 
such occult groups was somewhat retained under colonial indirect rule, despite 
the introduction of new religion and a Western form of governance. For the Brit-
ish, indigenous institutions could be allowed to function inasmuch as they gave 
prestige and support to the Native Authorities, which were the key organs of in-
direct rule. In the southern part of the country, however, the colonial administra-
tion introduced artificial warrant chiefs and destroyed some shrines. 
It was the half-tolerance, half-suppression, of older systems of governance that made Indi-
rect Rule so thoroughly ambiguous, the official organs of Indirect Rule being shadowed by 
institutions such as shrines whose actual powers often exceeded those they were officially 
deemed to have. (Ellis 2008) 
The influence of cultism and witchcraft could also be felt in the creation of po-
litical parties right from their inception. Indeed, the nationalist movement inter-
acted with indigenous religious institutions and initiation societies in Nigeria’s 
eastern and western regions. Moreover, secrecy and hidden powers were used to 
provide a form of legitimacy and protection for politicians with influence. After 
independence, for instance, military leaders were also reported to have kept an 
arsenal of sorcerers, fortune-tellers, and Islamic marabouts around them. This 
shows that the belief in sorcery has overshadowed every form of government in 
Nigeria, be it civilian rule or military dictatorship. Modern and traditional rulers 
alike have had to understand and speak the language of ritual violence to guaran-
tee their power in the state. 
 
Economic context of witchcraft and cult societies 
The economic context also plays a role. Belief in witchcraft shapes perceptions 
and provides an answer to the question ‘Why me?’ when misfortune strikes: 
Unexpected hardship or bad luck, sudden and incurable diseases, all can be accounted to 
the actions of evil people; to magical forces the diagnosis of witchcraft opens up the possi-
bility of combating the causes of hardship. (Schnoebelen 2009) 
Witchcraft beliefs satisfy a deeply rooted desire to be sure that the world is 
concerned with us, our fate, and our happiness, and that nothing happens simply 
by chance. The acceptance of a domain of life where malevolent forces, like the 
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witch, can be defined and attacked makes it possible to bear a universe devoid of 
such design. 
Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria still ranks among the poorest in the world on the 
basis of per capita income. The country has witnessed a plundering of her wealth 
by its leaders: Nigerian office holders are considered among the most flamboyant 
in the world. The cult groups have profited from the patronage of these corrupt 
leaders. In his analysis of the patrons of the Okija shrine, for instance, Ellis 
(2008) observed that the cult industry remains very lucrative even in contempo-
rary times: 
Analysis of the names indicated that most patrons were from the southeast of the country and 
that they included doctors, lawyers, engineers, politicians and company directors. Some of 
these litigants were reported to have paid very large sums, even hundreds of thousands of 
naira, the equivalent of thousands of dollars, to the chief priest of Okija. Contrary to priests’ 
claims that the fees were paltry, the lowest recorded payment was 5,000 naira ($38 at 2004 
values). The highest payment recorded was over 100 times that amount. The Anambra State 
police commissioner, Felix Ogbaudu, who led the 2004 raid on the Okija shrine, stated that 
he knew of one person who claimed to have paid 800,000 naira ($6,070). Moreover, litigants 
who subsequently died, and whose corpses were brought by their families to the forest, had 
their goods confiscated by the shrine. This meant that very considerable amounts of money 
were involved in the shrine’s affairs. 
Scholars have also argued that the proliferation of local cult groups is evidence 
of economic discontent by disaffected youth. This can be said to be the case in 
the Niger Delta, a region known for its oil wealth. The paradox of penury in the 
midst of plenty has exacerbated grievances, prompting local resistance and rebel-
lion in which militia and cult groups have been critical actors, especially since 
the 1990s (Nyiayaana 2011). Thus, membership of cult groups has economic un-
derpinning, yet is sometimes open to a specific class of people: the rich and in-
fluential. As observed by Elegbeleye (2005) and Egbochuku (2009) all over 
southern Nigeria, for instance, university cult societies include children of the 
higher strata of society. 
The economic dimension of witchcraft can also be linked to urbanization and 
modernity. When considering reported cases of penis snatching or ritual killing 
for money, witchcraft seems to have evolved from the kinship stage to a new 
stage of anonymity in large cities. 
Penis snatching, deadly alms and killer phone numbers all illustrate the dangers of anonymi-
ty. Anonymity stands out clearly as the most distinctive common denominator of these new 
forms of the occult, especially if contrasted with ‘family witchcraft’, which represents the ar-
chetypal form of witchcraft. (Bonhomme 2012) 
Many Nigerians have left their rural villages, coming to modern cities such as 
Lagos and Abuja in search of greener pastures. In these cities, they realize that 
the grass is much greener at home, yet they cannot return to the village empty-
handed. Thus, they resort to blaming witchcraft for their economic woes. Also, 
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anyone successful in business or education is believed to be involved in one form 
of sorcery or another. His/her wealth is due to ritual killing or to the use of body 
parts for money rituals. According to Korhnet (1996), for instance: 
Witchcraft accusations with a strong liberating, emancipative or egalitarian impetus are di-
rected against enemies within their own community. Examples are witchcraft accusations di-
rected against rich peasants and traders in East and West Africa, who accumulate large 
sums of grain or money individually, without due regard to their obligation - under the tradi-
tional solidarity-system of the village community - to assist the poor in case of hardship. 
 
Social dimension of witchcraft and cult societies 
Rooted in spirituality and religious practices, secret cult groups are not a new 
phenomenon in African social formations. Traditionally, they provided mecha-
nisms and structures that defined the role and relationships of each member. 
They not only served the spiritual and social needs of their members, but also 
acted as institutions for social control through the execution of traditional cus-
toms, settlement of disputes, and the dispensation of justice (Offiong 1984). Fur-
thermore, membership of a cult group was restricted to adults and represented an 
elevated status in traditional African society. 
In Nigeria, cult groups were ethnically based. Accordingly, the Reformed Og-
boni Fraternity, Ekpo, Okija Shrine, Amanikpo, and the Igbe secret cult groups, 
among others, have been found among the Yoruba, the Efik, the Igbo, the Ogoni, 
and the Isoko peoples of the south-western and south-eastern parts of Nigeria 
(Ellis 2001). At the same time, new forms of cult groups, the Pyrate confraterni-
ty, Panama, and Black Eye have also emerged as a response to changing social, 
political, and economic realities in Nigeria. These cults initially functioned as 
civil society organizations but were later factionalized and transformed into vio-
lent groups (Nyiayaana 2011). 
Just as cult groups were a source of control in pre-colonial African society, the 
same can be said of witchcraft. Stenberg (2010) asserted that ‘witchcraft operat-
ed, simultaneously, as a moral narrative and means of behavioural enforcement 
which facilitated social control, and maintained and restored damaged social or-
ders’. Belief in witchcraft has shown resilience to change and, instead of dying 
out, has evolved to face new situations in contemporary life. People have often 
resorted to cult societies because they lacked effective mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts. Having no access to independent central powers meant that any groups 
that got involved in a conflict were also burdened with the task of resolving that 
conflict among themselves (Harnischfeger 2006). Under such circumstances, the 
determination to have an oracle decide matters may have been the best means of 
keeping or building peace. Thus, thousands of people in search of justice once 
came from all over Igboland to the famous shrine of Arochukwu in order to have 
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their disputes settled there. For Westerners it is frightening to imagine that deci-
sions of life or death should depend on such methods. For many Igbo, however, it 
is reassuring to know that judgment is rendered by alien, invisible powers, not by 
one’s fellow humans, as human authority is scarcely to be trusted. 
Witchcraft, cult societies and violent  
deaths in Nigeria since 2006 
Nowadays, witchcraft and sorcery account for a relatively small number of vio-
lent deaths in Nigeria (Figure 1.2). The Nigeria Watch database recorded over 
61,000 violent deaths during the period under investigation, from June 2006 to 
May 2014. Crime and car accidents remain the major causes of fatalities, fol-
lowed by political and religious conflicts. Despite many legends of blood-
sucking witches killing thousands, sorcery accounted for only 661 deaths, which 
represents just 1% of violent deaths reported. Yet the Nigeria Watch database 
records fatalities only and does not cover all the aspects of witchcraft. For in-
stance, the press reports many cases of mutilated bodies where the violent cause 
of the death is not proven and hence not recorded. 
A look at the protagonists involved in lethal violence confirms that sorcery 
does not constitute an overarching cause of fatalities in Nigeria. Figure 4.1 shows 
that cult societies accounted for 1,863 deaths between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 
2014. These figures seem low when compared with other protagonists, such as 
armed gangs, political groups, and the police. However, women and children ac-
count for an important proportion of the victims, even if men and adults still rep-
resent the majority (Tables 4.1 & 4.2). 
 
 
Table 4.1 Number of male and female victims killed because of the belief in 
  sorcery, Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
 Male Female Undetermined Total 
Number 206 170 396 772 
Percentage 26.7% 22% 51.3% 100% 
 
 
Table 4.2 Number of adults and children killed because of the belief in sorcery,  
 Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
 Adult Children Undetermined Total 
Number 274 123 375 772 
Percentage 35.5% 15.9% 48.6% 100% 
 
Note: The total number in the tables above is slightly different from the number in Figures 1.2 and 4.1 
because it is based on actual texts of newspaper reports, while the Nigeria Watch database records aver-
ages according to different sources for each incident. 
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Figure 4.1 Number of violent deaths in Nigeria, by protagonist, cumulated figures  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
A mapping of witchcraft and ritual killings in Nigeria 
In trying to track the prevalence of witchcraft in Nigeria, available data also show 
a high prevalence in the southern part of the country compared with the northern 
part. States like Yobe and Sokoto experienced no occurrence of fatalities result-
ing from witchcraft, while the other northern states recorded less than five in the 
last eight years, except for Borno, where newspapers reported 44 deaths involv-
ing mutilation of body parts and credited these deaths to the Boko Haram insur-
gents (Map 4.1). 
In the South, Lagos witnessed the highest number of sorcery-related deaths 
(89), followed closely by Delta (84). In terms of frequency, Lagos also recorded 
more cases of ritual killings than in any other state, with 59 incidences in eight 
years. However, compared with its population, Delta State had a relatively higher 
number of such deaths, with a rate of 1.9 per 100,000 inhabitants, as against 0.8 
in Lagos. Delta State was followed by Abia (1.7) and Kwara, which had the 
highest prevalence in the North, except for the special case of Borno because of 
the Boko Haram insurgency. The pattern of Kwara may be due to its location as a 
link between the southern and northern parts of Nigeria. 
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Map 4.1 Fatality rates caused by sorcery in Nigeria, per 100,000 inhabitants  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
In Lagos, the high prevalence of ritual killings can be attributed to the fact that 
the state is the commercial nerve centre of the country, a situation which exacer-
bates the belief in money rituals. The reported case of a multi-millionaire Pente-
costal pastor involved in a case of ritual killing supports this argument. Accord-
ing to the press: 
The General Overseer of a fast-growing pentecostal church in Lagos has been arrested by 
the Police for alleged ritual murder. The pastor simply identified as Fireman has been de-
tained at the State Criminal Investigation Department (SCID), Panti, Yaba, Lagos following 
alleged confessional statement of an 18-year-old boy, Ikechukwu, who was caught strangu-
lating a 12-year-old girl identified as Bose. 
501890-L-bw-ASC
85 
 
Okechuku had told the Police that the Pastor had contracted him to kill a female virgin 
and bring her faeces for a N100,000 fee. The pastor was arrested after five days on the run. 
Ikechukwu, who was paraded at SCID, Panti by the state Police spokeswoman, Ngozi 
Braide, narrated how he strangulated the girl. 
‘I started attending the church in Surulere since 2011 when I heard how the man of God 
was performing miracles and I believed in the pastor. After Christmas celebration, I was 
ashamed that I had nothing for the New Year celebration, especially clothes. The spirit 
moved me to approach my pastor for help and when I met with him, he promised to give me 
N100,000 if I could get the faeces of a strangled virgin. 
‘I agreed to get the faeces of a virgin. I remembered a food vendor’s daughter, who I sus-
pected was a virgin and I went to the woman’s shed at Badagry. When I met Bose, I bought 
rice and plantain from her. She served me and after eating, I lured her to an uncompleted 
building on the pretense that I wanted to show her something. Immediately we entered the 
building, I held Bose on the throat until she defecated and died. I wanted to pack the faeces 
when I heard the shout of a man calling for my arrest and I tried to escape but I was arrest-
ed by some people. 
‘They wanted to kill me but a man begged that I should be spared so that I can be used as 
witness against the pastor. I thank God that my life was saved because the pastor would have 
denied that he sent me.’ 
Police spokeswoman, Ngozi Braide, said the pastor has been arrested after many days of 
being on the run. She said that though the case was being investigated, Ikechukwu had made 
confessional statement that the pastor sent him. 
She said the pastor was being interrogated by detectives after which the police would de-
termine the fact of the matter. (Oji 2014) 
Another explanation for the higher prevalence of ritual killings in the southern 
part of Nigeria can be found in history. In Lagos, the first church was established 
in Badagry in 1842, while Islam was already well developed in the North before 
finding its way to the South. As we observed in our data, Sokoto State, revered as 
the seat of the caliphate, reported no case of violent deaths attributed to sorcery 
in the period under examination. Meanwhile, in the South, the indirect rule intro-
duced by the British colonialists relied on some traditional structures that used to 
practise human sacrifice. 
As shown in Map 4.1 and Figure 4.2, Rivers State, for instance, recorded the 
highest prevalence of cult killings per state in the last eight years. This was due 
to the activities of local cult societies and their frequent clashes with rival gangs 
and security forces. In fact, all the states in the South recorded at least one case of 
cult society killing. By contrast, eight northern states reported no cases of cult 
killing in the years under review. However, the LGA that suffered the highest 
number of fatalities related to cult activities (205), Lafia in Nasarawa State, was 
in the North. This is due to the emergence of a new cult group, Ombatse (lit. 
‘time has come’), that claims to heal the region from corruption and poverty. The 
administration of Nasarawa State actually saw the group as a political movement 
of opponents, and many people were killed in a clash with security agents in May 
2013. 
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Figure 4.2 Number of violent deaths in events where cult societies were involved,  
 by state, cumulated figures (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Links with politics 
Cult activities often have political underpinnings. A total of 307 deaths attributed 
to cult groups were politically motivated in five states in the last eight years, as 
shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Violent deaths caused by political issues in events where cult societies  
 were involved (June 2006-May 2014) 
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The situation in these areas is actually quite complex: 
Cult gangs are active within community youth associations as enforcers, to defend the inter-
ests of their members, increase their influence and for protection […]. Cults have served as 
a gateway into all kinds of criminality and violence, including militancy […]. These groups 
and networks of groups had wide geographical penetration and were heavily armed. But fur-
ther complicating the structure is the fact that many youth associations at the community 
level also have ‘cult groups’, some of which take their names from the larger organizations 
with whom they may or may not have direct or indirect linkages. So the entanglements and 
overlap between university confraternities, street gangs, youth groups, and ethno-nationalist 
militias are not easily unraveled. (UNLock Nigeria 2012: 9) 
Nationwide, no significant correlation seems to exist between witchcraft and 
cult society fatalities and election years in 2007 and 2011 (Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 
Map 4.2). Although there is a steady climb yearly in violent deaths related to po-
litical issues because of the Boko Haram crisis in the North-East, there was no 
visible increase in the number of fatalities attributed to sorcery in 2011, an elec-
tion year. However, the trend seems to be on the increase, especially for the year 
2013 and the first five months of 2014 (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Number of violent deaths in Nigeria caused by sorcery, per year  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
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Map 4.2 Fatalities in events where cult societies were involved in Nigeria
(June 2006-May 2014)
Figure 4.5 Number of violent deaths caused by political issues, per year 
(June 2006-May 2014)
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Conclusion 
Although the media has been accused of fuelling the belief in witchcraft and 
cults, fatal cases reported by newspapers are as real as the threat associated with 
witchcraft in the mind of the African. The Nigeria Watch database shows that 
witchcraft-related violence is more prevalent in the southern than in the northern 
part of Nigeria. The main reason for this can be found in the history, traditions, 
and culture of these areas, and in the introduction to a foreign monotheistic reli-
gion, which occurred earlier in the North than in the South. In the case of cult 
killings, fatalities and incidents are highest in Rivers State. Although cult-related 
killings are also to be found in Nasarawa, Kwara, and Benue states, eight north-
ern states were totally free of the problem, while in the South, all the states rec-
orded at least one incidence of cult killing. However, empirical evidence con-
necting witchcraft and cult societies to violent deaths is low compared with the 
widespread belief in occult phenomena. 
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Muslims, Christians and religious  
Violence in Nigeria: Patterns and  
mapping (2006-2014) 
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Abstract 
The notion that religious violence in Nigeria is always characterized by con-
flicts between religions (Muslims versus Christians) is too simplistic. This 
study shows that between June 2006 and May 2014 the frequency of violent 
death incidents involving Islamic groups against Islamic groups is 60, a figure 
higher than 57, which is the frequency of violent death incidents involving Is-
lamic groups against Christian groups or churches within the same period. A 
second major point in this paper is that violence involving religious groups is 
not always caused by religious issues. This explains why the frequency of vio-
lent death incidents involving Islamic groups against Christian groups or 
churches due to non-religious issues is as high as 42 between June 2006 and 
May 2014. Thirdly, it remains inconclusive whether or not more Muslims than 
Christians (or vice versa) are killed because of violence in general in Nigeria. 
Finally, the Western media frames violence in Nigeria as being mainly inter-
religious, while lethal incidents involving Islamic groups against Islamic 
groups are largely under-reported. 
Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to sketch out and analyse the evolution and diverse pat-
terns of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria between 1 
June 2006 and 31 May 2014.1 Although this nationwide mapping offers represen-
tations of the broad spectrum and character of Muslim-Christian religious vio-
lence over the eight-year period in focus, it also includes the dynamics of violent 
deaths of a non-religious nature involving Muslims and Christians. Our assess-
ment also considers the violent interaction between Muslim and Christian groups 
in relation to other protagonists associated with religious and non-religious is-
                                                 
1  This period is chosen because the Nigeria Watch database began recording data in June 2006, and this 
study seeks to analyse the available data over an eight-year period. 
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sues. Without doubt, the religious institutions of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria 
are major rallying points for various social and political groups with disparate 
and sometimes obscure agendas. In fact, the almost ubiquitous use of religious 
pretexts in Nigeria has at several periods been appropriated by ‘non-conforming’ 
groups to instigate violence and inadvertently give the impression that religion is 
the paramount source of violence in the country. 
However, this study finds that while the factor of religion cannot be entirely 
disregarded, particularly in light of the character of recurrent crises in (northern) 
Nigeria, religious issues do not represent the only cause of violent deaths involv-
ing Muslims and Christians in the country. Religion as a causal factor must be 
put in perspective and nuanced with other pertinent sources of violent deaths, 
such as issues related to land and territorial claims, ethnicity, and politics and 
elections, as well as community violence and crimes involving Muslims and 
Christians. In addition, this study finds that in cases where religion appears to be 
an underlying cause of violent deaths, such incidents can also be reflected in 
clashes between just one of the religious faiths and a non-religious protagonist, or 
in fact occur within the same religious faith. 
The study thus explores the aforementioned dimensions and causes of Mus-
lim-Christian violent deaths, and our analysis is corroborated by maps and graphs 
of data drawn from the statistical records of Nigeria Watch. Our focus raises sev-
eral important questions for this study, and three main ones are considered: First, 
what factors explain why the dynamics of Muslim-Christian religious violence 
appear to gain more local and international traction in academic and media cir-
cles, in contrast to the attention accorded to the narratives of intra-religious vio-
lence, for instance? Second, if religious issues are not the only cause of violent 
deaths between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, which other factor(s) also 
merit deeper investigation, based on the available data? Third, in connection with 
other key protagonists such as the security forces, to what extent are the Islamic 
and Christian faith blocs involved or implicated in incidences of violent deaths in 
Nigeria? We address these questions in the three main sections of this paper. Fol-
lowing this summary, a description of the general context of religion and vio-
lence in Nigeria will be provided and accompanied by brief reference to one of 
the major theoretical discourses - the ‘clash of civilizations’ - that continues to 
frame academic (and media) debates on inter-religious tensions in countries such 
as Nigeria. Bearing in mind the second question in this study, we then move on 
swiftly to the second part of this paper to characterize the distribution of data re-
lated to violent deaths between June 2006 and May 2014. This is done in an at-
tempt to reveal in a statistical way the main causes of violent deaths and their 
correlation with both religious and non-religious issues involving Muslims and 
Christians. 
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From this point, the third part of this study guides our focus in line with our 
third question. Based on the data presented, our statistical narrative here enables 
an understanding of the extent to which Islamic and Christian actors and groups 
are involved in the phenomenon of violent deaths. This is also examined in asso-
ciation with the role of other protagonist variables implicated in incidences of 
violent deaths where Muslims and Christians are involved. The concluding sec-
tion will highlight our findings and underscore what is instructive for further re-
search, based on the overall empirical content analysed in this study. 
In this paper, reference to violent deaths does not exclusively denote the act of 
perpetration of violence on the part of Muslims or Christians. Rather, the context 
of our interpretation of violent deaths refers to the involvement of Muslims and 
Christians also as victims. It should also be noted that the period under examina-
tion starts on 1 June 2006 and ends on 31 May 2014. Therefore, apart from the 
full years in between (2007-2013), data analysed in relation to either 2006 or 
2014 should be considered in light of the stipulated period when data collation 
and analysis started and ended. 
Religion and violence in Nigeria 
Violence in Nigeria has taken various forms over the decades, and the data in this 
study depicts its wide-ranging character expressed through the interactions be-
tween Muslims and Christians. Political issues, especially those associated with 
the struggle for elective offices and power allocation, remain a potent source of 
violence. This state of affairs is often catalyzed by a lethal infusion of interests 
rooted in deep socio-economic and ethnic concerns, some of which may be legit-
imate and others spuriously held by different actors and groups. In addition, the 
overall frequency of violent deaths in Nigeria owes much to a combination of 
other causes such as car accidents and crime. And certainly, not least, religious 
issues appear to also reinforce the collective tally of fatalities, particularly in 
terms of recurrence rates in regions such as northern Nigeria. 
Scholarly interpretations of this religious angle hold significance because of 
the added perspective they bring to our assessment of Muslim and Christian in-
volvement in the trends of violent deaths. However, in instances where violent 
deaths are not underscored by religious issues between Muslims and Christians, 
or in cases where violent deaths transpire between groups of the same religious 
faith, it raises questions regarding the limits of certain theoretical paradigms and 
how effectively their frameworks capture the violent interaction between adher-
ents of religious faiths in Nigeria. One such paradigm pertains to the ‘clash of 
civilizations’, which suggests that civilization identity, of which religion is a core 
component, will be increasingly important in the post-Cold War period. Samuel 
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Huntington, the main proponent of this acclaimed yet widely criticized civiliza-
tional thesis went further to assert that the fundamental source of conflict and 
great divisions will be cultural and that the fault lines between civilizations, be-
ing the broadest level of cultural identity, will be the battle lines of the future 
(Huntington 1996). 
To a certain degree, some of the fundamental conflicts evident in the era Hun-
tington prognosticated about have indeed found some expression along religious 
fault lines, and particularly in relation to Islam in countries such as Nigeria. The 
academic literature is also instructive in the way it guides our thoughts on the 
central role of religion. Ellis and Haar (2007) describe religion as an emerging 
political language whose pattern of interaction cannot be ignored in the study of 
African politics. For Matthew Kukah (1993), the process of political bargaining 
in Nigeria appears to increasingly embody the factor of religion. Toyin Falola 
(1998) pushes this further by underscoring the profundity of religious attachment 
expressed by both Muslims and Christians and its instrumentality in political life 
and leadership in Nigeria. 
In the overall estimation of various scholars writing on religion and politics in 
Nigeria, there appears to be an almost seamless connection between several vio-
lent incidents from the 1960s through the decades up to the current period. And 
at different phases in this historical trajectory, the controversy between Muslims 
and Christians over the definition and interpretation of ‘secularity’, for instance, 
has offered opportunities for analysts to gauge what they see as diametrically 
opposed platforms of Muslims against Christians in Nigeria. A typical instance 
appeared in 1976 during the drafting of Nigeria’s Constitution and then again in 
1986 on the occasion of Nigeria’s admittance into the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), which sparked off intense debates between Muslims and 
Christians. The common thread of ‘fundamentalism’ that also runs through these 
decades has often given way to militant expressions on both sides of the religious 
divide in Nigeria. On the one hand, for instance, northern Nigerian Christians, 
arguing self-defence, have in the past justified the use of militancy to protect 
their lives and defend their faith through the use of physical violence. On the oth-
er hand, however, Islam appears to have gained a wider reputation for militancy 
than Christianity, as clearly more cases of religious violence involving Islamist 
groups are reported (Falola 1998). 
The cumulative reality of these events appears to mirror the classical model of 
a religious clash involving Muslims and Christians in the country. Thus, when a 
superficial reading of the prevailing Boko Haram crisis is carried out, the pen-
chant to anchor analysis exclusively on Huntington’s discourse and assume the 
reflection of a clash between a ‘Muslim North’ and ‘Christian South’ is rein-
forced. Besides, Boko Haram itself purportedly calls for a Sharia state, and the 
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several incidences of violence instigated against Christians or representations of 
Western civilization in Nigeria tend to receive considerable media interest and 
hype both locally and internationally. The overall impression of a civilizational 
clash involving Muslims and Christians is also strengthened in some way by the 
phenomenon of the ‘youth bulge’ in Africa and particularly in the case of Nigeria 
where the demographic structure is characterized by nearly three-quarters of the 
population being under the age of 30 (Leahy et al. 2007). The portrayal of such a 
population trend in a country where there is an exceedingly large and misman-
aged youth population invokes the notion of how easily violent deaths can be a 
consequence of youth vulnerability in the hands of radicalized (religious) groups. 
By extension, it also becomes easy to understand how much analysis of the vio-
lence involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria maintains intellectual curren-
cy within academic debates, policy circles, and the sensational projection of the 
global media. 
Beyond this, however, the connections between the aforementioned variables 
are far more complex than what fits perfectly into a single theoretical paradigm 
about a clash between religions. The religious divide between Muslims and 
Christians should not be overstated, because the monolithic perception held by 
many observers of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria should be balanced with the 
sense of caution expressed by scholars such as Pérouse de Montclos. He draws 
attention to the need to recognize the divisions within Islam as well as disruptive 
factors within the Muslim ummah, which crises such as that related to Boko Ha-
ram underscore (Pérouse de Montclos 2014). This kind of perspective holds mer-
it as a safeguard against speculative counter-arguments about an inter-religious 
clash and also as a guide for other aspects of our study, which will permit a fuller 
understanding of the idea of divisions or schisms within religions such as Islam 
in Nigeria. Particularly in the third part of this paper, an appreciation of this will 
emerge through our statistical presentation of violent trends between rival groups 
aligned to the same religion. However, before reflection on this, we will proceed 
to present and analyse the distribution of data related to the causes of violent 
deaths and its relationship to religious and non-religious issues involving Mus-
lims and Christians. 
Frequency of violent deaths and their causes 
Between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014, the absolute number of violent deaths 
recorded by the Nigeria Watch database was over 61,000 (Figure 5.1). This stag-
gering number is spread out over the period examined in this study. Although an 
observable feature of this data is the steady rise in the absolute yearly frequency 
of deaths from 2009 to 2013, a critical look at 2014 reveals a sharp increase in 
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the measure of absolute frequency just within a period of five months. Further-
more, in less than a year’s span, the aggregation of violent deaths for the first five 
months of 2014 exceeds the absolute frequency of violent deaths for each of the 
preceding years, with the exception of 2013. Subsequent events confirmed this 
alarming trend. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Absolute number of violent deaths per year (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Yet Figure 5.1 does not provide a clear enough impression of which factors act 
as instigators of lethal violent. Figure 1.2 takes us a little closer by fine-tuning 
our focus. Between June 2006 and May 2014, religious causes thus accounted for 
over 11,300 violent deaths. Some other causal factors registered higher frequen-
cies, and two major variables were crime and car accidents, with over 27,000 and 
15,000 fatalities, respectively. The data shows that religious issues did not consti-
tute the main cause of violent deaths, taken in absolute terms, over the past eight 
years. However, if we focus on the data on absolute fatalities caused by religion 
and distribute it over the eight-year period, it will permit us to gauge the propor-
tion of violent deaths attributable to religious issues on a yearly basis (Figure 
5.2). This is possible when we compare the yearly data on religious causes of 
501890-L-bw-ASC
97
violent deaths (Figure 5.2) with the yearly data on absolute number of violent 
deaths (Figure 5.1). In the process, even though we are still unable to view pro-
portions of Muslim and Christian involvement in violent deaths, we are able to
detect the relative influence of religious issues, especially during years such as 
2013 and 2014. If we consider 2014, for instance, not only did violent deaths rise 
dramatically, but religious issues accounted for nearly half the number of violent 
deaths in the first five months. The reason for this high proportion is closely as-
sociated with the dynamics of violent deaths caused by the Boko Haram crisis in
northern Nigeria. We will shed some light here because the spikes in violent 
deaths for 2013 and 2014 are also linked to the involvement of Muslims and 
Christians in violence, either as perpetrators or victims.
Figure 5.2 Violent deaths caused by religious issues, per year (June 2006-May 2014)
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Map 5.1 Fatalities caused by religious issues in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
Violent deaths in 2013 and 2014 
The year 2013 had the highest frequency of violent deaths in the country, with an 
absolute figure of 10,486, while 2014 followed with a similar trend. Although 
factors such as crime are a foremost cause of violent deaths across the entire 
eight-year period, issues located within the context of religion were the underly-
ing reasons for the escalation of violent deaths in 2013 and 2014. The religious 
issues in question here are attributable, of course, to the Boko Haram crisis, 
which at the same time explains the spike in violent death rates in places such as 
Borno State in 2013 and 2014 (Figures 5.2 and Map 5.1). These were particularly 
violent years, as the group calling itself the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati 
wal-Jihad (widely known as Boko Haram) was responsible for numerous attacks 
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against the security forces and civilians, Muslim and Christian alike. It should be 
noted, however, that the death timeline as a result of Boko Haram attacks can be 
traced back to periods before 2013. In fact, in December 2003, members of the 
sect reportedly launched a series of deadly attacks on police stations in northern 
cities such as Kanama in Yobe State. However, such instances in the past pale in 
comparison with the sequence of violent onslaughts by the group in 2013 and 
2014. While the generation of an entire list of these attacks is not the main focus 
of this section, some major incidents involving the fatalities of both Muslims and 
Christians stand out owing to the scale of the loss of lives involved.2 
In September 2013, approximately 50 students of the School of Agriculture in 
Guijba were reportedly killed in Yobe State. This event was preceded by the 
massacre of approximately 49 people in August following an attack on a mosque 
and several villages, including Konduga and Malari, in Borno State. The degree 
to which lives were lost in single attacks in 2014 was unprecedented, based on 
the fatality records in the Nigeria Watch database. In February 2014, gunmen 
suspected to be Boko Haram members killed at least 47 people in Bama and Bu-
ratai in Borno State. Within the same state (and month), Boko Haram insurgents 
attacked Izghe village and killed 106 people. If there exist doubts regarding the 
identity of the perpetrators of some of these attacks, Boko Haram publicly 
claimed responsibility for the April 2014 bomb blast that claimed the lives of at 
least 70 people at a mass transport terminal in Nyanya, Abuja. 
A final example is that involving the death of hundreds of individuals during a 
clash between security operatives and Boko Haram members who launched an 
attack on Giwa Military Barracks in Borno State in March 2014. There were var-
ious casualty accounts rendered by the Nigerian press community, with the Van-
guard newspaper suggesting 207 deaths, ThisDay reporting 350, and Daily Trust 
stating that as many as 500 lives were lost (Nigeria Watch database 2014). It 
should be noted, however, that exact figures remain a subject of debate and so 
also is the problematic issue of identifying the precise religious identity of some 
of the victims of these attacks. As a matter of research, Chouin, Reinert and 
Apard (2014) set out this thinking eloquently, and they attest to the particular 
difficulty in ascertaining the religious identities of several victims of Boko Ha-
ram attacks with complete accuracy. Notwithstanding, the findings of these 
scholars suggest that the majority of the victims of Boko Haram attacks - around 
two-thirds - are in fact Muslims. This of course challenges the commonplace 
temptation to understand the crisis as a war between religions. For our study’s 
focus, what is also not in doubt is the diverse range of actors who comprise the 
casualty figures: the fatality profiles consist of victims who are Boko Haram in-
                                                 
2  These events were retrieved from the Nigeria Watch database. 
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surgents, members of the Nigerian government’s Joint Task Force (JTF), and 
Christian and Muslim civilians. 
 
Frequencies of Muslim and Christian violent deaths 
We have been able to establish to some degree the impact of religious issues on 
the escalation in the number of violent fatalities in certain years, such as 2013 
and 2014. The added bearing of the Boko Haram crisis on the connection be-
tween religious issues and fatalities has also been highlighted. Without disregard-
ing the relevance of this link, we must at the same time keep in mind one of the 
questions of this study, which underscores the interrogation of non-religious 
causal factors of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians as well as the 
role of other non-religious protagonists that have at certain periods been impli-
cated in the phenomenon of violent deaths involving either Christian or Islamic 
groups. Once again, we must emphasize that the frequency of violent deaths in-
volving Muslims and Christians does not always express a connection with reli-
gious issues only. One way to test this is to compare the data in the yearly fre-
quencies of violent deaths linked to religious issues with the yearly frequencies 
of violent deaths linked to the involvement of Christians. In other words, com-
pare the data presented in Figure 5.2 with that of Figure 5.3. By doing so, we can 
identify a year such as 2008, when the frequency of violent deaths involving 
Christians (605 fatalities) was higher than the frequency of violent deaths linked 
to religious issues (576 fatalities). This disparity can be understood, of course, in 
light of the fact that in November 2008, there were comparably higher numbers 
of Christian fatalities (protagonists and victims) following ethno-political clashes 
over local government election results in Plateau State. 
We can also apply this same principle of comparison to the Islamic context. 
To test this, we can compare the data in the yearly frequencies of violent deaths 
linked to religious issues with the yearly frequencies of violent deaths linked to 
the involvement of Muslims. While still drawing upon our comparative data in 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3, we can identify years such as 2012 when the frequency of 
violent deaths involving Muslims (2,033 fatalities) was higher than the frequency 
of violent deaths linked to religious issues (1,170 fatalities). Similar to the way 
we explained the case with Christian fatalities, the observed disparity here can 
also be understood against the background of violent clashes and deaths that in-
volved Muslims or Muslim groups in relation to issues that are not necessarily 
religious in nature. 
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Figure 5.3 Violent deaths involving Islamic and Christian groups, per year  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
At the heart of these comparisons is the fact that there are certain fatalities 
which are attributable to entirely non-religious issues involving Muslims and 
Christians. This explains to an extent why there are certain years reflecting lower 
frequency bars for religious causes of violent deaths in comparison with higher 
frequency bars for either Islamic- or Christian-related violent deaths in the coun-
try. In other words, the existence of ‘excess’ fatalities explains why the frequency 
bars for Islamic and Christian groups are at certain periods higher than the fre-
quency bars for religious causes. 
There were certainly other years that reflected higher frequencies of violent 
deaths involving Muslims in comparison with the frequencies of violent deaths 
linked to religious issues. These periods include 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2013. 
However, the fatalities that contributed to making these years particularly higher 
in frequency are, of course, not only linked to non-religious issues such as poli-
tics or land/territorial crisis; they are also linked to the role of what we referred to 
earlier as non-religious protagonists. In this regard, while the causes of violent 
deaths may indeed be religious, one of the actors involved in a violent encounter 
may be a Christian or Islamic group and the other a state security entity such as 
the police or the JTF. 
As it appears in our data and especially when we make reference to Figure 5.3, 
there are comparably more yearly periods that reflect higher frequency levels of 
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violent deaths involving Muslims or Islamic groups. Typical cases include 2012 
and 2013, which far outweigh the frequency of violent deaths involving Chris-
tians or Christian groups. Although, as we have noted all along, this high fre-
quency on the Muslim side entails a combination of both perpetrators and victims 
of violence, it is the kind of disparity which has led scholars such as Falola 
(1998) to suggest that Islam has gained a wider reputation for militancy than 
Christianity. It is also the kind of disparity which in a metaphoric sense is a re-
minder of Huntington’s (1996: 254) analysis of the phenomenon he describes as 
‘Islam’s bloody borders’. 
 
Beyond frequencies: Dimensions of violent death incidents 
Returning to our data, we will try to expound further on these ‘excess’ fatalities 
involving Christian and Islamic groups, which appear to fall outside the scope of 
religious issues. We will expand our framework to also examine some of these 
non-religious protagonists implicated in the phenomenon of violent deaths in-
volving Christian and, particularly, Islamic groups. In doing so, we will look be-
yond the frequency of violent deaths to examine more critically the nature of the 
issues themselves. The frequencies of violent deaths tell us one thing, but the fre-
quencies of the violent incidents that produce these violent deaths reveal even 
more. This opens up in several interesting ways another dimension of our study. 
First, it facilitates our knowledge of the frequency of these incidents involving 
Christian and Islamic groups in addition to just the frequency of the violent 
deaths reflected in the graphs so far. Second, we will have more knowledge of 
the extent to which non-religious issues involving Christian and Islamic groups 
occur and recur each year. And third, we will further be able to gain a clearer 
sense of the proportions which these non-religious and religious issues hold in 
relation to each other, as well as the correlational dynamics between the different 
protagonists between June 2006 and May 2014. 
Table 5.1 is therefore an attempt to capture the aforementioned explanation 
through the display of various frequencies of violent death incidents of which 
religious and non-religious issues are casual factors with the involvement of 
Muslim and Christian groups, as well as their linkages with other key protago-
nists. The search method used in generating the data in this table employed the 
use of the key words ‘Islamic groups’ and ‘Churches’ in the Nigeria Watch data-
base. When these specific key words are utilized in a search like this on the data-
base, the data generated includes violent incidents involving Islamic groups and 
Christian groups, as well those incidents that share a nexus with intra-group vio-
lence within either of the religious faiths. Additional data generated through this 
search method includes incidents of both a religious and non-religious character 
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which have a lethal connection between either of the religious faiths and other 
non-religious protagonists. 
For each year, all the data generated is classified under six main rubrics: Is-
lamic group versus Christian group (religious issues); Islamic group versus 
Christian group (non-religious issues); Islamic group versus Islamic group (reli-
gious issues); Islamic group versus Security forces (JTF, police); Islamic group 
versus Vigilante group, Civilian JTF; and Other Violent Death Incidents involv-
ing Muslims and Christians (Community violence). With reference to specific 
incidents, where necessary we will analyse the data under each rubric one at a 
time. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Frequencies of violent death incidents involving Muslims and Christians  
 (religious and non-religious issues) (June 2006-May 2014) 
Year 
Islamic group 
vs. Christian 
group (reli-
gious issues) 
Islamic group 
vs. Christian 
group (non-
religious 
issues) 
Islamic group 
vs. Islamic 
group (reli-
gious issue) 
Islamic 
group vs. 
Security 
forces (JTF, 
police) 
Islamic 
group vs. 
Vigilante 
group, Civil-
ian JTF 
Other violent death 
incidents involving 
Muslims and Chris-
tians (community 
violence) 
2006 2 0 1 0 0 18 
2007 3 0 5 1 0 19 
2008 2 1 0 0 0 25 
2009 0 2 4 10 0 18 
2010 8 4 9 11 0 35 
2011 5 33 20 66 0 52 
2012 27 1 15 161 0 59 
2013 6 1 4 138 5 38 
2014 4 0 2 31 2 68 
TOTAL 57 42 60 418 7 332 
 
 
Islamic group versus Christian group (religious issues) 
Under this rubric, we take into account the recurrence rate of violent incidents 
with manifestations inspired by religious issues involving Christian and Islamic 
groups. A total of 57 incidents are identified, and 2012 represents the year with 
the highest rate of this type of incident between June 2006 and May 2014. In 
comparison with some other rubrics that possess higher frequencies of incidents 
reflected in Table 5.1, this total figure of 57 is once again a reminder of how reli-
gious issues do not represent the only cause or pattern of violent deaths involving 
Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. These religious incidents are nonetheless sig-
nificant and are mainly comprised of three forms of violent encounters: first, at-
tacks instigated by the Islamist group Boko Haram against Christian groups, with 
churches being a prime target; second, attacks through series of assassinations 
targeted at Christian clerics; and third - although to a lesser extent than the first 
and second forms - reprisal attacks by Christians against Muslims. 
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The geographical locations of the majority of these incidents include Niger, 
Kaduna, Yobe, and Borno states, all of which are in the northern region of the 
country. Regarding the first form of violent encounter, instances include the 
bomb attacks on churches, notably Saint Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, 
Niger State on 25 December 2011. Other events include the attack on Saint Ri-
ta’s Catholic Church, Kaduna State in October 2012, as well as numerous attacks 
on other church denominations in Borno State. Among several cases of assassi-
nations, three clerical leaders affected were Reverend David Usman of the 
Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Reverend Ilaisha Kabura of the same 
COCIN, and Reverend Bulus Marwa of Victory Baptist Church. Table 5.2 pro-
vides further insight into the trend of Islamist-motivated (mostly Boko Haram) 
attacks on Christian clerics between June 2006 and May 2014. Finally, in regard 
to reprisal attacks by Christians, a typical case transpired in June 2012 in Kaduna 
State when scores of Muslims were killed by Christians following suicide bomb 
attacks on churches a few days earlier in the state. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Violent deaths of Christian clerics due to Islamist (mainly Boko Haram)- 
 related attacks (June 2006-May 2014) 
Name of Christian 
cleric/leader 
 Church affiliation 
 Location of 
death/state 
Month of 
death/year 
Reverend George Orji 
Good News of Christ Church Inter-
national 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State July 2009 
Reverend Sylvester 
Akpan 
National Evangelical Mission 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State 
July 2009 
Reverend Sabo Yaku-
bu 
Church of Christ in Nigeria 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State 
July 2009 
Reverend Bulus 
Marwa 
Victory Baptist Church 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State 
Dec 2010 
Pastor Michael Madu-
gu 
Deeper Life Bible Church 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State 
Jan 2011 
Reverend David Us-
man 
Church of Christ in Nigeria 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State 
June 2011 
Reverend Ilaisha Ka-
bura Church of Christ in Nigeria 
Maiduguri, Borno 
State Nov 2012 
Reverend Yohanna 
Agom 
Saint Joseph’s Anglican Church Nangere, Yobe State Sept 2013 
 
 
Islamic group versus Christian group (non-religious issues) 
With 42 incidents between June 2006 and May 2014, the details under this rubric 
attest to violent death dynamics typified by non-religious causes involving Mus-
lims and Christians in Nigeria. Although the non-religious causes may appear 
insubstantial in terms of recurrence rates, their importance can still not be ig-
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nored. Based on the data, they represent violent deaths connected with issues 
such as election to political office. The years 2008, 2010, and 2011 stand out in 
relation to these non-religious causes and, to various extents, states such as Plat-
eau, Kaduna, Kano, and Bauchi bear witness to this. In Plateau State, for in-
stance, November 2008 was a critical period for local government elections in 
Jos North, where a tense political struggle for power pitched the People’s Demo-
cratic Party (PDP) against the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). 
In Jos North, voters were polarized because the PDP was made up of mostly 
Christian supporters and the ANPP largely comprised the Jasawa, who are main-
ly Muslims of Hausa/Fulani ethnic make-up. Only to this extent did this combi-
nation create an entry point for religion in the local government election crisis, 
because the crisis which led to a reported 350 to 500 deaths (some estimates are 
higher) in just two days was essentially political in nature. In fact, in the account 
rendered by Philip Ostien (2009), he explained that although religious difference 
adds fuel to the fire when things go wrong, it remains a secondary factor. Ostien 
thus emphasized that the underlying problem stems from the alleged rights of 
indigenes (meaning roughly ‘earliest extant occupiers’) to control particular loca-
tions, as opposed to the rights of ‘settlers’ or ‘strangers’ (or more generally ‘non-
indigenes’), defined as everybody who came later. 
The violent fallout from election results recurred in April 2011. However, this 
time, clashes between Muslims and Christians were due to presidential elections 
in which the main opposition candidates, Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Mus-
lim from the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), lost to the incumbent Pres-
ident Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta in the South, who was 
the candidate for the ruling PDP. As with the previous crisis, the violence that 
ensued divided opposing parties and their supporters along ethnic and religious 
lines. However, the underlying cause was largely political and more widespread 
because violent deaths involved Muslims and Christians in places such as 
Zangon-Kataf and Kachia in Kaduna State, Alkaleri and Itas/Gadau in Bauchi 
State, and Kano Municipal in Kano State. 
 
 
Islamic group versus Islamic group (religious issues) 
Our mapping study will not be complete without delving into the dimension of 
the violent interplay between and among Islamic groups. With a total of 60 inci-
dents of intra-Islamic violent deaths, it is vital to consider the character of these 
events. They are divided into two broad categories: violent deaths due to clashes 
between Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tijaniyya and groups such as the Yan 
Izala; and, in the second case, violent deaths due to clashes involving either of 
these Islamic brotherhoods (and sects) and Boko Haram. The incidents involved 
in both categories are underpinned by religious issues and usually stem from dif-
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ferences in the interpretation of Islamic doctrines. However, the violent outcomes 
of these divergent interpretations of Islamic tenets are more pronounced in regard 
to the second category, that involving clashes between Islamic groups and Boko 
Haram. This is evident not only in the frequency of incidents but also in the 
number of fatalities as a result of incidents. These incidents also entail in some 
cases attacks on mosques by the rival Islamist sect Boko Haram. More significant 
in the second category is the nature of the fatalities involved, which include an 
increasing number of Islamic clerics. Table 5.3 is a list of some of these clerics 
reportedly attacked and killed by Boko Haram between June 2006 and May 
2014. 
There are a few of these assassination cases, however, whose source of perpe-
tration is still shrouded in controversy. An example is that related to the death of 
Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam. In such cases a direct link to Boko Haram re-
mains inconclusive. The locations of most of these intra-Islamic violent death 
incidents include states such as Kaduna, Yobe, and Borno. Some of the inter-
group clashes observed in the data tend to often involve the Shi’ite Islamic 
movement. There are three notable occurrences in regard to this: The first was in 
January 2009, when Shi’ite adherents in Zaria, Kaduna State clashed with a rival 
Islamic group following accusations by this group against the Shi’ites of attack-
ing the convoy of the Emir of Zaria. In January 2011, violent encounters ensued 
again between the Shi’ites and members of the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood in 
Kaduna State. A third instance was in October 2013, when Shi’ite members 
clashed with Sunni youths in Sokoto State. These incidents, in which the Yan 
Shi’a movement led by Sheikh Ibrahim El Zakzaky was implicated, do not in any 
way downplay the violent complicity of groups such as the Yan Izala, which in-
deed clashed with members of the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood in October 2013 in 
Zamfara State. 
It was noted earlier that the second category of violent deaths caused by intra-
Islamic clashes refers specifically to attacks instigated by Boko Haram against 
the entire cross-section of Islamic groups in Nigeria. Similar to the desire of sev-
eral of these Islamic movements in the country, Boko Haram advocates a na-
tionwide application of Sharia. However, the line of disparity between these Is-
lamic groups and Boko Haram is drawn based on the aggressive modus operandi 
which Boko Haram adopts. As a result, it is indeed the case that the majority of 
these Islamic groups are in fundamental disagreement with Boko Haram, and it is 
this point of divergence that contributes to the provocation of  
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Table 5.3 Violent deaths of Islamic clerics due to Islamist (mainly Boko Haram)- 
 related attacks (June 2006-May 2014) 
Name of Islamic  
cleric/leader Islamic affiliation 
Location of 
death/state 
Period of 
death/year 
Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud 
Adam 
Jama’t Izalat al Bid’a Wa 
Iqamat as Sunna or Yan Izala 
Kano State Apr 2007 
Sheikh Bashir Mustafa Not indicated Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Oct 2010 
Ustaz Ibrahim Ahmed 
Abdullahi Gomari 
Not indicated 
Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Mar 2011 
Sheikh Goni Tijjani Not indicated 
Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
May 2011 
Mallam Alhaji Abur Not indicated 
Maiduguri, Bor-
no State May 2011 
Sheikh Ibrahim Birkuti Wahabbi Biu, Borno State June 2011 
Liman Bana Not indicated Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Aug 2011 
Mallam Dala Not indicated Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Sept 2011 
Sheikh Ali Jana'a Not indicated 
Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Oct 2011 
Mallam Mai Tatabara Not indicated 
Damaturu, Yobe 
State 
Feb 2012 
Modu Goroma (Arabic 
teacher) Not indicated 
Damaturu, Yobe 
State Feb 2012 
Sheikh Saina Alhaji 
Ajiya Not indicated 
Konduga, Borno 
State Feb 2012 
Mohammed Alhaji Bu-
kar 
Not indicated Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Mar 2012 
Goni Mustapha Not indicated Maiduguri, Bor-
no State 
Apr 2012 
Mohammed Alli Shiite Kano State May 2012 
Usman Muhammed Not indicated 
Potiskum, Yobe 
State 
May 2012 
Sheikh Ibrahim Majimi Not indicated 
Maiduguri, Bor-
no State July 2012 
Alarama Dan Gobobira-
wa Not indicated 
Potiskum, Yobe 
State Dec 2012 
Mallam Sheriff Not indicated Ngamdu, Yobe 
State 
May 2013 
Alhaji Liman Bukar 
(Chief Imam) 
Not indicated Fune, Yobe 
State 
Aug 2013 
Sheikh Muhammad Au-
wal Adam Albani 
Salafiyyah 
Zaria, Kaduna 
State 
Feb 2014 
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violence. Consequently, while 2011 reflected the highest frequency of Boko Ha-
ram attacks against several members of these Islamic groups and their mosques, 
2012 was replete with a record number of assassinations targeted at Islamic cler-
ics perceived as ‘opponents’. Table 5.3, as already noted, lists some of these cas-
ualties. 
 
Islamic group versus the security forces 
The security forces constitute what this study has so far described as non-
religious protagonists. Although not the prime concern of this study, their role 
assumes some measure of significance owing to their violent interaction with one 
of the major variables (Islamic actors) examined in this paper. Thus, on the one 
hand we have the Islamist group Boko Haram, and on the other we have the se-
curity forces, comprised of members of the JTF, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), 
and the State Security Service (SSS), among others. In addition, this rubric repre-
sents the highest number of violent death incidents (418) with which one of our 
major variables (Islamic actors) is connected. However, the lead-up to this high 
frequency of incidents appeared inconsequential until 2009, when figures (fatali-
ties and incidents) began to accumulate. 
It should be noted that among the several deaths that occurred in 2009, that of 
the former leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, marked a turning point in 
the level of violent encounters involving the Islamist group and the security forc-
es. Consequently, more clashes ensued in 2010 and particularly in (August) 
2011, which was also the year when the UN building was attacked. Events 
reached a violent crescendo in 2012, when as many as 161 incidents transpired, 
in places such as Damaturu and Potiskum in Yobe State, Zaria in Kaduna State, 
Tarauni in Kano State, and Dikwa and Maiduguri in Borno State. As at May 
2014, there have been 31 violent death incidents involving members of Boko Ha-
ram and the security forces since the start of the year. Although this may not re-
flect a high frequency in comparison with the two preceding years, the incidents 
in the first five months of 2014 led to well over 3,000 deaths (Figure 5.3). 
 
Islamic group versus Vigilante group and Civilian Joint Task Force 
By mid-2013, when the Nigerian government imposed a state of emergency in 
north-eastern states such as Borno, the formation of what is now called the Civil-
ian Joint Task Force (CJTF) became very visible amidst the violence instigated 
by the Islamist group Boko Haram. Since 2013, the CJTF, comprised mainly of 
youths whose families and communities have been ravaged by the state of unrest 
in the North-East, has engaged Boko Haram in a number of violent encounters. 
By way of counter-reaction, Boko Haram insurgents have extended their scope of 
attacks beyond battles waged against the state, religious clerics, and the govern-
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ment’s JTF to engage members of the CJTF in several clashes. Although the 
CJTF does not constitute one of the leading variables of this study, their contri-
bution to the overall frequency of violent deaths resulting from clashes with an 
Islamist group creates an entry point for them into the framework of our mapping 
study. 
Our data reflects a total of seven lethal incidents involving the CJTF, five of 
which occurred in 2013 and two as at May 2014. In spite of the presence of the 
CJTF in a number of states within the troubled North-East, these incidents all 
transpired in Borno State. The incidents have largely manifested in three forms: 
The first entails situations whereby members clash with Boko Haram insurgents 
resulting in casualties on both sides as well as affecting the civilian population, 
as occurred in July 2013 in Kaga, Borno State. The second is when members are 
attacked/ambushed by Boko Haram insurgents, as reported in January 2014 when 
four CJTF members were killed in Mafa, Borno State. The third is when efforts 
by CJTF members and the government’s JTF are jointly coordinated against 
Boko Haram insurgents. A case in point was in May 2014, when a Boko Haram 
attack was repelled and a reported 15 insurgents were killed in Konduga, Borno 
State. 
 
Other fatal incidents involving Muslims and Christians (community violence) 
The final aspect of our discussion on the patterns of Muslim-Christian violence 
deals with what we refer to as ‘other violent death incidents involving Muslims 
and Christians’. The process of data generation for this rubric raises a slight 
methodological challenge, however, because it lends itself to the potential risk of 
including data from almost the entire spectrum of violent death incidents in the 
Nigeria Watch database. This is the case because nearly every individual (perpe-
trators and victims) connected with violent death incidents in the database most 
likely bears the identity of one of the two major religions in Nigeria-Islam and 
Christianity. Therefore, an effective definition of ‘other violent death incidents 
involving Muslims and Christians’ is accompanied by some level of difficulty 
and risk for meaningful analysis. 
Hence, in order to mitigate the chances of collating an unwieldy set of data 
under this rubric, this study still maintained the approach of searching through 
the database using the key words ‘Islamic groups’ and ‘Churches’. Thereafter, 
the violent death incidents which remained after data selection and classification 
under the five rubrics discussed earlier became defined as ‘other violent death 
incidents involving Muslims and Christians’. However, to further qualify and 
give meaning to the leftover data that fell under this last rubric, each incident was 
analysed based on the complicity of Muslims and Christians in issues described 
as community violence. In other words, these ‘other violent death incidents’ are 
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not consequential to direct conflict between Muslims and Christians or between 
groups within either of the religions. A total of 332 incidents were identified 
(Table 5.1), and a few cases are briefly cited here to illustrate what exactly we 
label as community violence. 
In August 2006, the followers of a church known as Christian Praying Assem-
bly, whose overseer was popularly known as Reverend King, clashed with a 
group of youths (Area Boys) in the Ebute-Metta area of Lagos State. Although 
this was a single incident, community violence can take other forms, however, 
and also involve other religious actors as well as more casualties. In February 
2008, for instance, 60 individuals were reported to have been tortured to death in 
illegal detention camps described as ‘spiritual rehabilitation centres’, which were 
run by ‘Islamic clerics’ in Ibadan, Oyo State. A third form of community vio-
lence involved a town called Gobi in Adamawa State. It was the scene of two 
bank robbery attacks leading to the death of seven individuals and carried out by 
the Islamist group Boko Haram in August 2011. Indeed, while this type of bank 
raid may be linked to other sinister groups in the state, Boko Haram has attempt-
ed to justify such robberies in light of their accusation against Western banks of 
being owned by ‘big men’ who siphon public funds and charge usury (Pérouse de 
Montclos 2014). The group has also claimed responsibility for attacks on public 
spaces such as the Baga fish market, where dozens of innocent people were killed 
in February 2012 in Borno State. And in spite of a similarity with its style of at-
tacks against Islamic clerics, it often seems that religious motives do not factor 
into Boko Haram’s targeting of communities and district heads in several parts of 
Borno State. The sheer increase in the number of violent death incidents in 2013 
and 2014 reveals more and more non-religious community targets aimed at by 
the group, some of the incidents having included the killing of district heads in 
Dala Alamderi in Maiduguri and Lawanti in Damboa, and the invasion of villag-
es in Gwoza, Konduga, and Bama in Borno State. 
Conclusion 
Understanding the true character of Muslim-Christian violent deaths between 
June 2006 and May 2014 requires knowledge of not only the religious dimension 
of this linkage; intellectual inquiries must appreciate also the cases of violent 
deaths inspired by issues connected with ethnicity, crime, land, and politics. We 
have established in this study that the essence of the violent interaction between 
Muslims and Christians is not devoid of the non-religious factors highlighted. 
The statistics presented in this paper have also illustrated that even in cases 
where religious issues underlie causes of violent deaths, the associated incidents 
can also reflect the involvement of non-religious actors. Furthermore, our map-
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ping demonstrates that religious causes of violent deaths can in fact manifest be-
tween groups belonging to the same religious faith. Within the context of geog-
raphy, this paper finds that beyond any other region of Nigeria, the northern part 
embodies a preponderance of the violent interaction between Muslims and Chris-
tians. Finally, beyond local dynamics, global media perspectives consistently 
frame violence in Nigeria as largely religious and between Muslims and Chris-
tians, rather than adopting a more nuanced approach that enables a balanced in-
terpretation of events. 
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analysis (2006-2014) 
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Abstract 
Over the years, the Nigerian army has been regularly deployed to assist the po-
lice in law enforcement and internal security operations. This practice results 
largely from the belief that the presence of the security forces is sufficient to 
guarantee internal security. Data from the Nigeria Watch database, however, 
indicates that the intervention of the security forces in violent incidents often 
exacerbates the situation. This study shows that between June 2006 and May 
2014 the security forces caused fatalities in 59% of the lethal incidents in 
which they intervened. Secondly, the more the security forces intervene, the 
more people are killed. This explains why from an annual average of 59% be-
tween June 2006 and May 2007, killings by the security forces peaked at 80% 
between June 2013 and May 2014. Thirdly, 58% of police interventions cause 
fatalities compared with 60% in the case of the army, an indication that killings 
by the police are more prevalent, while the army cause more fatalities per inci-
dent. Lastly, killings by the security forces are more prevalent in the southern 
part of the country but cause more fatalities in the northern part. 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the evolution and patterns of killings by the security forces in 
Nigeria between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014. This nationwide mapping focus-
es on the dynamics of security forces killings, including the political dimensions 
of violent incidents involving the security forces. The study also considers the 
intervention of the security forces in violent incidents involving religious groups 
and criminal gangs. The interactions between the security forces and these groups 
are often characterized by violence and, in most cases, result in deaths. In fact, 
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the intervention of the security forces in violent incidents often exacerbates the 
situation and causes more deaths than the earlier stages of the incidents.1 
Deaths resulting from the intervention of the security forces are sometimes 
overstated in both media and individual reports, while the security forces them-
selves rarely admit to causing deaths in their operations. This study discovered 
that while media reports and victims’ accounts cannot be entirely disregarded, 
there are many inconsistencies in the reported number of fatalities caused by the 
security forces. Although it is very likely that media and victims’ accounts over-
state the number of fatalities, the security forces are notorious for either overstat-
ing or under-reporting the number of fatalities, depending on the context. The 
security forces usually give lower fatality figures when reporting to the interna-
tional media, and they present higher fatality figures at home to create the im-
pression that they are living up to their mandates. Hence, reports by the security 
forces rarely provide accurate figures and often reveal many discrepancies when 
compared with media reports and individual accounts. This makes it difficult to 
reliably analyse the trends and patterns of security forces killings nationwide. 
In view of the difficulty in arriving at reliable fatality figures, and considering 
the fact that one needs a reliable dataset in order to map and analyse trends na-
tionwide, this study explores the patterns and dimensions of killings by the secu-
rity forces using graphs and maps generated from data collated from the Nigeria 
Watch database. The focus is on the dynamics of killings by the security forces, 
and this raises several important questions for this study: First, what are the main 
features of security forces killings in Nigeria? This question also relates to the 
timing of major national events such as elections, when the security forces usual-
ly cause fatalities. Second, in terms of perpetrators, which security institution is 
more involved in security forces killings? Third, are security forces killings more 
prevalent in the North or the South, and why? These questions are examined in 
the three main sections of this paper. 
Following an outline of the paper, a description of the general context of secu-
rity forces killings in Nigeria is provided. Thereafter, we proceed to the second 
section of this paper and categorize the distribution of data relating to fatalities 
caused by the security forces between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014, in order to 
address the second question of the study. The objective here is to present statisti-
cal data in order to determine the major institutions involved in security forces 
killings. In order to address the third question of the study, the statistical data 
were disaggregated according to states and supplemented with a security map in 
order to determine regional differences in the prevalence of security forces kill-
                                                 
1  Ebohon, S.I. & E.U.B. Ifeadi (2012), Managing the Problems of Public Order and Internal security in 
Nigeria. African Security 5(1): 1-23. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2012.653304. 
Accessed 18 August 2015. 
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ings in relation to the North and the South. The statistical data was further dis-
aggregated and classified by period in order to analyse patterns of security forces 
killings during general elections. The concluding section highlights the major 
findings based on the overall statistical and empirical content of the information 
and data analysed. 
The security forces and incidents of violent deaths 
Killings of criminal suspects and innocents citizens by the security forces in Ni-
geria are reported in the media almost on a daily basis.2 Historically, law en-
forcement in the country has been characterized by violence and extra-judicial 
killings. Since its origin as a ‘consular guard’, whose primary function was to 
protect the economic and political interests of the colonial authority, the security 
forces have continued to use excessive force, including arbitrary killings, in their 
engagement with the civilian population.3 In the immediate post-colonial period 
the repressive character of the security forces was heightened as a result of the 
militarization of internal security during military rule, when the army, police, and 
paramilitary forces were used to repress and kill people arbitrarily.4 Since the end 
of military rule in 1999, successive civilian governments have militarized law 
enforcement by routinely deploying the army for internal security operations. 
Over the years, various Joint Security Task Forces (JTFs) have been created 
and deployed for internal security duties as a result of the inability of the police 
to effectively combat the rising wave of organized crime, militancy, and insur-
gency in the country.5 Members of these task forces, who are usually drawn from 
the Nigerian army, navy, air force, police, State Security Service (SSS), Depart-
ment of State Security (DSS), and immigration and customs officials, often act 
like occupying forces against the civilian population, killing people arbitrarily. 
The security forces rarely adhere to legally mandated rules of engagement, and 
they are known to use excessive force to arrest, detain, and kill anyone who hap-
pens to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.6 
                                                 
2  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014), Nigeria Watch: Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-
2014), p. 6. Available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report14.pdf. 
3  Alemika, E. (1993), Colonialism, State and Policing in Nigeria, Law and Social Change 20(3): 187-
219. 
4  Alao, A. (2010) Security Reform in Democratic Nigeria. Conflict, Security and Development, Work-
ing Paper, No. 2, pp. 1-52. Available at http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/work2.pdf. 
5  Francis, P., D. LaPin & P. Rossiasco (2011), Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A 
Social and Conflict Analysis for Change. Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Wash-
ington DC. 
6  Afeno, S. Odomovo (2012), The Boko Haram Uprising and Insecurity in Nigeria: Intelligence Failure 
or Bad Governance? Conflict Trend, Issue 1, pp. 35-41. Available at:  
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ACCORD-conflict-trends-2012-1.pdf. 
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Although some of the victims are criminal suspects, others are innocent indi-
viduals who are killed either because of politics, or extortion of bribes, or other 
pecuniary reasons. The security forces, notably the police and army, routinely 
mount roadblocks and checkpoints on major highways in order to forcefully ex-
tort bribes from commuters. Forceful extortion of bribes on the highways often 
results in incidents of accidental or intentional killings. Moreover, security forces 
often respond to civil unrest, including protests and riots, with excessive force, 
which frequently results in deaths. It is remarkable that killings by the security 
forces are often counted as evidence of effective counter-insurgency and polic-
ing,7 as is evidenced in the public display of criminal suspects killed by the secu-
rity forces. Perhaps the violent character of law enforcement in the country is a 
reflection of the history and social environment of the security forces. Certainly, 
the political influence, economic background, and ‘self-esteem’ of the security 
forces determine their actual behaviour and the level of security they provide for 
‘the ordinary people’.8 Hence, the dynamics of killings by the security forces 
may be better understood when examined within their changing political, legal, 
economic, and social contexts. 
 
Political context 
In Nigeria, ‘national security’ is equated with ‘state security’, and ‘state security’ 
is viewed as the security of political office holders.9 Consequently, the security 
forces are organized and managed to protect the politically influential and the 
rich by using state violence against other sections of the population.10 Moreover, 
certain political values are attached to state violence,11 especially during elections 
to public office. Political patronage and the use of political power to gain access 
to wealth promote political violence. Competition for political power is closely 
associated with the buying and selling of votes and politically motivated killings 
during elections.12 In addition, the so-called security votes - a security fund re-
served for the political executive - is often appropriated simply by ‘evoking na-
                                                 
7  NOPRIN (2007), Criminal Force? An Interim Report on the Nigeria Police Force. Network on Police 
Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), Lagos. 
8  Mehler, A. (2009), The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and 
the Central African Republic. German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Available at 
http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wp114_mehler.pdf. 
9  Ibeanu O. & A. Momoh (2008), State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs. Nigeria Country Case 
Study produced for the project on ‘The Politics of Security Decision-Making’. Available at 
https://www.academia.edu/1944700/State_Responsiveness_to_Public_Security_Needs_The_Politics_
of_Public_Security_Decision-Making_-_Nigeria_Country_Study. 
10  Pearce, J., R. McGee & J. Wheeler (2011), Violence, Security and Democracy: Perverse Interfaces 
and their Implications for States and Citizens in the Global South. IDS Working Paper, No.357.  
11  Hills, A. (2012), Lost in Translation: Why Nigeria’s Police Don’t Implement Democratic Reforms, 
International Affairs 88(4): 739-755. 
12  Hill, J.C.N. (2012), Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile? Palgrave Macmillan.  
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tional security’.13 The idea of ‘security votes’ implicitly promotes state violence, 
mostly through the security forces, because it often results in the allocation of 
more funds to political executives and the security forces. As Howe observed, the 
character and behaviour of the security forces is largely a reflection of ‘national 
political structures and values’.14 Hence, the increasing concern of the political 
leadership with regime and political survival has resulted in widespread killings 
by the security forces, with near impunity. 
 
Legal context 
In law enforcement, security forces use a form of authorized state coercion, but 
they do so in ‘tense and often emotionally charged interpersonal encounters’ with 
members of the public.15 Hence, to avoid abuse of their mandates, security forces 
are regulated through institutional laws and codes of conduct, including ‘rules of 
engagement’, while discharging their duties. In Nigeria, however, the law grants 
the security forces wide discretionary powers. For instance, the Criminal Code 
Act permits the security forces, notably the police, to use force in the suppression 
of civil unrest and the arrest of suspects, and to use ‘any reasonable force’ to pre-
vent the ‘escape of an arrested person’; and in the case of serious crime, it per-
mits them to kill the suspect if he/she cannot be arrested by any means.16 Police 
Order 237 also permits police officers to shoot detainees and suspects who try to 
escape or evade arrest.17 
Police officers are never held responsible for their excesses even though the 
Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that ‘[a]ny person authorized by law to use 
force is criminally responsible for any excess, according to the nature and the 
quality of the act which constitutes the excess’.18 Weak institutional accountabil-
ity measures make oversight of the security forces ineffective. Judicial oversight 
of security forces is weak largely because the leadership of the security forces 
prefer internal accountability measures to external oversight bodies. 19 For in-
stance, the police and the military forces prefer an ‘Orderly Room Trial’ and a 
                                                 
13  Uwimana, C. & L. Wawro (2014), Corruption in Nigeria Military and Security Forces: A Weapon in 
Boko Haram’s Hands. Available at http://saharareporters.com/report/corruption-nigerias-military-and-
security-forces-weapon-boko-haram%E2%80%99s-hands-transparency-inter 
14  Howe, M.H. (2001), Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.  
15  Harmon, A.R. (2008), When is Police Violence Justified? Northwestern University Law Review 
102(3): 1120. 
16 Criminal Code Act (1990), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. Available at 
http://nigerianlawguru.com/legislations/STATUTES/CRIMINAL%20CODE.pdf 
17  Force Order No. 237, Rules for Guidance in the Use of Firearms by the Police. 
18  Criminal Code Act (1990), 25 (298). 
19  Chukwuma, I. (1997), ‘The Legal Structure of the Police and Human Rights in Nigeria’. Third World 
Legal Studies, Vol. 14, Article 4, pp. 40-70. Available at:  
http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=twls 
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‘Court Martial’, respectively, in trying their erring officers.20 Thus, lack of coop-
eration from the security forces often frustrates the oversight functions of the 
courts and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). In consequence, 
the repressive laws and weak accountability measures reinforce the ability of the 
security forces to engage with impunity in arbitrary killings. 
 
Economic context 
Economic factors play a significant role in killings by the security forces in Nige-
ria. Most security forces violence and killings are driven by vested economic in-
terests. For instance, the security forces have been accused of influencing the 
continuation of violent instability in the Niger Delta because of their alleged in-
volvement in the oil bunkering business in the area.21 Corruption is widespread 
in Nigeria, and the security forces, and the police in particular, are among the 
most corrupt public institutions in the country.22 Funds meant for funding the 
security forces are often misappropriated by its leadership and by political execu-
tives, leaving the forces ill-equipped and demoralized.23 Hence, faced with lack 
of equipment and very low wages, the security forces indulge in corrupt practic-
es, including forceful extortion of bribes, which often result in human rights 
abuses and extra-judicial killings. Most security operatives see extortion of bribes 
as ‘a way to earn a living’, and ordinary citizens are obliged to pay for every ser-
vice rendered by the security forces. 24 Furthermore, the police usually solicit 
bribes to investigate or discontinue investigation of suspects, and they sometimes 
kill on behalf of influential individuals.25 
 
Social context 
Nigeria is bedevilled by many social challenges that promote widespread killings 
by the security forces. Poverty and social inequalities can cause ethno-religious 
conflicts, criminality, and insurgency, all of which result in violent responses by 
                                                 
20  NOPRIN (2007), Criminal Force? An Interim Report on the Nigeria Police Force. Network on Police 
Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), Lagos. 
21  Katsouris, C. & S. Aaron (2013), Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Ex-
port of Stolen Oil. Chatham House. Available at: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf. 
22  Persson, H. (2014), Nigeria – An Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security. Available at: 
http://www.foi.se/Documents/Persson,%20Nigeria%20-
%20An%20Overview%20of%20Challenges%20to%20Peace%20and%20Security,%202014.pdf. 
23  Uwimana, C. & L. Wawro (2014), Corruption in Nigeria Military and Security Forces: A Weapon in 
Boko Haram’s Hands. Available at http://saharareporters.com/report/corruption-nigerias-military-and-
security-forces-weapon-boko-haram%E2%80%99s-hands-transparency-inter 
24  Persson, H. (2014), Nigeria: An Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security. Available at: 
http://www.foi.se/Documents/Persson,%20Nigeria%20-
%20An%20Overview%20of%20Challenges%20to%20Peace%20and%20Security,%202014.pdf. 
25  Human Rights Watch (2014), World Report – Nigeria. Available at http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/nigeria. 
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the state.26 ‘To restore order’, the security forces often kill more people than are 
killed at the initial stage of a conflict.27 Hence, killings by the security forces are 
very common in the areas most affected by ethno-religious violence, criminality, 
militancy, and insurgency. For instance, arbitrary killings by the security forces 
were very common in the pre-amnesty Niger Delta because of militant activities, 
while the imposition of emergency rule in the North-East following the Boko 
Haram insurgency has resulted in widespread killings by the security forces. 
Mapping of killings by the security forces 
There is hardly any reliable statistical analysis of trends and patterns of security 
forces killings across Nigeria. This is partly a result of inconsistencies in both 
official data and media reports on such killings. Reports by the police and other 
security agencies rarely give accurate figures and reveal many discrepancies 
when compared with media reports and individual accounts.28 These discrepan-
cies make it very difficult to get the ‘actual number of people killed by the police 
and other security forces’.29 As a result of the unsystematic recording of crime 
data, deaths resulting from security forces violence are either under-reported or 
overstated.30 This inconsistency in body count makes it very difficult to reliably 
analyse trends and patterns of killings by the security forces nationwide. Statis-
tics about security forces killings in Nigeria simply do not provide reliable in-
formation for nationwide mapping and analysis. Consequently, it has become 
difficult to identify major categories of security forces killings, where and when 
such killings are likely to occur, and whether such killings are decreasing or in-
creasing. 
 
Data and methods 
This study is based on data extracted from the Nigeria Watch database and co-
vers the period between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014.31 This time frame was 
                                                 
26  Persson, ‘Nigeria – An Overview’ ; Ebohon, S. & E. Ifeadi (2012), Managing the Problems of Public 
Order and Internal Security in Nigeria, African Security 5(1): 1-23. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2012.653304. 
27  Hill, J.C.N. (2012), Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile? Palgrave Macmillan. 
28  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2011), Nigeria Watch: Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-
2011), p. 7. Available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report11(1).pdf. 
29  Ojo, O.E. (2010), Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extra-Judicial State. Journal of Sustainable Development in 
Africa 12(2): 55. Available at: 
http://www.jsd-
africa.com/Jsda/V12No2_Spring2010_B/PDF/Boko%20Haram%20Nigeria's%20Extra-
Judicial%20State%20(Ojo).pdf. 
30  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2011), Nigeria Watch: Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-
2011), p. 8. Available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report11(1).pdf 
31  Nigeria Watch. Available at: www.nigeriawatch.org. 
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chosen because the database started in June 2006, and this study seeks to map 
and analyse the trends of killings by the security forces over an eight-year period. 
It should therefore be noted that with the exception of the full years 2007 to 
2013, data for 2006 and 2014 should be considered in the light of the stated peri-
od when data collation and analysis started and ended. The choice of the Nigeria 
Watch database is based on the understanding that official data, media reports, 
and individual accounts are largely inconsistent and therefore unreliable. The 
security forces, especially the police, either under-report or overstate the number 
of deaths, depending on the occasion;32 the press have a tendency to overestimate 
casualties of security forces violence; and individuals also tend to overstate the 
number of people killed by the security forces. However, discrepancies in body 
counts and methodological biases inherent in official data, media reports, and 
individual accounts are largely mitigated in the Nigeria Watch database, which 
monitors, compiles, and cross-checks data on violent deaths from several sources 
for reliability. 
The categories ‘security forces’, ‘army’, ‘police’, and ‘other security forces’ 
were used to search the database. Here, ‘other security forces’ includes all Feder-
al and state governmental security and paramilitary forces, excluding the police, 
army, and JTFs.33 The database was also searched through a filter, ‘security forc-
es implication’, which identifies violent incidents where the involvement of the 
security forces resulted in at least one death. The data generated were categorized 
into main protagonists (army, police, or other security forces), causes (crime, po-
litical issues, religious issues, etc.), and relations (security forces versus religious 
groups, political groups, communities, and trade unions). Data collated from the 
database were used to produce charts and security maps and to generate statistics 
for trend analysis of killings by the security forces nationwide. 
 
The main security institutions involved in killings 
In general, the Nigerian security forces - including the army, navy, air force, po-
lice, SSS, customs, immigration, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) - exhibit a 
culture of violence and kill with impunity. They are often responsible for violent 
deaths whenever they intervene in any violent incident.34 They repeatedly show 
themselves unable to maintain law and order in violent conflicts; and the more 
                                                 
32  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2011), Nigeria Watch: Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006–
2011). Available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report11(1).pdf. 
33  JTFs are combinations of the police and the army in common task forces that can also include other 
security institutions. For the sake of clarity, it is here considered that press reports on JTFs refer main-
ly to the police and the army. These task forces are not to be confused with paramilitary militias called 
‘Civilian JTF’ in north-eastern Nigeria. 
34  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014), Nigeria Watch: Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-
2014). Available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report14.pdf. 
501890-L-bw-ASC
120 
 
they intervene, the more people are killed.35 In the majority of conflicts where the 
security forces intervened, they were responsible for causing many deaths. This 
is worrisome because the interventions of the security forces result in more rather 
than fewer fatalities. Figure 6.1 shows the trend in the number of deaths caused 
by the security forces between June 2006 and May 2014. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Number of violent deaths resulting from incidents where the securi-
ty  
 forces intervened, per year (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
The results show that most of the killings were perpetrated by the police and 
the army. Between 2006 and 2014, the police caused deaths in 1,560 of 2,694 
violent incidents they were involved in, which represents an average of 58% of 
their interventions causing deaths. The majority of the fatalities caused by the 
police resulted from extra-judicial killings. The Legal Defence and Assistance 
Project of Nigeria recorded 997 and 2,987 extra-judicial killings by the police in 
2003 and 2004, respectively.36 The proportion is quite similar (60%) in the case 
of the army, which killed in 529 out of 880 incidents in which they intervened 
within the same period. While it is reasonable to argue that most of the killings 
were caused by the police and the army, other governmental security forces also 
caused many deaths in their operations. For instance, the ‘other security forces’ 
have killed in 119 out of 265 (45%) incidents in which they were involved. From 
                                                 
35  Hill, Nigeria Since Independence; Peruse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014), Nigeria Watch: Fourth Report 
on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2014), p. 6. Available at: 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report14.pdf.  
36  Alston, P. (2006) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions: Mission to Nigeria, Geneva, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commissioning on 
Human Rights, 38 pp. 
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an annual average of 59% between June 2006 and May 2007, security forces in-
terventions that resulted in deaths peaked at 80% between June 2013 and May 
2014. This is not unexpected, because the pattern of killings by the security forc-
es has changed since 2013, following the imposition of emergency rule in the 
North-East in response to the Boko Haram insurgency. However, the pattern is 
quite systemic, and one can safely argue that these killings ‘ha[ve] much to do 
with a general culture of violence and impunity within the security forces’ rather 
than ‘collateral damage’.37 
Many security personnel have also been killed in the course of discharging 
their duties. Among the security agencies, the police and the army arguably suf-
fered the highest casualty figures. According to Nigeria Police Watch, for in-
stance, a total of 263 police officers were killed on active service in 2009.38 The 
majority of the deaths were caused by armed robbers, while others were killed in 
violent encounters with Boko Haram insurgents. The year 2013 was particularly 
deadly for the police, as it recorded very high casualty figures among its officers. 
According to the Police Officers Wives Association (POWA), ‘in the year 2013 
alone, 1,585 policemen were killed in the line of duty’.39 Although the army does 
not publicize casualty figures among its officers and the rank and file, the Boko 
Haram crisis has resulted in many soldiers being killed in the fight against the 
insurgents. In fact, in August 2014, some soldiers who were angry about the high 
death toll in the army even rebelled against their commanding officer.40 
Involvement of the army and police in security forces killings 
The security forces are usually the major protagonists in all incidents where they 
cause violent deaths. The majority of incidents where the security forces have 
killed often involve criminal groups, oil companies, and religious, political, and 
ethnic groups. A closer analysis shows that more people are killed where the se-
curity forces are the major actors. Between 2006 and 2014, for instance, the secu-
rity forces killed in 2,043 incidents, resulting in 12,078 fatalities. However, it 
would be too simplistic to assume that the magnitude of killings by the security 
                                                 
37  Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014), Nigeria Watch: Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-
2014), p. 7. Available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report14.pdf. 
38  Nigeria Police Watch (2011), 263 Police Officers Gunned Down in 2009, Official Says. 
http://www.nigeriapolicewatch.com/2011/05/263-police-officers-gunned-down-in-2009-official-says/. 
Accessed 30 September 2014.  
39  Otuchikere, C. (2014), Keeping Alive Dreams of Fallen Police Officers’ Children, Leadership. 
http://leadership.ng/features/372674/keeping-alive-dreams-fallen-police-officers-children. Accessed 
29 September 2014. 
40  Sahara Reporters (2014), Near Mutiny at Army Barracks in Maiduguri over High Number of Casualty 
in Gwoza. http://saharareporters.com/2014/08/07/near-mutiny-army-barracks-maiduguri-over-high-
number-nigerian-troops-casualty-gwoza. Accessed 30 September 2014.  
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forces is the same in all violent incidents where they intervene. Ethno-political 
and religious conflicts are very common, and the intervention of the security 
forces in these conflicts causes more deaths.41 In law enforcement, the police and 
other security agencies have a tendency to kill rather than arrest and prosecute 
criminal suspects.42 Although the police are the primary institution responsible 
for law enforcement and internal security, routine deployment of the army for 
internal security duties has resulted in cases where their encounters with crimi-
nals have caused many deaths. In terms of relationship, more people have been 
killed in violent incidents where the army is involved. 
The internal security operations of the army are usually characterized by high 
fatalities, resulting from excessive use of force. Figure 6.2 represents the major 
protagonists in incidents where the army and the police intervened and their cor-
responding number of deaths. The results show that most fatalities caused by the 
army or its adversaries are recorded in violent conflicts involving religious and 
political groups. Of course, the army has killed more insurgents and civilians 
since its engagement with the Boko Haram Islamic group in the North-East. The 
ideology of the Boko Haram group makes them both an Islamic and a political 
group; but if it is possible to differentiate between the two types of group, the 
army appears to cause more deaths in violent incidents involving religious 
groups. Besides political and religious groups, the intervention of the army in 
violent conflicts involving communities within the same period resulted in 1,572 
fatalities. This shows that the army is more violent in its engagement with the 
public than the police and that its intervention in violent conflicts often results in 
more deaths. 
Compared with the army, the relationships between the police and political 
groups, religious associations, trade unions, and host communities appear less 
violent. However, the involvement of the police in conflicts involving political 
groups causes more fatalities. Figure 6.2 shows that between June 2006 and May 
2014, fatal incidents where the police intervened resulted in 1,332 fatalities when 
they involved political groups, 877 fatalities when they involved communities, 
and 612 fatalities when they involved trade unions. Perhaps the politicization of 
the engagement of the security forces with civilians is responsible for this pattern 
of large numbers of fatalities in incidents involving political groups. 
 
 
  
                                                 
41  Hill, Nigeria Since Independence. 
42  Serrano, R. & P. Zacharias (2014), By the Numbers: The Nigerian State’s Efforts to Counter Boko 
Haram. In: M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos, ed., Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in 
Nigeria. Leiden: African Studies Centre, p. 207.  
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Figure 6.2 Number of violent deaths resulting from incidents where the security forces  
 intervened, by type of relationship (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Main protagonists in incidents where the army have caused fatalities 
Since 1999, successive civilian governments have established various military-
dominated JTFs, under whose auspices the army is routinely deployed for law 
enforcement and internal security operations.43 Unfortunately, the internal securi-
ty operations of the army are usually characterized by the use of disproportionate 
force, causing high civilian fatalities. Since 2006, the intervention of the army in 
violent conflicts involving the police, communities, trade unions, political 
groups, and religious associations has caused very many deaths. A total of 7,648 
fatalities were recorded in 529 out of a total of 880 lethal incidents where the ar-
my was involved. This translates to an average of 60% of all army interventions 
causing fatalities. Figure 6.3 presents the distribution of these incidents over the 
years under study. 
 
  
                                                 
43  Francis, P., D. LaPin & P. Rossiasco (2011), Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A 
Social and Conflict Analysis for Change. Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Wash-
ington DC. 
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Figure 6.3 Number of violent deaths resulting from incidents where the army intervened, per  
 year (June 2006- May 2014) 
 
 
 
The result shows a noticeable increase in the number of fatalities caused by 
the army in 2009, 2012, and 2013. The high fatality figures in 2009 can be ex-
plained by the deployment of military forces to combat Boko Haram in the 
North-East and militant groups in the Niger Delta. In May 2009, a combined 
force of army, air force, and navy personnel bombarded seven communities sus-
pected of harbouring militant camps in Delta State, killing over 500 people.44 
However, there was a downward trend in killings by the army in 2010, with a 
steady increase in the following years and a peak when emergency rule was es-
tablished in the North-East in 2013. In April 2013, for instance, approximately 
185 civilians were killed in a military operation against Boko Haram insurgents 
in Borno. Although it appears the army caused more fatalities in 2013, a critical 
look at 2014 reveals a sharp increase in fatalities within the first five months. The 
trend is alarming and the number of victims reached a total of 5,045 by the end 
the year. 
These results do not provide information about the major actors involved in 
such incidents. However, Figure 6.2 shows that within the period examined in 
this study, military interventions caused a significant number of fatalities in 
clashes involving Islamic groups, political groups, and communities, as well as in 
inter-agency conflicts with the police. The relationship between the army and 
Islamic groups is particularly deadly. Between June 2006 and May 2014, violent 
conflicts involving the army and Islamic groups, especially the Boko Haram sect, 
have caused 3,152 fatalities. The relations between the army and political groups 
are equally very violent, causing 2,212 fatalities within the same period. While it 
appears that the relation between the army and Islamic groups is more deadly 
                                                 
44  Ibid. p. 200. 
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than other of its relations, it would be too simplistic to assume that the relation 
between the army and political groups is less violent, because it is often difficult 
to differentiate between the two groups. For instance, the ideology of the Boko 
Haram Islamic sect presents them as both a religious and political group. 
 
Main protagonists in incidents where the police have caused fatalities 
Clashes between the army and police are another problem, even if they are less 
deadly (26 fatalities within eight years). In theory, the involvement of the army in 
internal security is supposed to supplement the efforts of the police in maintain-
ing public order. It is not to create unnecessary rivalry to the extent of causing 
fatalities. As the primary institution responsible for law enforcement and internal 
security, the police actually intervene in many violent conflicts involving diverse 
groups. Most of these interventions cause fatalities. In 1,560 of 2,704 lethal inci-
dents where it intervened, the police were responsible for killings resulting in a 
total of 5,851 deaths between June 2006 and May 2014. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Number of violent deaths resulting from incidents where the police intervened, per  
 year (June 2006-May 2014 
 
 
Figure 6.4 indicates an increasing trend of killings by the police between 2006 
and 2009 and a significant decrease in fatalities in 2010. The active involvement 
of the army in internal security, as a result of the inability of the police to effec-
tively combat the menace of insurgency, is the most likely explanation for the 
observable decrease in fatalities caused by the police in 2010. A critical look at 
Figure 6.3 above shows that the sharp decrease in police killings in 2010 was 
followed by a corresponding increase in fatalities caused by the army in the same 
year. The army caused 899 fatalities compared with 714 fatalities caused by the 
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police in the same year. At the time, after the leader of the Boko Haram sect, 
Mohammed Yusuf, was extra-judicially executed by the police in July 2009, the 
sect regrouped under a more radical leader, Abubakar Shekau, under whose lead-
ership the group began to carry out more violent attacks, including targeted kill-
ings and suicide bombings.45 This development compelled the Federal Govern-
ment to deploy special military task forces to combat the insurgents, and this sig-
nificantly reduced the involvement of the police in the counter-insurgency opera-
tions in the affected states. 
However, killings by the police peaked in 2011, during violent incidents that 
caused 1,838 fatalities. This translates to a 39% increase from the 714 fatalities in 
the previous year. Perhaps the significant increase in killings by the police in 
2011 may be explained by the fact that it was an election year, and the 2011 gen-
eral election was adjudged one of the most violent in the history of the country.46 
The presidential election, in particular, was followed by post-election protests 
and riots that degenerated into sectarian and ethnic clashes in which the police 
intervened. It will not be necessary here to go into the details of killings by the 
security forces during the 2011 general elections since it is examined in a later 
section of the study. Furthermore, since 2012 there has been a steady decrease in 
the number of fatalities caused by the police. Again, a close look at Figures 6.3 
and 6.5 shows that the reduction in the number of fatalities caused by the police 
since 2012 is followed by a corresponding increase in the number of fatalities 
caused by the army in the same period. Between 2012 and the first five months 
of 2014, the army caused a cumulative fatality figure of 5,465 compared with 
2,541 fatalities caused by the police within the same period. However, this result 
does not provide detailed information about the major groups involved in inci-
dents where the police caused fatalities. Figure 6.5 examines the relational fac-
tors in incidents where the police have caused fatalities. 
In terms of fatalities, the relation between the police and political groups when 
compared with other groups appears to be the most deadly. Figure 6.5 indicates 
that between June 2006 and May 2014, incidents involving the police and politi-
cal groups caused 1,332 fatalities compared with 877 and 612 fatalities in inci-
dents where the police confronted communities and trade unions, respectively. 
Important information in this graph is that the police cause more fatalities in in-
cidents involving political issues than in routine law enforcement. If we assume 
that one can use the number of fatalities to determine the level of encounter be-
tween the police and a particular group, then it can be argued that the police in-
                                                 
45  Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) News (2013), Updated Timeline of Boko Haram 
Attacks and Related Violence. Available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=99319. 
Accessed 16 December 2013. 
46  Human Rights Watch (2011), Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800. 
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tervene more in violent incidents involving political groups than in incidents in-
volving communities and criminal groups. The impression is that the police are 
largely organized and managed to protect the politically influential by using state 
violence against other sections of the population.47 It may be the case, however, 
that the police do not intervene more in political violence, only that their inter-
vention in incidents involving political groups is more deadly. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Number of violent deaths resulting from incidents where the police intervened, by  
 type of relationship (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Regional differences in security forces killings 
The causal and relational explanations of killings by the security forces provided 
in previous sections of this study indicate that the majority of the fatalities result-
ed from attempts by security operatives to restore public order during crises. 
Hence, such killings are likely to be more prevalent in regions that are prone to 
violent conflicts. However, it is important that we analyse the fatality figures 
across all the states in order to determine the states where the security forces 
cause more fatalities. A state-by-state analysis of the fatality figures will also en-
able us determine regional differences in killings by the security forces. A map-
ping of the number of fatalities caused by the security forces based on data col-
lated from the Nigeria Watch database from June 2006 to May 2014 is presented 
in Map 6.1. The Map shows that the security forces caused more fatalities in the 
northern part of Nigeria. During the period under review, however, incidents in-
volving the security forces, causing a total of more than a thousand fatalities, 
                                                 
47  Pearce, J., R. McGee & J. Wheeler (2011), Violence, Security and Democracy: Perverse Interfaces 
and Their Implications for States and Citizens in the Global South. IDS Working Paper, No. 357.  
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were recorded in six states nationwide: Borno, Plateau, Lagos, Delta, Rivers, and 
Anambra. Furthermore, the majority of these states are located in the South (La-
gos, Delta, Rivers, and Anambra). 
 
 
Map 6.1 Fatalities resulting from incidents where the security forces intervened in Nigeria  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
At the state level Map 6.1 shows that incidents involving the security forces 
have caused more fatalities in Borno than in any other state. The alarming fatality 
figure (4,569 deaths) recorded in the state was largely the result of the interven-
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tion of the security forces, notably the army, in the deadly Boko Haram insurgen-
cy. The counter-insurgency operations of the army took a very violent dimension 
after the imposition of emergency rule in the North-East in May 2013. However, 
the security forces, notably the army, also caused hundreds of fatalities in a series 
of violent encounters with the Islamic sect before the imposition of emergency 
rule. In a widely condemned operation against members of the sect in Baga in 
April 2013, the army under the auspices of the Multi-National Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF) killed 185 people, many of them civilians.48 Since the declaration of 
emergency rule, the spate of killings by the security forces has assumed a worry-
ing dimension in the state, as the army often issues accounts of scores of insur-
gents killed almost on a daily basis.49 
In the North Central region, the intervention of the security forces in the lin-
gering sectarian and ethnic conflicts in Plateau State has caused many fatalities. 
The Nigeria Watch database recorded 1,784 fatalities in incidents involving the 
security forces in the state between June 2006 and May 2014. The intervention of 
the security forces in the mainly ethno-sectarian crises that have occurred in this 
state has usually been very violent. In November 2008, for instance, the army 
and police caused more than 130 fatalities while repressing ethno-sectarian and 
political violence in Jos.50 In a similar development in July 2012, the security 
forces killed more than 20 Fulani militiamen who had earlier attacked some 
communities and killed many people, including Senator Gyang Dantong and As-
semblyman Gyang Fulani. The Plateau experience exemplifies situations where 
the involvement of the security forces in violent conflicts results in increased fa-
talities. 
In the South-West, the security forces have caused more fatalities in Lagos 
State than in any other state in the region. Between June 2006 and May 2014, 
incidents involving the security forces caused 1,195 fatalities in the state. As the 
commercial hub and one of the most populous states in the country, Lagos is a 
haven for social miscreants, including armed robbers whose engagement with the 
security forces often results in violent deaths. Clashes between smugglers and 
customs officers, as well as violent confrontations among personnel of the vari-
ous security agencies, often result in high fatality figures. In May 2011, for in-
stance, soldiers killed four police officers, including a Divisional Police Officer 
(DPO) and a Divisional Crime Officer (DCO), to avenge the death of their col-
                                                 
48  Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) News (2013), Updated Timeline of Boko Haram 
Attacks and Related Violence. http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=99319. Accessed 16 
December 2013.  
49  Monguno, H. (2013), Terrorism, Security and Fifth Columnists. Leadership (Nigeria), 29 October 
2013, p. 34. 
50  Human Rights Watch (2009), Arbitrary Killings by the Security Forces, Submission to the Investiga-
tive Bodies on the November 28-29, 2008 Violence in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0709web.pdf. Accessed 9 September 2014.  
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league who was killed by policemen at a checkpoint while he was escorting a 
vehicle conveying goods across the Nigerian border with the Republic of Be-
nin.51 Although most security forces killings in the state are related to criminals, 
there are instances where innocent people have been killed either accidentally or 
intentionally. Many fatalities have resulted from stray bullets fired by security 
personnel, mostly during encounters with criminal gangs in the state. 
In the South-East the majority of the killings by the security forces are related 
to political and criminal issues, and a greater proportion of this violence occurred 
in Anambra State. From June 2006 to May 2014, incidents involving the security 
forces caused 1,150 fatalities in the state. The majority of these deaths occurred 
in violent incidents involving criminal gangs and political groups in the commer-
cial city of Onitsha. The city is notorious for violent incidents involving the secu-
rity forces, trade unions, criminal gangs, and political groups. 
Apart from criminal groups, the relationship between the security forces and 
the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 
has been very violent. From June 2006 to December 2013, clashes between the 
security forces and supporters of MASSOB caused over 800 fatalities. In June 
2006, for instance, 16 people were shot dead when security forces raided MAS-
SOB offices in the state.52 In a related incident, the intervention of the security 
forces in clashes between supporters of MASSOB and members of the National 
Association of Road Transport Owners (NARTO) between June and July 2006 
caused over 700 fatalities in Onitsha.53 Perhaps the status of Onitsha as an im-
portant trading centre and gateway to the South-East makes it susceptible to vio-
lent incidents, which often involve the security forces. 
In the Niger Delta region, the involvement of the security forces in violent in-
cidents was remarkably deadly in Delta and Rivers states. The operations of the 
various security task forces which are mandated to combat militancy, illegal oil 
bunkering, and piracy in the Niger Delta area have always been very violent. In 
May 2009, over 500 people were killed in a coordinated attack by a combined 
team of army, navy, and air force personnel in Gbaramatu kingdom of Delta 
State.54 In Rivers State, killings by the security forces are largely related to polit-
ical issues and criminal activities, including oil wars. In September 2008, for in-
stance, JTF operatives invaded approximately seven communities in search of 
                                                 
51  DPO’s Murder: Policemen Desert Badagry Checkpoints, ThisDay.  
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/dpo-s-murder-policemen-desert-badagry-checkpoints/92072/. Ac-
cessed 9 September 2014.  
52  Onuchukwu, B. (2012), Security Personnel Raided MASSOB Offices, Kill 16. Daily Trust. 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/doc_acc/DT2012-06-06p12.pdf. Accessed 9 September 2014.  
53  See Nigeria Watch Database. http://ngw-opsis//index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=16&rang=74. 
Accessed 9 September 2014. 
54  Francis, LaPin & Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace, p. 200. 
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Farah Dagogo, a factional leader of MEND, and killed more than 70 people, in-
cluding innocent residents.55
Geopolitically, the security map in Map 6.1 shows that the security forces 
were most violent in the North-East, followed by the North Central, South-South, 
South-West, and South-East regions, based on cumulative fatality figures. How-
ever, Map 6.1 does not provide us with enough information to determine in 
which place security forces violence is more frequent. Figure 6.6 presents the 
frequency of incidents where the security forces have caused fatalities in selected 
states from the six geo-political regions of the country. The graph shows that 
cases where the security forces cause fatalities are more frequent in Lagos than in 
any other state. However, based on information shown in Figure 6.6, it appears 
that the security forces caused fewer fatalities in each violent incident in which 
they intervened in the state. This implies that although the security forces are 
usually involved in many violent incidents in Lagos, their intervention results in 
fewer fatalities when compared with states such as Borno and Delta, where the 
security forces have caused more fatalities. This may be explained by the fact 
that the security forces in Lagos avoid extra-judicial killings because they are 
more scrutinized by human rights organizations. Moreover, violent incidents in 
Lagos are largely related to criminal gangs, where the police usually intervene, 
causing fewer fatalities than cases involving the army.
Figure 6.6 Frequency of security forces killings in selected states (June 2006-May 2014)
                                                 
55 Ibanga, I. et al. (2008), 100 People Feared Killed as Oil War Enters Second Day. Punch. 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/doc_acc/P2008-09-16b.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2014. 
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A critical look at Figure 6.6 also shows that killings by the security forces are 
more frequent in the Niger Delta states of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers than in the 
north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, where the security forces are 
currently involved in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents. The pervasiveness 
of security forces killings in the Niger Delta may not be unconnected with gang 
wars, oil bunkering, political violence, armed robbery, kidnapping, and the now 
abated militancy. The involvement of the security forces in organized criminal 
and political violence in most states in the Niger Delta often causes more fatali-
ties per incident because the army are usually involved, and they are known for 
using excessive force. 
Although Figure 6.6 indicates the frequency of violent incidents by state 
where the security forces cause fatalities, it does not provide enough information 
to help determine the specific security agency that causes more deaths in each 
state. Figure 6.7 therefore presents the frequency of the involvement of each of 
the major security agencies in incidents that result in fatalities. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Frequency of security forces killings, by perpetrators, in selected states  
 (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 shows that killings by the police are by far the most frequent na-
tionwide. With the exception of Bayelsa, Borno, and Yobe states, where there is 
the strong presence of the army-dominated JTFs, killings by the police are most 
frequent in every other state where killings by the security forces are widespread. 
However, there is no major difference in the frequency of killings by the police 
and army in Plateau State. This may be explained by the fact that the main securi-
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ty outfit in the state, the Special Task Force (STF), comprises personnel from 
both the army and the police force. There are, however, a significant number of 
killings involving the ‘other security forces’ in Lagos State. 
The next section of the study examines some ad hoc case studies to illustrate 
the trend and patterns of killings by the security forces. 
 
Ad hoc cases of killings by the security forces 
Relevant ad hoc case studies will be helpful in illustrating the ‘growing prefer-
ence among the Nigerian security forces to kill’.56 Two cases are presented to 
illustrate how the intervention of the security forces in violent incidents often 
results in more deaths. Case 1 looks at how the intervention by a team of army 
and police personnel in a violent conflict between supporters of MASSOB and 
members of NARTO caused many more fatalities than were recorded at the ini-
tial state of the conflict. In Case 2, the study uses two deadly military operations 
in Baga town and Giwa Barracks, both in Borno State, to illustrate how the secu-
rity forces use human fatalities to determine the success or failure of their inter-
nal security operations. 
 
Case 1: A deadly intervention 
In March 2006, dozens of MASSOB activists were killed by the police in Anam-
bra State following a campaign by the group to boycott the 2006 population cen-
sus. MASSOB was formed in 1999 by a lawyer-cum-secessionist activist, Ralph 
Uwazurike, to actualize the dream of an independent state of Biafra after the civil 
war of 1967-1970. However, the anti-government stance of the group often 
pitched it against the security forces. Clashes between supporters of the move-
ment and the security forces have always been deadly. In one of the most violent 
encounters between MASSOB and the security forces, many supporters of the 
group were killed. The crisis started after two weeks of violent clashes between 
MASSOB activists and NARTO members, which resulted in the burning of two 
police stations and a major prison in the state. Approximately 200 prisoners were 
allegedly set free, and scores of people were killed.57 Both groups accused the 
other of destroying the prison and releasing the prisoners, and thereafter engaged 
one another in a proxy war. 
Following a series of street battles between the two groups, the police inter-
vened by raiding MASSOB offices in Onitsha and caused many fatalities among 
members of the group. Subsequently, the Federal Government deployed soldiers 
                                                 
56  Serrano, R. & P. Zacharias (2014), By the Numbers: The Nigerian State’s Efforts to Counter Boko 
Haram. In: M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos, ed., Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in 
Nigeria. Leiden: African Studies Centre, p. 207. 
57  IRIN News (2006), Nigeria: Government Cracks Down on Biafra Separatist Resurgence. 4 September 
2006. http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?ReportId=60795. Accessed 10 September 2014.  
501890-L-bw-ASC
134 
 
to help the police restore law and order. This was followed by a declaration of a 
dusk-to-dawn curfew by the state government. During the ensuing violent con-
frontation between the security forces and supporters of the group, ‘[m]any peo-
ple found with guns or MASSOB identity cards’ were summarily executed dur-
ing cordon-and-search operations in Onitsha.58 The involvement of the security 
forces in that violent incident resulted in more deaths by far than were recorded 
in the initial clashes between MASSOB and NARTO members. At the last count, 
the intervention of the security forces caused over 700 deaths in the conflict, 
mainly through summary executions.59 
 
Case 2: Killings as a yardstick 
Fatality figures have become a key yardstick used by the security forces to meas-
ure the effectiveness of their operations. The police are known to publicly display 
the corpses of armed robbery suspects as evidence of effective policing. More 
recently, the JTFs have formed the habit of claiming success in the fight against 
insurgency based on the number of insurgents they kill in each operation.60 Al-
most everyone killed by the security forces is now classified either as a criminal 
or an insurgent. In a widely condemned military operation against Boko Haram 
insurgents in April 2013, soldiers under the auspices of the MNJTF caused an 
estimated 185 fatalities and devastated the entire town of Baga in Borno State.61 
The leadership of the MNJTF later claimed that those killed were either Boko 
Haram members or individuals associated with the sect. 
In a similar incident in March 2014, the JTF killed over 200 people when sus-
pected Boko Haram insurgents attempted to release a number of their members 
from a detention centre in the Giwa military barracks in Borno State. Notwith-
standing the high number of avoidable deaths that were caused by the army, the 
defence headquarters claimed the operation was a success. While commenting on 
the military operation, the Director of Defence Information, Major General Chris 
Olukolade, stated that the attack by the insurgents ‘ha[d] been successfully re-
pelled with heavy human casualties on the terrorists’.62 As the comment indi-
cates, military operations that devastate entire communities and result in high 
civilian fatalities are celebrated as accomplished missions. It is worth noting, 
                                                 
58  Ibid. 
59  See Nigeria Watch Database. http://ngw-opsis//index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=16&rang=74. 
Accessed 9 September 2014.  
60  Monguno, H. (2013), Terrorism, Security and Fifth Columnists. Leadership (Nigeria), 29 October 
2013, p. 34. 
61  Wisdom, P. ( 2013), 185 Feared Killed in JTF, Boko Haram Clash in Borno. Daily Independent (Ni-
geria). http://www.dailyindependentnig.com/2013/04/185-feared-killed-in-jtf-boko-haram-clash-in-
borno/. Accessed 9 July 2013. 
62  Mamah, E., K. Omonobi, N. Marama & B. Agande (2014), 207 Suspected Terrorists Killed as Boko 
Haram Battle Military in Maiduguri, The Vanguard (Nigeria). http://vanguardngr.com/2014/03/207-
suspected-terrorists-killed-boko-haram-battle-military-maiduguri/. Accessed 21 May 2014.  
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however, that both the attackers and the detainees were killed, so even if the at-
tackers were assumed to be insurgents, it is very likely that some of the detainees 
were innocent civilians. The military authority later admitted that over 1,400 sus-
pected insurgents were held in that same detention centre for many months with-
out trial.63  
 
Security forces killings during elections 
The involvement of the security forces in the conduct of elections is usually 
characterized by violence, and killings by the security forces are common. In par-
ticular, the police have been alleged to collude with politicians to intimidate po-
litical opponents and the electorate in order to influence the outcome of elections. 
The fact that general elections are conducted periodically also means that killings 
by the security forces during elections are cyclical. Moreover, the political signif-
icance of elections also means that such killings will most likely assume a politi-
cal dimension. In this regard, this section of the study analyses the 2007 and 
2011 general elections in Nigeria in order to determine the pattern of killings by 
the security forces. 
 
The 2007 general elections 
The 2007 elections were no doubt among the most violent in the electoral history 
of the country. Many people were killed in a series of violent incidents before, 
during, and after the elections. During the electioneering period that preceded the 
general elections in April of that year, supporters of the major political parties as 
well as rival factions of the various parties engaged one another in violent clashes 
that often involved the security forces. The security forces actively intervened in 
several pre-election, election-day, and post-election violent incidences that oc-
curred between the end of 2006 and April 2007. Within this period, the Nigeria 
Watch database recorded 29 fatalities caused by the security forces. These fatali-
ties were recorded from 13 violent incidents in which the security forces inter-
vened during the elections. The majority of these deaths occurred during the gu-
bernatorial/state Houses of Assembly and the presidential/National Assembly 
elections which took place on 14 April and 21 April 2007, respectively. Figure 
6.8 presents the percentages of fatalities caused by the security forces before and 
during the 2007 general elections. 
 
 
  
                                                 
63  Mutum, R. (2013), Insurgency… Military Admits 1,400 Detained Without Trial, Daily Trust (Nige-
ria). http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/top-stories/11657-i-n-s-u-r-g-e-n-c-y-military-admits-1-400-
detained-without-trial. Accessed 20 May 2014. 
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Figure 6.8 Percentages per month of the total fatalities caused by the security forces during  
 the 2007 general elections 
 
 
Figure 6.8 shows that 76% of the fatalities occurred around the election days, 
while 24% occurred in the pre-election period. It is worth noting, however, that 
most of the incidents where the security forces caused deaths involved inter-party 
violence. As soon as the deadline for the return of nomination forms by political 
parties elapsed on 29 January 2007, the various political parties became en-
meshed in violence. The security forces were actively involved in these violent 
incidents either through official intervention or as personal guards to party stal-
warts and candidates during the campaign and elections periods. According to 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), more than 280 election-related deaths 
were recorded shortly before the 2007 elections.64 
 
The 2011 general elections 
Unlike the 2007 elections, the involvement of the security forces in the 2011 
elections was well coordinated. The security forces participated in the 2011 gen-
eral elections under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on 
Election Security (ICCES). Through the ICCES the various security agencies 
were integrated into the security and logistics committees of all the states and 
LGAs to ensure law and order during the elections. However, the security forces 
intervention in violent incidents before, during, and after the elections resulted in 
many deaths. The majority of these killings occurred immediately after the presi-
dential elections. The elections, in which the major presidential candidates came 
from the predominantly Christian South and Muslim North, led many politicians 
                                                 
64  National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2007), Final NDI Report on the Nigeria’s 2007 Elections. 
https://www.ndi.org/files/2313_ng_report_election07_043008.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2014. 
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to leverage their ethnic and religious identities for political advantage, a situation 
that resulted in widespread post-election violence in parts of the country.65 Figure 
6.9 presents the percentages of fatalities caused by the security forces during the 
elections in April 2011 and in each of the three months that preceded the elec-
tions that year. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Percentages per month of the total fatalities caused by the security forces during  
 the 2011 general elections 
 
 
 
Between January 2011, when the electioneering process climaxed, and April 
2011 when the elections took place, the security forces killed 25 people in 9 vio-
lent incidents where they intervened. Most of the killings took place immediately 
after the presidential election on 16 April. Figure 6.9 shows that the majority 
(56%) of fatalities caused by the security forces occurred during and immediately 
after the presidential election, compared with 44% of the fatalities recorded in the 
three months that preceded the elections. Inflammatory utterances by some aspir-
ants that had lost the elections resulted in post-election riots, which degenerated 
into violent assaults, arsons, and killings.66 In parts of the North, the outcome of 
the elections, particularly the presidential election, resulted in violent protests, 
which later degenerated into sectarian and ethnic violence. The intervention of 
the security forces in the more than three days of post-election violence, especial-
ly in the northern cities of Kano and Kaduna, resulted in many fatalities. The pat-
                                                 
65  Ayoade, J. & A. Akinsanya, eds, (2013), Nigeria’s Critical Election, 2011, Lanham (Md.), Lexington 
Books. 
66  INEC (2013), Report on the 2011 General Elections. http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/REPORT-ON-THE-2011-GENERAL-ELECTIONS.pdf. Accessed 12 Sep-
tember 2014.  
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tern of killings by the security forces during the 2011 elections indicates that the 
post-election violence was more deadly by far than the election-day and pre-
election violence. However, in terms of cumulative fatality figures, the involve-
ment of the security forces in the 2007 general elections was more deadly than in 
the 2011 elections. 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the dynamics of security forces killings in Nigeria requires not only 
an understanding of the role of the security forces as the primary apparatus of 
state-sanctioned violence; it also requires a knowledge of the general context 
within which the security establishment operates. Scholarly analysis must recog-
nize the general context, as well as the relational and causal factors that increase 
security forces killings. This study has established that security forces killings 
have much to do with a general culture of violence, rather than with the result of 
accidental deaths or collateral damage. The statistics presented in the paper 
demonstrate that the majority of incidents where the security forces intervene 
result in fatalities; and the more they intervene, the more people are killed. The 
statistics further illustrate that the involvement of the army causes more fatalities 
per incident, even though killings by the police are more numerous. Further 
mapping in the paper illustrates that the intervention of the security forces in in-
cidents involving political groups causes more fatalities, but the Boko Haram 
crisis and the relationship between the army and Islamic groups is the most dead-
ly, causing more fatalities per incident. Lastly, the paper discovered that incidents 
of killings by the security forces are more prevalent in the southern region but 
cause more fatalities in the northern region of the country. 
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A qualitative analysis of violence in Nigeria 
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7 
A survey of violence-related deaths  
in Aninri and Isi-Uzo LGAs of Enugu  
State (2006-2014) 
 
 
Joachin Uche Okanume 
 
 
Abstract 
Aninri and Isi-Uzo are rural LGAs in Enugu West and Enugu East Senatorial 
Zones of Enugu State, respectively. Their inhabitants are predominantly farm-
ers and traders, who are not immune to violence. Yet many fatal incidents are 
not reported by the national press. Thus, the general aim of this study is to doc-
ument virtually all the violence-related deaths that occurred in these two LGAs 
from June 2006 until May 2014 and to ascertain why they were neglected by 
the media. Fieldwork was conducted in October 2014 in Aninri and Isi-Uzo 
LGAs, as well as in Enugu, the state capital. Sixty questionnaires were admin-
istered to randomly selected respondents, while 38 key informants were pur-
posively selected and interviewed. The study also utilized two focus group dis-
cussions, which were comprised of 17 participants drawn from the various 
communities that make up the two LGAs. Our findings reveal, among other 
things, that there have been numerous violent deaths in the study areas within 
the time frame covered by the study. It was also discovered that the national 
press neglects these rural LGAs because they have no economic value, lack ur-
ban centres, and are difficult to access (particularly Isi-Uzo). 
Introduction 
In Nigeria, the media report violence-related deaths in virtually all the communi-
ties and LGAs of the country. In Enugu State, however, newspapers and maga-
zines have missed many fatal incidents in Aninri and Isi-Uzo LGAs since 2006. 
Yet these two LGAs did not enjoy peace. Hence this study intends to undertake 
the following: 
1. Document all the violence-related deaths in Aninri and Isi-Uzo from June 2006 to May 
2014, the period covered by the Nigeria Watch database. 
2. Discover what types of violence occurred. 
3. Explain why these LGAs are neglected by the national press. 
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Methodology and limitations of the study 
A total of 60 questionnaires, 38 key informant interviews (KIIs), and two focus 
group discussions (FGDs) were utilized for generating the primary data for the 
survey. The FGDs were composed of 17 participants drawn from the various 
communities that make up the two LGAs. The KIIs were conducted with tradi-
tional rulers, community leaders, medical doctors, security personnel, journalists, 
civil servants, women and youth leaders, and commercial motorcyclists. Both the 
KIIs and FGDs were immensely useful not only in providing detailed infor-
mation for the study but also in validating some of the data elicited with ques-
tionnaires. 
A limitation encountered during the survey was the inability of respondents to 
recall the totality of violence-related deaths that took place in the two LGAs from 
2006 to 2014. This might explain why, in Aninri, more incidents were remem-
bered for 2013 than for other years. In Isi-Uzo, however, violence-related deaths 
peaked in 2010 and 2011 and then declined in 2012, 2013, and 2014 (see Figures 
7.1 and 7.2). Clearly, respondents were unable to recall the specific dates of oc-
currence for most of the incidents remembered. Data had to be cross-checked to 
confirm that fatal events actually occurred at the places mentioned, despite a few 
discrepancies with regard to dates. Some law enforcement agents who spoke to 
the researcher in their individual capacities mentioned specific cases as well as 
validated some of the information elicited from other sources. However, all ef-
forts by the researcher to gain access to the official records of the security agen-
cies operating within these LGAs yielded no result. 
Aninri: Geographical, political and socio-economic profile 
Aninri is an LGA in Enugu West Senatorial Zone of Enugu State. It was created 
from Awgu LGA in 1996 and its headquarters are at Ndiabor. It has an area of 
364 sq km and a population of 133,723, according to the 2006 census. The LGA 
has a total of ten wards: one each in Ndiabor, Okpanku, and Mpu; three in 
Nenwe; and four in Oduma. It is composed of five major communities, which are 
all Igbo, namely Ndiabor, Mpu, Nenwe, Oduma, and Okpanku. Each of these is 
further divided into smaller autonomous communities: Ndiabor is split into two 
autonomous communities; Mpu into four; Nenwe into four; Oduma into eight; 
and Okpanku into two. There are two police posts, at Mpu and Ekoli-Okpanku, 
and a police station opposite the LGA Secretariat at Ndiabor. 
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Figure 7.1 Percentage of violent deaths per year in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014)
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014
Figure 7.2 Percentage of violent deaths per year in Isi-Uzo LGA (June 2006-May 2014)
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014
Agriculture is the backbone of the economy because the land is lush, making 
the people predominantly farmers. The major food products are rice, okro, cassa-
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va, yam, and groundnuts. Being part of a traditional community, people believe 
that none of them can commit sacrilege, such as killing, without supernatural 
powers getting the person to confess to the act in his or her lifetime. In their opin-
ion, this system has helped in the curbing of violence, even if the system was 
brought into serious question when a series of murders were committed by per-
sons who were never identified.  
Despite its rural background, Aninri has quite a sizeable number of politicians. 
Among them are the current Deputy President of Nigeria’s Senate, Ike Ekwere-
madu; the former speaker of the Enugu State House of Assembly, Mr. Abel 
Chukwu (who is now a member of the Federal Character Commission); and the 
former state chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Chief Onyioha 
Nwanjoku. Aninri has so far had 13 sole administrators and chairmen. Senator 
Ike Ekweremadu, for instance, became its first executive chairman in 1997 after a 
sole administrator was appointed when the LGA was created by the military re-
gime of General Sani Abacha in 1996. As in many rural communities in Nigeria, 
these political heavyweights are not domiciled in the LGA itself. Rather, they 
reside in Enugu, Abuja, or other large cities; nevertheless, they do contribute to 
local development. Thus, Aninri had very poor roads before 2011; since then, 
they have been renovated courtesy of the Federal Government and the Deputy 
President of the Senate, Senator Ike Ekweremadu. 
Isi-Uzo: Geographical, political and socio-economic profile 
Isi-Uzo is an LGA in Enugu East Senatorial Zone of Enugu State. It has an area 
of 877 sq km and a population of 148,415, according to the 2006 census. It was 
initially called Isi-Uzo County Council until it became a District Council in 1950. 
With its headquarters at Ikem, it is bounded to the east by Ishielu LGA in Ebonyi 
State, to the west by Enugu East LGA, to the south by Udenu LGA of Enugu 
State, and to the north by Ogbadibo, Okpokwu, and Ador LGAs in Benue State. 
The present Isi-Uzo was created in 1976 and includes five main communities, all 
Igbo: Eha-Amufu, Ikem, Neke, Mbu, and Umualor. In terms of land mass, Eha-
Amufu is said to constitute about 60% of the LGA and accommodates seven oth-
er autonomous communities. Ikem, Neke, Mbu, and Umualor contain four, four, 
three, and two autonomous communities, respectively. 
As the largest community, Eha-Amufu was formerly said to dominate political 
affairs in Isi-Uzo. Nowadays, however, political offices rotate among the five 
main communities, particularly the chairmanship of the LGA. Since its creation 
in 1976, Isi-Uzo has had 20 chairmen or administrators, none of them being fe-
male. The distribution of wards among the major communities is as follows: Eha-
Amufu has four; Ikem has two; Neke has two; Mbu has two; and Umualor has 
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one. The LGA is included in Enugu East Senatorial Zone despite its cultural af-
finity with the people of Nsukka in Enugu North Senatorial Zone. 
Isi-Uzo is a rural area and the majority of the people are farmers and petty 
traders. The major food products are cassava, rice, yam, and gari. As far back as 
the 1930s, economic activities started booming when a railway station was built 
in Eha-Amufu. Today, each of the five major communities of Isi-Uzo has its 
market day, and the market at Eha-Amufu attracts people from all parts of the 
country either to sell or to buy items. Eha-Amufu has also benefited from the 
College of Education which was established there by the old Anambra State in 
the early 1980s and upgraded to a Federal College of Education ten years later; 
some of the students and staff still reside in the community. Other infrastructures 
are to be found at Ikem, which has the only police station in the entire LGA, and 
Mbu, where the Divisional Office of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (NSCDC) is located. 
Regarding development, however, almost all the roads in Isi-Uzo are in a de-
plorable state except the one leading to the headquarters at Ikem from Ugwuogo 
Nike in Enugu East LGA. This factor, respondents bitterly complained, has ad-
versely affected economic activities in the area. All our respondents at Eha-
Amufu argued that previously you could see at least ten truckloads of gari leav-
ing the community every market day, as against three nowadays. 
Aninri: Discussion of findings 
Table 7.1 shows that there were more male respondents than female. The study 
was originally designed to administer equal number of questionnaires to both, but 
the women were not as responsive as the men. The majority of the 30 respond-
ents were married and between the ages of 41 and 50 years. Most of them were 
self-employed; a few were farmers and civil servants. A majority had lived in 
Aninri since birth. Hence, most respondents had lived in the LGA for a minimum 
of eight years, covering the time frame of the study. 
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Table 7.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents in Aninri LGA 
Sex n % 
Male 
Female 
19 
11 
63.3 
36.7 
 
Age 
 
n 
 
% 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
Above 60 
4 
8 
13 
4 
1 
13.3 
26.7 
43.3 
13.3 
3.3 
 
Marital status 
 
n 
 
% 
Married 
Single 
Widow/widower 
21 
6 
3 
70.0 
20.0 
10.0 
Employment status n % 
Civil/public servant 
Self-employed 
Farmer 
Student 
6 
15 
7 
2 
20.0 
50.0 
23.3 
6.7 
Years of residence in the community n % 
8-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
Since birth 
7 
1 
10 
12 
23.3 
3.3 
33.3 
40.0 
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014 
 
 
While 96.7% of the respondents claimed that their neighbourhood was not vio-
lent, all of them were aware of fatal incidents in their various communities. Table 
7.2 lists the incidents that readily came to their minds. 
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Table 7.2 Violent events recorded in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014) 
  
S/n Date Community Cause Description No. of 
deaths 
1 2007 Amachara Accident A man went fishing and 
drowned in the river. 
1 
2 2008 Amaorji Nenwe Crime 
A boy was said to have 
murdered his uncle with a 
machete. 
1 
3 2008 
Obiofu Amaorji 
Nenwe Accident 
A palm tree cutter fell and 
died. 1 
4 2008 
Obiofu Amaorji 
Nenwe 
Accident 
Another palm tree cutter fell 
and died. The deceased’s 
wife and son later died in a 
motor accident in a different 
LGA. 
1 
5 30 Dec 
2008 
Nenwe Junction, 
along Port Har-
court-Enugu 
Expressway 
Motor 
accident 
A teenage girl went to fetch 
some water and was hit by a 
vehicle. 
1 
6 2008 
Nenwe Junction, 
along Port Har-
court-Enugu 
Expressway 
Motor 
accident 
A former security man at 
Comprehensive Secondary 
School, Nenwe was hit by a 
vehicle as he was riding his 
bicycle to night duty. 
1 
7 2009 
Obuagu Mpu, 
along Ishiagu 
road 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A commercial motorcyclist 
hit and killed a man cross-
ing the road. 
1 
8 2009 
Abacheku vil-
lage, Ndiabor 
Land dis-
pute 
A woman was reportedly 
killed as she was farming 
on disputed land between 
Ndiabor and Oduma. 
1 
9 2009 Oduma Crime 
A mother came to separate 
two male siblings fighting; 
in the process, one of the 
boys cut her with a machete 
and she died. 
1 
10 2009 Obiofu Junction, 
Amaorji Nenwe 
Motor 
accident 
A woman was hit by a car. 1 
11 2009 Nenwe 
Motor 
accident 
A cyclist was hit in an acci-
dent involving a car and a 
commercial motorcycle; he 
later died in hospital. 
1 
12 
31 Aug 
2010 Nenwe 
Motorcycle 
accident 
Two motorcycles had a 
head-on collision and one 
rider died. 
1 
13 Oct 2010 
Nenwe, along 
Nenwe/Mgbowo 
road 
Motorcycle 
accident 
An over-speeding private 
motorcyclist had an acci-
dent at an ongoing bridge 
construction site. 
1 
14 2010 Obiofu Junction, 
Amaorji Nenwe 
Motor 
accident 
A woman was hit by a car 
on her way from a farm. 
1 
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Table 7.2 Violent events recorded in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014) continued 
  
15 2010 Amangwu vil-
lage, Ndiabor 
Accident A young boy drowned in a 
pond. 
1 
16 2010 Aguenyi Mpu Crime 
A female farmer was mur-
dered by herdsmen whom 
she had scolded for tres-
passing onto her farm with 
their cattle. 
1 
17 2011 Uke Mpu Crime 
A woman was allegedly 
murdered on her farm by 
herdsmen while she was 
cutting bamboo sticks. 
1 
18 2011 
Umuoma vil-
lage, Ndiabor 
Crime 
A woman allegedly hit and 
killed her husband with a 
digger. 
1 
19 2011 Amaeke Oduma 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A man lost his life in an 
accident involving two 
motorcycles in a head-on 
collision. 
1 
20 2011 Ohafia Oduma Crime 
At a building construction 
site, a young boy clubbed 
another to death with a 
stick. 
1 
21 2011 
Nenwe, along 
Mgbowo road 
Motor 
accident 
A cyclist died instantly in 
an accident involving a 
tipper and a motorcyclist. 
1 
22 2011 Nenwe, along 
Oduma road 
Motor 
accident 
A woman hit by a car died 
later at the University of 
Nigeria Teaching Hospital. 
1 
23 2011 Ndiabor Crime 
A man was allegedly mur-
dered and dumped in a bush 
behind the LGA Secretariat. 
1 
24 Feb 2012 Okpanku 
Motor 
accident 
A car and a commercial 
motorcyclist had a head-on 
collision. The cyclist and 
his passenger died instantly. 
2 
25 2012 Amaorji Nenwe Crime A man was murdered and 
dumped in the bush. 
1 
26 Sept 2012 Amaorji Nenwe Crime 
A girl’s naked and lifeless 
body was found somewhere 
near St. Peter’s Catholic 
Church. The autopsy re-
vealed that she was raped to 
death. 
1 
27 2012 Agbada Nenwe Accident 
A carpenter fell from a 
building where he was 
working. 
1 
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Table 7.2 Violent events recorded in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014) continued 
  
28 2012 
Nenwe Junc-
tion, along Port 
Harcourt-Enugu 
Expressway 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A man was hit by a motor-
cycle and died. 1 
29 2012 
Nenwe Junc-
tion, along Port 
Harcourt-Enugu 
Expressway 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A man was hit by a motor-
cycle and later died in hos-
pital. 
1 
30 2012 
Ugwungo vil-
lage, Ndiabor 
Crime 
One boy died while fighting 
with another one. 
1 
31 2012 Obuagu Mpu 
Motor 
accident 
An accident between a bus 
and a commercial motorcy-
cle killed two. 
2 
32 25 Dec 
2012 
Aguenyi Mpu Accident A man was electrocuted at 
an electric transformer. 
1 
33 Jan 2013 Okpanku Motor 
accident 
A commercial motorcyclist 
died when he hit a car. 
1 
34 2013 Amagu Mpu Crime A man was allegedly mur-
dered. 
1 
35 2013 Amagu Mpu Crime A man was allegedly shot 
dead by armed robbers. 
1 
36 2013 Ovum Mpu Crime 
A young girl’s dead body 
was found near the river. 
An autopsy allegedly re-
vealed she had been raped 
to death. 
1 
37 2013 Mpu, along 
Ishiagu road 
Motor 
accident 
A bus hit an eight-year old 
girl. 
1 
38 2013 Mpu, along 
Oduma road 
Motor 
accident 
A bus killed a girl. The 
driver reportedly ran away. 
1 
39 2013 Obuagu Accident 
A young prince of the 
community was drowned in 
a river. 
1 
40 2013 
Umarah village, 
Ndiabor 
Land dis-
pute 
A young man used a short 
bamboo stick and beat his 
uncle to death. He reported-
ly did not run away but 
waited until the police came 
and apprehended him. 
1 
41 2013 Amaururo vil-
lage, Ndiabor 
Crime A madman attacked and 
killed a woman. 
1 
42 2013 Emudo Nenwe Sorcery 
A man was caught after he 
had allegedly killed a four-
year old child, purportedly 
for ritual purposes. 
1 
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Table 7.2 Violent events recorded in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014) continued 
  
43 2013 
Ndiabor, along 
Mpu road 
Motor 
accident 
A man riding on a motorcy-
cle with his wife hit a car; 
the woman died on the spot. 
1 
44 May 2013 Mpu 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A motorcyclist hit a wall 
and died instantly. 1 
45 June 2013 
Amaogudu vil-
lage, Okpanku 
Motor 
accident 
A Hausa passenger on a 
commercial motorcycle was 
severely injured in an acci-
dent with a Volvo car; he 
died in hospital the same 
day. 
1 
46 July 2013 Oduma Crime 
A commercial bus driver 
was strangled to death by 
unknown persons. 
1 
47 2013 
Obiofu Junc-
tion, Amaorji 
Nenwe 
Motorcycle 
accident 
An elderly woman was hit 
by a truck while she was 
crossing the expressway on 
her way from her farm. 
1 
48 2013 Nenwe Crime 
A man’s lifeless body was 
found in a bush not far from 
his motorcycle. The de-
ceased allegedly chased 
people’s wives and was 
therefore suspected to have 
been killed for revenge. 
1 
49 Nov 2013 
Nenwe, along 
Mgbowo road 
Motor 
accident 
A cyclist ran into a bus and 
died instantly. 1 
50 Nov 2013 Oduma Crime 
A man was said to have 
been stabbed to death by 
unknown persons. 
1 
51 Dec 2013 Nenwe Crime 
A young man was found 
dead with injuries on his 
body at the boundary be-
tween Nenwe and Omogho. 
1 
52 
25 Dec 
2013 
Aguenyi Mpu, 
opposite the 
secondary 
school 
Motor 
accident 
A commercial motorcyclist 
died instantly in an accident 
with a car. 
1 
53 Jan 2014 Ohafia Oduma Crime 
A boy used a stick and beat 
another boy to death. 1 
54 Jan 2014 
Ohafia Oduma, 
close to Afor 
market 
Motorcycle 
accident 
Two motorcycles had a 
head-on collision. 
1 
55 
26 Jan 
2014 
Uhueze Nenwe Accident 
A man was electrocuted on 
an electric pole. 
1 
56 Feb 2014 Ohafia Oduma 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A man had a head-on colli-
sion on his motorcycle. 
1 
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Table 7.2 Violent events recorded in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014) continued 
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014 
 
 
Table 7.2 reveals that at least 66 violence-related deaths occurred in Aninri 
LGA from June 2006 to May 2014: 44 from accidents, 19 from crimes, two from 
land disputes, and one from sorcery. Motor accidents involving cars, buses, lor-
ries, trucks, and motorcycles were by far the most deadly (Figure 7.3). Data on 
Aninri clearly show a rise in the number of fatalities within the period covered by 
the study, and this may be connected to the fact that the recall period was shorter 
and people remembered better. Interestingly enough, respondents lamented the 
fact that the good roads provided by the government had become a source of 
concern owing to over-speeding and reckless driving. The study revealed that 26 
people had lost their lives in motor and motorcycle accidents in the last three 
years, as against eight persons who had died from the same cause prior to the 
time the roads were extended to most parts of the LGA. This calls for a vigorous 
public enlightenment campaign, targeting more particularly commercial motor-
cyclists and bus drivers.  
 
 
  
57 Mar 2014 
Nenwe Junc-
tion, along Port 
Harcourt–Enugu 
Expressway 
Motor 
accident 
Two persons died on the 
spot in a car accident. 2 
58 2014 Emudo Nenwe Accident 
A man fell from a tree and 
died as he was being taken 
to a hospital. 
1 
59 2014 
Aninri LGA 
Secretariat, 
Ndiabor 
Accident 
A man reportedly fell from 
a tree while cutting palm 
fruit within the premises of 
the LGA Secretariat. 
1 
60 2014 Aguenyi Mpu 
Motor 
accident 
A pregnant woman was 
riding on a private motor-
cycle when she was hit by a 
car. She died on the spot. 
1 
61 May 2014 
Nenwe, close to 
Nenwe Girls 
High School 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A commercial motorcyclist 
had a road accident. 
1 
62 May 2014 Ohafia Oduma 
Motor 
accident 
A young child was hit by a 
truck belonging to Setraco, 
a construction company 
working on the road. 
1 
63 May 2014 Oduma Motor 
accident 
A man was hit by a tipper 
belonging to Setraco. 
1 
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Figure 7.3 Percentage of causes of violent deaths in Aninri LGA (June 2006-May 2014)
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014
According to the survey, 90% of the respondents confirmed that the national 
press grossly under-reported violence in Aninri, while 10% stated that they did 
not know. In the case of the Ezza people who were said to have migrated from 
Ebonyi State to Ndiabor and Mpu, for instance, occasional skirmishes over land 
between the settlers and the indigenes were not covered by the media. The rea-
sons advanced for this neglect were the lack of urban centres, the distant location 
from the state capital, and the absence of economic benefits for the media. Inter-
estingly enough, none of the respondents mentioned lack of access roads as a 
factor in under-reporting the area, unlike the respondents in Isi-Uzo (as we shall 
see below). Indeed, Aninri communities now have very good access roads, ex-
cept the ones from Nenwe to Oduma, and from Mpu to Oduma, which was under 
construction at the time of fieldwork.
Isi-Uzo: Discussion of findings
Table 7.3 shows that the majority of respondents in Isi-Uzo LGA were male. As 
in the case of Aninri, females were more reluctant to respond to the question-
naires. The majority of the respondents were married and in the age bracket of 
31-50 years. More than half were born in Isi-Uzo LGA, and most had lived in the 
area long enough to be conversant with violence-occasioned deaths within the 
stipulated period (2006-2014).
Crime29%
Land dispute3%
Motor  accident49%
Sorcery2% Other accidents 17%
501890-L-bw-ASC
155 
 
Table 7.3 Demographic characteristics of respondents in Isi-Uzo LGA 
Sex n % 
Male 
Female 
21 
9 
70.0 
30.0 
 
Age 
 
n 
 
% 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
Above 60 
4 
10 
10 
3 
3 
13.3 
33.3 
33.3 
10.0 
10.0 
 
Marital status 
 
n 
 
% 
Married 
Single 
Widow/widower 
20 
8 
2 
66.7 
26.7 
6.7 
 
Employment status  
n 
 
% 
Civil/public servant 
Self-employed 
Farmer 
Student 
Retired 
6 
17 
4 
2 
1 
20.0 
56.7 
13.3 
6.7 
3.3 
 
Years of residence in the community 
 
n 
 
% 
8-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
Since birth 
2 
4 
7 
17 
6.7 
13.3 
23.3 
56.7 
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014 
 
 
While 86.7% of the respondents claimed that their neighbourhood was not vio-
lent, all of them were aware of fatal incidents in their locality. Table 7.4 lists the 
violent incidents that respondents recalled. 
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Table 7.4 Violent events recorded in Isi-Uzo LGA (June 2006-May 2014) 
S/n Date Community Cause Description No. of deaths 
1 2006 
Amede & Umuhu 
in Eha-Amufu 
Religious issue 
A group of Christian 
youths organized ‘a cru-
sade’ and went on the 
rampage on what they 
called a war against idol 
worshippers. 
3 
2 2006 Eha-Amufu Crime 
The community’s vigi-
lante group went to ar-
rest a suspected notori-
ous criminal and killed 
him. 
1 
3 Jan 2007 
Umuhu in Eha-
Amufu 
Crime 
A man was said to have 
been caught dancing 
around the grave of 
somebody buried the 
previous day, and he was 
lynched by a mob. 
1 
4 2007 Mbu Land dispute 
Two young men alleged-
ly set on fire a thatched 
house erected by their 
cousin on a disputed 
piece of land. The owner 
of the house shot dead 
the two cousins with a 
Dane gun in a barber’s 
shop and ran away. 
2 
5 2008 Mbu Crime 
Two young men had a 
quarrel. One of them 
went home, got a knife, 
and stabbed the other to 
death. 
1 
6 2009 Mbu Sorcery 
A woman believed to be 
under demoniac influ-
ence was taken to a 
church to be attended to 
by ‘prayer warriors’. A 
church member applied 
force to calm her down 
and killed her. 
1 
7 2009 
Amede, Eha-
Amufu 
Crime 
A boy stabbed his friend 
to death because of N50 
after they had both hired 
a wheelbarrow and 
worked on a construction 
site. 
1 
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Table 7.4 Violent events recorded in Isi-Uzo LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
8 2010 
Federal College 
of Education, 
Eha-Amufu 
Sorcery 
A female student of the 
institution was axed to 
death by suspected cult-
ists. 
1 
9 2010 Ihenyi, Eha-
Amufu 
Crime A boy stabbed his girl-
friend to death. 
1 
10 2010 Ngelekwe, Eha-
Amufu 
Crime A girl was strangled to 
death. 
1 
11 2010 
Agu Amede, 
Eha-Amufu 
Crime 
A boy attacked and 
killed a girl after they 
had a quarrel. 
1 
12 2010 
Ikem, along 
Ikem–Neke road 
Motorcycle acci-
dent 
Two motorcycles had a 
head-on collision. 1 
13 2010 Mbu Crime 
A young man beat an old 
man who tried to stop a 
fight; the old man re-
portedly died on his way 
to hospital. 
1 
14 2011 
Umuhu, Eha-
Amufu Crime 
Two women dating the 
same man were fighting 
over who would eventu-
ally become his wife; 
one of them stabbed the 
other to death. 
1 
15 4 May 
2011 
Eha-Amufu Crime 
There was a bank rob-
bery at a branch of First 
Bank PLC. 
4 
16 2011 Ogor, Ikem Crime 
A unmarried young man 
was cohabiting with a 
woman whose mother 
insisted that her daughter 
must return home. The 
infuriated man went to 
the would-be mother-in-
law’s residence, behead-
ed her, and ran away. 
1 
17 
25 Dec 
2012 
Agu Amede, 
Eha-Amufu Crime 
A young boy attacked an 
old woman because she 
had scolded him over 
forcing a young girl to 
be in a relationship with 
him. 
1 
18 2012 Neke Motor accident 
During the construction 
of Ugwuogo Nike-Neke 
road, a truck belonging 
to the construction firm 
killed a cyclist. 
1 
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Table 7.4 Violent events recorded in Isi-Uzo LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
19 25 Dec 
2013 
Ikem Land dispute 
In a heated argument 
between two families 
over a land boundary, 
one of them, who was 
said to be a soldier, 
stabbed another to death. 
1 
20 2013 Eha-Amufu Crime 
A woman who was be-
lieved to be mad gave 
birth to a daughter and 
killed her. 
1 
21 Mar 2014 Ogor Ikem Crime 
Members of a cultural 
troupe were hired to 
perform at a burial cer-
emony and disagreed 
over sharing the money. 
One of them ran home, 
brought a gun, and shot 
dead a colleague. 
1 
22 2014 Neke Land dispute 
An ongoing land dispute 
between Ikem and Neke 
claimed one life. 
1 
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014 
 
 
We can see from Table 7.4 that at least 28 violence-related deaths took place 
in Isi-Uzo LGA within the time frame covered by this study: 17 from crime, four 
from land disputes, three from religious issues, two from sorcery, and two from 
accidents (Figure 7.4). Data on Isi-Uzo indicate that the trend in fatalities fluctu-
ated and decreased in 2012, 2013, and 2014. This challenges the notion that peo-
ple usually remember recent incidents more than older ones. Whether or not this 
was as a result of actual reduction in the number of fatalities in Isi-Uzo, the study 
could not determine. As in Aninri, almost all of the cases were not reported by 
the press. Motor accidents, in particular, did not make the news. However, terri-
ble accidents occur on a weekly basis on a stretch of 2 km between Eha-Amufu 
and Mgbuji, which happens to be one of the very few tar roads in Isi-Uzo LGA. 
According to a chief of the community: ‘There is no week we do not record up to 
five motorcycle accidents, especially on our market days. Within the last two 
years, we have witnessed numerous accidents that have resulted in about four 
deaths on that road.’ Motorists have also not helped matters, as they are said to 
often over-speed. 
Comparatively speaking, there were fewer motor and motorcycle accidents in 
Isi-Uzo than in Aninri. Roads leading to most of the communities in the latter are 
in a very good state, and this, unfortunately, has predisposed motorists to reckless 
driving and Aninri recording higher fatalities resulting from road accidents. 
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Figure 7.4 Percentage of causes of violent deaths in Isi-Uzo LGA (June 2006-May 2014)
Source: Fieldwork, October 2014
The majority of Isi-Uzo respondents (83.3%) agreed that the national press 
neglected events in their LGA. Only 3.3% disagreed, while 13.3% indicated that 
they did not know. When asked why the national press neglected Isi-Uzo, 83.3% 
mentioned factors such as impassable roads, lack of urban centres, the distant 
location from the state capital, and the absence of economic benefits for the me-
dia. 
Conclusion
While carrying out fieldwork in all the communities of Aninri and Isi-Uzo LGAs 
during 27 days, the researcher could not find a single journalist except on Sun-
day, 19 October when several of them accompanied Senator Ike Ekweremadu, 
the Deputy President of the Senate, to his country home at Mpu in Aninri. One of 
the traditional rulers interviewed observed sadly: ‘Rural areas like ours do not 
make news in Nigeria because politicians do not reside here.’ Thus, a female 
journalist in Enugu metropolis stated:
As a journalist, I cannot just get up from here in Enugu and go to those places if I do not 
have a special project. For example, since the people of the two LGAs are mainly farmers, I 
could take up a project on agriculture to find out how they plant rice and how challenging it 
is for them to procure fertilizer. I could also go there if I have a special interview with a par-
   Crime
68%
Land dispute
16%
Motor  
accident
8% Sorcery
8%
Percentage of causes of violent deaths in Isi-Uzo LGA (June  
2006-May 2014)
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ticular politician. So, before a journalist decides to report a particular rural community, 
something must have propelled her or him, because there are fewer activities there. 
It is agreed that a rural society may not necessarily be as violent as a cosmopoli-
tan city like Enugu, where anonymity encourages violence and crime. Yet fatal 
incidents do happen in remote places. To bridge this information gap, respond-
ents in FGDs suggested that media houses should train and employ selected per-
sons from local communities to serve as their reporters. However, a senior male 
journalist in the office of the chairman of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), 
Enugu State Chapter, disagreed because of the prevailing cost: 
Inasmuch as it would be proper to station reporters in these LGAs who are indigenes and 
would now transmit information to their offices in the state capital, media houses cannot af-
ford it. Government should reduce tariff on printing materials to enable more newspapers, 
including community newspapers, to come on board; and then it would be easier for the 
owners of existing newspapers to save some money to be able to give employment to more 
people, especially in rural communities. 
To conclude, it is thus clear that fatal incidents are rarely reported by the na-
tional press, yet are part of people’s living experiences in Aninri and Isi-Uzo 
LGAs. These shortcomings, some argued, are due largely to the fact that rural 
communities hold little or no economic value for the media. Besides, most inci-
dents resulted in one or two deaths maximum - not enough to attract the press. 
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Abstract 
Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs are rural communities that do not attract media at-
tention, yet they have their share of violence leading to loss of lives. This paper 
focuses on these deaths, their causes, and the reasons such incidents were not 
reported by the national press. A non-probability sampling technique was 
adopted for this study, using both incidental and purposive sampling, to source 
information from people who were accessible and based on the researcher’s 
choice. Virtually all the respondents (100% in Egbedore and 88.9% in Ifedayo) 
considered the study areas non-violent. However, nine and 13 violent deaths 
were recorded in Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs, respectively, during the period 
under review. These incidents resulted mainly from communal clashes, land 
disputes, and road accidents due to bad roads. Interviews conducted with jour-
nalists covering the State of Osun1 revealed that almost all media houses repre-
sented in the state had one reporter to cover 30 LGAs and one area council. A 
number of reasons were advanced for not covering the councils adequately: 
there were claims of poor and irregular salaries - and hence an inability to 
make frequent visits to remote parts of the state - lack of community newspa-
pers, bad roads and poor transportation services, and an uncooperative attitude 
from security operatives in regard to releasing information. In addition, jour-
nalists pointed to different media house styles, which see some stories as not 
weighty enough to make national news. 
Introduction 
Violence is a global problem confronting all parts of the world, with attendant 
negative effects on lives, property, and the environment. While quite a number of 
direct violent occurrences in terms of wars, insurgencies, and terrorist actions, 
among other high-profile destructive acts, are being witnessed in places like Syr-
                                                 
1  The administration in the state changed the name from Osun State to the State of Osun in 2011. 
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ia, Central African Republic, and Nigeria, other lethal violent events also abound 
and, in many cases, pass unnoticed. These include violent communal clashes, 
riots, armed banditry, arson, ritual killing, and related extra-judicial killings, 
which remain ‘invisible’ since they are not recorded or accounted for. This work 
conducted a survey of such ‘invisible’ violence, including violent deaths caused 
by accidents, in Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs of the State of Osun from June 
2006 to May 2014. 
The study areas 
Egbedore 
Egbedore LGA covers an approximate area of 102 sq km in the State of Osun. It 
has its headquarters in Awo, about 12 km from Osogbo, the state capital. Created 
in 1989 from the old Ede LGA, Egbedore is one of the largest LGAs in the state 
and has many historical towns, including Ido-Osun (which hosted the first aero-
drome in Nigeria), Ara, Ojo, Iragberi, Ofatedo, Idoo, Ekuro, Iwoye, Aro, Okinni, 
and Olorunsogo. The LGA’s population was put at 73,969, according to the 2006 
population census. The population is, no doubt, enhanced by the proximity of 
some of the towns in the LGA to Osogbo, the capital of the State of Osun. Like 
others in the state, Egbedore also has a homogenous Yoruba population of Oyo 
extraction. As a result of the closeness of some of the towns such as Ofatedo, 
Ido-Osun, Okinni, and other minor settlements to the state capital, the LGA is 
inhabited by other Nigerians and foreigners, especially from the West African 
sub-region. 
The locals are predominantly farmers, cultivating both food and cash crops. 
They also practise fish farming and raise poultry, with many non-indigenes par-
ticipating. According to the council’s information handbook, the LGA has been 
identified by the State of Osun’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry as pos-
sessing large quantities of granite, talc, laterite, and precious stones. Miners’ ac-
tivities are noticeable in many parts of the LGA, especially around Awo, the 
headquarters where talc is suspected to be in large deposits, and in Iwoye, Eg-
bedi, Ido-Osun, Okinni, Idoo, and other towns and villages where granite, gravel, 
and sand are being extracted for construction purposes. 
There are also commercial activities that thrive in the LGA. As a matter of 
fact, the area played host to the state’s trade fair complex located in Ido-Osun, 
where the then joint trade fair among all Odua states-Oyo, Ekiti, Ondo, and 
Ogun-was held on a rotational basis. The complex is currently being reconstruct-
ed as an ultra-modern market by the state government. There are small business-
es that engage artisans such as mechanics, tailors, and bricklayers, as well as 
commercial motorists and cyclists. 
501890-L-bw-ASC
163 
 
Politically, the LGA is divided into ten wards, each producing a councillor to 
represent it at the council’s legislative arm. The wards are distributed among the 
towns and villages that constitute the LGA as follows: Awo/Abudo, Ara I, Ara II, 
Ido-Osun/Egbedi, Iragberi I, Iragberi II, Iwoye/ Ekuro/ Idoo/Origo, Iko-
tun/Olope, Ojo/Aro, and Okinni/Ofatedo/Olorunsogo.2 Since the commencement 
of the fourth republic, the chairmanship position in the LGA is rotated among the 
indigenes of the major towns. Individual towns and villages are also administered 
traditionally by the obas (kings) and chiefs, who essentially handle non-violent 
conflicts and other civil matters that may be referred to them. There are two 
prominent religions, Christianity and Islam, as well as the traditional religions in 
various constituent communities. 
As a result of the proximity of some of its settlements to the state capital, the 
LGA enjoys many of the benefits of the developments around the seat of power. 
Among these are relatively regular electricity, potable water, communication and 
transport facilities, and other physical and economic development programmes. 
For instance, Ido-Osun, one of the towns in the LGA, currently hosts the state 
office of the National Communication Commission, a proposed international air-
port (under construction), the relocated sawmill and plank market, and a new in-
ternational market complex (under construction). In addition, junior and senior 
government workers, as well low- and high-level income earners in the private 
sector, now see some satellite towns in the LGA as alternative places to reside 
and are building their houses in the area. Towns like Ofatedo, Okinni, Ido-Osun, 
Olorunsogo, and up as far as Egbedi are being rapidly built up to provide ac-
commodation to people who work in the state capital. 
However, these developments are also a source of violence in various forms in 
the LGA. As a result of the pressure on land, competition has become so severe 
that both inter- and intra-community clashes have sometimes led to deaths. Fur-
thermore, the volume of traffic as well as the pressure on villagers to improve 
their incomes to compete favourably with the new settlers in the market are addi-
tional sources of problems. This has also led to traffic-related deaths in the coun-
cil area. 
 
Ifedayo 
Ifedayo LGA was carved out of the old Ila LGA in September 1991, as noted in 
the Federal Government Gazette No. 54 of 2 October 1991. This border LGA in 
the State of Osun shares boundaries with Kwara and Ekiti states, thus making it 
the farthest from the state capital at Osogbo. Ifedayo has only two major towns: 
                                                 
2  Egbedore local government website. http://www.egbedore.com/overview.php. Accessed 2 October 
2014.  
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Ora, reputed to host the first church (built in 1895) in the area; and Oke-Ila, the 
LGA’s headquarters. There are adjoining villages, such as Ooyi-Aduni, Ayegun-
le, Idi-Awewe, Ayedaade, Ejifunmi, Temidire, Alagbede, Idi-Odan, Agunsoro, 
Isimi-Ehinle, and Baasin/Arutu. All these are grouped together and called ‘Leesi-
ti’ by the locals, which is a bastardized pronunciation of ‘less cities’. The LGA 
has an area of 128 sq km. According to the 2006 census, Ifedayo has a total pop-
ulation of 37,058. Apart from a few settlers from the northern and eastern parts 
of Nigeria, who mainly practise farming and supply labour to the indigenous 
farmers, the LGA has a homogenous population, mainly of the Igbomina sub-
ethnic group of the Yorubas. 
Ifedayo has a predominantly agrarian economy, as the tropical rain forest sup-
ports farming, especially in the areas of food and cash crop production. Food 
crops, however, including yam, cassava, maize, rice, and vegetables, are still be-
ing grown in many cases at the subsistence level. Farmers bring only the excess 
for sale to the markets. It is somewhat better in the areas of cash crops, especially 
cocoa and kola nuts, as well as oil palm. The majority of the farmers in Ifedayo 
still use old implements and human labour to manage their farms and to process 
agricultural products such as palm kernels. In addition, many of the farms are 
inherited. 
Other economic activities include petty trading, especially among the women, 
and the transportation business, dominated by young commercial motorcyclists. 
These transport businesses provide services to the likes of LGA workers, teach-
ers, paramedics, and security operatives, consisting mainly of the Nigerian Police 
and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps. There were very few com-
mercial vehicles plying routes in the LGA. 
Some Fulani cattle herdsmen have also settled in some of the Lessiti villages, 
where they rear their cattle and practise some form of food crop farming, mainly 
maize and millet cultivation. Their women earn their living by selling cheese 
produced from cow milk. The nature of this occupation, where animals are 
moved from one point to another to graze, has on some occasions caused con-
flicts between local farmers and the herdsmen settlers. 
The LGA can also boast of civil and public servants who work in its council 
secretariat, seven secondary schools (including three privately owned), two state 
hospitals (in Oke-Ila and Ora), the maternity units in Lessiti, waterworks, the 
presence of the security services of police, civil defence, Department of State 
Security (DSS), and the Immigration Service. A major tourist attraction that oc-
casionally draws visitors to the LGA is Ayekunugba waterfall.3 
Being a border LGA, commuters find the Osogbo-Ila-Ora road, which links 
the state to Otun Ekiti in Ekiti State, especially convenient when going to Abuja. 
                                                 
3  Ayekunugba is the name given to the waterfall located in Oke Ila Orangun. 
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This has been a source of problems to the people of the area for various reasons. 
The volume of traffic, including heavy-duty vehicles, increases drastically each 
time the road is reconstructed and has consequently shortened its lifespan, as is 
noticeable at present. Secondly, due to the hilly nature of the road, with its many 
sharp bends especially between Ila and Ora, road accidents can be fatal. This is 
worsened when the road becomes bad during the rainy season. Commuters who 
use the link to their destinations do not normally stop, except on the occasions 
when their vehicles develop a fault that prevents them from moving further. Res-
idents also occasionally stop to buy farm products such as plantains and, at times, 
cheese from herdsmen’s wives and children who hawk them along the roads. 
The LGA has two prominent religions: Islam and Christianity. There are also 
traditional religions and festivals. Thus, aside from the celebration of Christmas 
and Eid-kabir by the Christians and Muslims respectively, Egungun, Oro, and 
Isagun4 are held at their appointed times. Like any other typical Yoruba settle-
ment, the two major towns are ruled by the traditional rulers (obas) and their 
chiefs. The headquarters, Oke-Ila, is headed by the Orangun of Oke-Ila. Howev-
er, Ora unusually has two obas. Both have separate palaces on either side of the 
only road that links the town to Ila Orangun. Entering the town while coming 
from Ila reveals the palace of the Akesin5 of Ora-Igbomina to the right, while that 
of the Asaoni6 of Ora-Igbomina is to the left. The unresolved historical conflict 
over who should be the paramount traditional head of the sleepy community has 
occasionally led to violence in the past, resulting in destruction of property and 
loss of lives on both sides. 
Politically, Ifedayo is divided into ten wards, mainly shared among the two 
towns. These are Oyi Ayegunle, Ayetoro, Isinmi olootu, Balogun, Obaale, 
Aworo/Oke-Ila Rural, Asaoni, Akesin/Otun, Akesin/Oja/Ora, and Akesin/ 
Temidire. These are designated wards 1 to 10, respectively. They are all repre-
sented by either elected or appointed councillors at the council’s legislative arm. 
The council is headed by an elected or appointed chairman, as the larger political 
situation in the state may dictate. For instance, since the dissolution of the last 
elected chairmen in all the LGAs in the State of Osun about four years ago, local 
government elections have not been held. As such, operators of the executive 
arms of the local governments have been the appointees of the governor. 
Ifedayo LGA, especially Ora, has produced many prominent Nigerians in the 
political sphere, including a Nigerian Ambassador to the Philippines, Dr. Yemi 
Farounbi, and a senator representing Osun Central senatorial district, Professor 
Sola Adeyeye. 
                                                 
4  Egungun, Oro, and Isagun are forms of masquerades celebrated in Ifedayo communities at regular 
intervals. 
5  Akesin is the title given to the traditional ruler of Ora by one side of the indigenes. 
6  Asaoni is the title given to the traditional ruler of Ora by the other side of the indigenes. 
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Objectives of the research 
The main objectives of the research were as follows: 
1. To discover the number of violence-related deaths that occurred in the study areas 
between 2006 and May 2014. 
2. To discover the causes of such violent deaths. 
3. To discover whether or not such deaths were officially reported at appropriate 
quarters such as security operatives’ offices and hospitals. 
4. To discover reasons why such violent deaths were not reported in the media. 
 
For the purposes of this research, violent deaths in the period under review in-
clude those that resulted from disasters, road crashes, drownings, being trapped 
at mining sites, and fire incidents, in addition to fatalities caused by interpersonal 
disputes, communal clashes, and attacks. The mismanagement of conflicts was 
also studied. 
Since Egbedore was created from the old Ede LGA, its constituent communi-
ties that share boundaries with the mother council, such as Awo and Ido-Osun, 
have been in constant disputes. Also, like any value-based conflict, the chieftain-
cy rift over who should be the paramount ruler of Ora in Ifedayo LGA, between 
the persons bearing the Akesin and Asaoni titles, seems difficult to resolve once 
and for all and requires constant management. 
Media reports and gatekeeping theory 
Media is defined by O’Sullivan (1991) as an intermediate agency that enables 
communication to take place and a technological development that extends the 
channels and range of speed of communication. It can also mean ‘those institu-
tional structures that foster the rapid transmission of standardized information to 
a relatively large audience through some mechanised channels or medium’ (Ike 
2005). In a nutshell, the media is responsible for the dissemination of information 
among people, while it also takes their reactions in the form of feedback, with a 
view to making such feedback available. The media is the link, that is, the chan-
nel of communication, that ensures a successful journey of the code from the 
sender to the receivers, who then decode the message and respond in the form of 
feedback, thus making it an information chain. 
Whether or not a piece of information will make it into the public arena is al-
ways a painstaking activity in the media. The volume of information available to 
any medium is enormous, and hence the need to prune it down to allow the most 
important items to see the light of day, while other items have to wait temporarily 
or forever. In taking this decision, there are sets of rules and regulations to be 
followed, including ethical considerations and the public interest. The process is 
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referred to as ‘gatekeeping’, and it manifests at every level of the media, that is, 
from the reporters in the field who decide which information should be gathered, 
processed, and sent to the news editor, and the editor who has the final say re-
garding publication. Ekeli in Folarin (1995) summarized it thus: 
Gatekeeping is nothing but self-censorship performed by the media themselves. Gatekeeping 
emanates from the understanding by the journalists that apart from legal restrictions on 
what is to be published, including photographs, journalists have a moral right to be socially 
responsible to their readers in whatever materials they package for them. 
The essence of gatekeeping therefore is to ensure relevant, factual, and re-
sponsible information is disseminated to the reading public. However, in reality, 
gatekeeping is far more complex. There are many factors other than the need to 
ensure factual, relevant, and balanced information. For instance, a one-time cor-
respondent of Time magazine in China, Teddy White, was reported to have put a 
sign in his office: ‘Any resemblance between what is written here and what is 
printed in TIME magazine is purely coincidental’ (Kunczik 1988, cited in Folarin 
1995). Even the editor of the magazine himself was also once quoted to have 
said: ‘I don’t pretend this is an objective magazine. It’s an editorial from the first 
page to the last and whatever comes out has to reflect my view and that’s the way 
it is’ (ibid.). 
Without doubt, whatever is eventually published in the newspapers or broad-
cast in the electronic media is largely determined by the reporters and, more im-
portantly, by their editors. Speaking about editors, Bolawole (2004, cited in 
Arogundade 2004) said the following: 
Editors are different kettles of fish. Some are bold and brave, some are adventurous and ide-
alistic. Some are practical down to earth realists of the present-day Nigeria. Some are con-
scious of the naira value of the seats on which they sit while some are conscious of their 
place in history. 
There are other factors, however, that may act naturally as gatekeepers, be-
yond the control of the reporters and their editors. These may include unforeseen 
circumstances such as disasters, including crashes, floods, or fire disasters, that 
can cause damage to the materials intended for broadcast or publication. The re-
porters themselves can be victims of such mishaps. In addition, there can be 
technological problems in terms of communicating the gathered information to 
the newsroom and even the processing of the information for the public 
(Abodunrin 2007). 
Another uncontrollable gatekeeper in this category is the consumer. Even 
when reporters and editors make news stories available, consumers may not lis-
ten to or read them. This is referred to as selective consumption (Folarin 2005). 
This may include the boycott of certain media products in protest, or the con-
sumer may simply have preferences for other media outlets. 
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Again, the media thrive on information, which is, relatively speaking, a per-
ishable item. If the media is unaware of a particular development, such a devel-
opment can go unreported. Nobody can give what is not available. However, as 
noted by Bello (2007), the gate must be opened wide, especially for partnership. 
This will allow the media not only to report disasters but also to render early 
warning (EW) services such as educating the public, sharing information about 
affected areas, and alerting government. 
Methodology 
Sources of data 
Broadly speaking, the data for this work were derived from both primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources included the administration of question-
naires and interviews. Secondary sources were records from security operatives, 
local government authorities, and Internet resources (the study areas’ website 
pages). 
 
Sampling techniques 
A non-probability sampling technique was adopted for this study. Thus, both in-
cidental and purposive sampling employed sourced information from people who 
were accessible and based on the researcher’s choice. This was as a result of the 
need to get accurate and official angles on the data collected. Among the people 
accessed were members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers 
(NURTW) and selected community leaders, while security operatives were pur-
posively selected. The necessity for purposive selection was as a result of the fact 
that, by their mode of operation, not all officers and personnel of security ser-
vices were authorized to provide information. In addition, certain services tended 
to decline to provide information in any form, for what they always referred to as 
‘security reasons’. 
Thus, personal interviews were conducted with stakeholders. Four focus group 
discussions (FDGs) were conducted with members of the NURTW operating in 
Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs. Key informant interviews (KIIs) were also con-
ducted with journalists working in the state, as well as with security operatives 
and health workers. 
 
  
501890-L-bw-ASC
169 
 
Data analysis and presentation 
This research aimed to answer two basic questions: 
1. What types of violence are recorded in these ‘invisible’ LGAs? 
2. Why are these LGAs neglected by the national press? 
 
These and sundry other questions, such as causes of the violence recorded, are 
discussed using simple descriptive statistical analysis. 
Egbedore LGA 
Despite frequent land disputes among the people of this area, it is still considered 
not violent by all the respondents, including security operatives, community 
leaders, and organized union members. Twenty copies of the questionnaire were 
distributed purposively, as explained above, and 17 were returned. All the re-
spondents answered ‘No’ to the question: ‘Do you consider your neighbourhood 
to be violent?’ The reasons for this were explained thus by a respondent from 
Ido-Osun, who said he had lived in the community for over 40 years: 
Generally, Egbedore is peaceful, if not for the issue of land disputes that occurred occasion-
ally. If there is land tussle, we refer the case to the palace for settlement. Whoever sells to 
more than one person would either be made to refund money or provide another parcel, ex-
cept the buyer refuses. The major land issue here is caused by the government. They should 
have come up with a definite policy that will show who owns the land where the airport is 
being built. That is the major problem for now. The youth from Ede wanted to claim Ido-
Osunland, and the youths here resisted them. The government owns the land; but when the 
airport is ready, it should bear the name of Ido-Osun. 
Another respondent at Okinni, who also described Egbedore as peaceful, noted: 
The major problem here is land, because many civil servants in Osogbo have been building 
their houses here and Ido-Osun because of their nearness to the state capital. Family mem-
bers at times fought, and the ones they could not resolve were reported to the police. There 
was an occasion or two when people went violent, but the police arrested the suspects and I 
don’t know the latest now. 
 
Types of violence in Egbedore 
Although Egbedore cannot be said to be a violent LGA, it has had its own share 
of deaths. Broadly speaking, the reported fatal incidents can be categorized into 
natural disasters, accidents, and crime, including clashes. Table 8.1 below shows 
the recorded violence and deaths in Egbedore LGA between February 2012 and 
May 2014. There were no records, especially from official angles, to show these 
types of violence and deaths from 2006 to 2011 in the LGA. The only violent 
conflict that came close was in 2003, when the community and the police clashed 
over the alleged repeated arrest of residents for no just reasons. Matters came to a 
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head in February 2003, when irate members of the community burnt the part of a 
private building being used as the police station and then chased the policemen 
away. The residents took over the security of the town for about ten years until a 
police post was recently built in the oba’s palace. For the residents interviewed, 
the fact that they could do without policemen for about ten years was a pointer to 
the non-violent nature of the community and its environs. 
 
 
Table 8.1 Violence types and fatalities in Egbedore LGA (February 2012-May 2014) 
Date Town / location Type of violence Remarks No. of deaths 
29 Feb 2012 Ido-Osun Drowning 
Victim drowned 
while swimming at 
Kosa River 
1 
15 Mar 2012 Awo Mining accident 
A miner trapped at 
site 1 
10 May 2013 Ido-Osun Drowning 
19-year old 
drowned in Kosa 
River 
1 
11 June 2013 Awo Road accident 
Blood-stained 
woman’s body 
found along Iwo 
Road 
1 
13 Sept 2013 Ido-Osun Road accident 
A vehicle hit two 
soldiers riding a 
bike 
1 
6 Nov 2013 Iwoye Road accident 
Auto crash killed a 
passenger 
1 
9 Nov 2013 Ido-Osun Land dispute 
Man macheted, 
later died in his 
room 
1 
28 Feb 2014 Ofatedo Road accident A male victim 
killed 
1 
21 Mar 2014 Okinni Land dispute 
A male victim 
hacked to death 
over a land dispute 
1 
Source: Fieldwork, August-September 2014 
 
 
From Table 8.1, one can see that a total of nine deaths were recorded in five 
communities during the period under review. Out of these, only two were as a 
result of land disputes, which was in line with the relatively peaceful nature of 
the LGA. Following the pattern of Nigeria nationwide, road accidents remained 
the main problem and accounted for four deaths.7 
 
                                                 
7  See Chapter 1. 
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Summary of findings 
As noted earlier, both Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs of the State of Osun were 
under-reported in the last ten years as far as violent deaths are concerned. Alt-
hough this research could not assess any record of violent deaths between 2006 
and 2008, the following incidents were discovered between November 2009 and 
June 2014: 
 
(a) Awo 
1.  Awo (the headquarters of Egbedore LGA) and Ede (the headquarters of both Ede 
North and South LGAs, from which Egbedore was created in 1989) engaged in non-
lethal clashes in November 2009 and January 2010 over boundary disputes. Security 
operatives were drafted to the location on both occasions to prevent escalation. 
2.  As explained above, the LGA is endowed with mineral resources such as talc, granite, 
and limestone. On 15 March 2012, a worker of Sunny James Construction Company 
named Sunday Gbenga was trapped while working at the mining site excavating cer-
tain types of precious stone. Indiscriminate diggings dot the environment and continue 
to pose threats not only to these miners but to other people and to animals in the area. 
3.  On 11 June 2013 the corpse of a woman was found with blood stains along Awo-Iwo 
road in Awo. She appeared to be the victim of hit-and-run driver. 
 
(b) Ido-Osun 
1.  Ido-Osun shares a boundary with Ede, which hosts the state’s waterworks. On 
29 February 2012, an Ayo drowned while swimming in Kosa River, one of the 
tributaries to Osun River. 
2.  On 10 May 2013, another person, a Class 5 YTD primary school student 
named Niyi Isiaka, also drowned in Kosa River (which was overflowing be-
cause the dam across Osun River was opened). He was recovered the following 
day by Hausa fishermen because the fire fighters could not retrieve him on the 
first day. 
3.  On 13 September 2013, a vehicle, number KSF976QC, knocked two soldiers 
off the Honda bike they were riding along Ido-Osun Ede road in Ido-Osun. One 
of the men, a 28-year old named Ibraheem, died instantly. 
4.  On 8 November 2013, a riot broke out between Ido-Osun and Ede over the 
name of the airport under construction, as the two communities lay claim to the 
land. A man named Fatai Oyedeji, who was reportedly attacked with machetes 
during the fracas, died the following day. 
 
(c) Ofatedo 
1.  On 28 February 2014, a male victim called Fawad was crushed by a vehicle re-
ported to be travelling at top speed. 
 
It should be noted that Ofatedo is a community that is so close to Osogbo that, 
unless one is told, one cannot know it is a separate town from the state capital. 
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Ifedayo LGA 
Ifedayo is a typical rural LGA. Apart from being a border settlement far from the 
state capital Osogbo, the hilly, windy, and pot-holed road from Ila Orangun 
makes it devoid of the hustle-bustle characteristic of cities. The LGA can also be 
said to be peaceful, as 16 of our 18 respondents attested to this. Only one re-
spondent, a road safety official, insisted that it is ‘not a Yes or No answer’; some 
road users, especially commercial motorcyclists, popularly called okada riders, 
were violent in the way they used the road. Another respondent did not answer. 
The peaceful nature of the LGA was corroborated by a community leader in Oke-
Ila: 
We have no problem here at all. We sometimes disagree, but that is normal. Even tongue and 
teeth, as close as they are, do fight, and when the teeth bites tongue none of them will leave, 
the wound will be healed, and this does not happen always. Our only problem is bad road 
and other developments. 
Also in Ora, an FGD conducted among commercial motorcyclists revealed 
that the LGA was relatively peaceful. A participant said the only problems they 
had were bad roads and the numerous domestic animals, especially goats, that 
competed with them on the roads. 
The LGA’s major source of conflicts has been the age-old chieftaincy rift be-
tween the Akesin and Asaoni of Ora, who have been laying claims to the kingship 
of the sleepy town. The peak of the violence was in 2004, when both sides 
clashed and destroyed lives and property. They have since been avoiding a re-
peat. According to a community leader in Ora: 
It is true we once fought, but that was long ago. We are now united; in fact, the Asaoni that 
just died and the current Akesin were good friends, and they visited each other’s palaces. I 
think we are more concerned about our seeming neglect now than chieftaincy issues. 
Despite these opinions, Ifedayo also had incidences of violence that led to 
deaths in the period under review, as shown in the Table 8.2. 
Out of a total of 13 deaths recorded during the period under review, Alagbede 
(one of the villages called Leesiti) had seven, while Ora and Oke-Ila had three 
each. Eesikin, a border village between the LGA and Ekiti, also had one death. 
Only four of the deaths could be traced to clashes, thus justifying the claim of the 
respondents that the LGA was peaceful. Road accidents were the cause of the 
highest number (8) of violent deaths, while the remaining one death could not be 
traced to a definite cause. 
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Table 8.2 Violence types and fatalities in Ifedayo LGA (December 2009-September  
 2014) 
Date Town/location 
Type of vio-
lence Remarks No. of deaths 
8 Dec 2009 Ora Clash/attack 
Police/NURTW 
clashed at check-
point 
3 
4 July 2011 Eesinkin village Clash/attack 
Herdsmen/farmers’ 
clash killed one 
man 
1 
20 July 2013 Ora Road accident Goat obstructed a 
speeding cyclist 
1 
23 Oct 2013 Alagbede Hill Road accident Motorcycle acci-
dent killed rider 
1 
18 Nov 2013 Alagbede Hill Road accident A tanker skidded 
off the road 
Nil 
22 Dec 2013 Alagbede Hill Road accident 
A bus’s brakes 
failed, killing a 
passer-by 
1 
24 Dec 2013 Alagbede Hill Road accident 
A bus crashed, 
killing 5 and injur-
ing 7 
5 
3 Feb 2014 Alagbede Hill Road accident 
A asphalt-laden 
truck skidded off 
the road 
Nil 
26 May 2014 Oke-Ila Other 
60-year old man 
found dead on a 
farm8 
1 
Source: Fieldwork, August-September 2014 
 
 
Summary of findings 
Ifedayo is a rural LGA and a relatively peaceful area. The major source of violent 
deaths was accidents due to bad roads. Of the 13 deaths recovered during the pe-
riod, eight (61.5%) were a result of road accidents. It is instructive to also note 
that of the six road accidents recorded during the period under review, five oc-
curred around Alagbede Hill, thus marking the place as disaster-prone. Details 
are as follows: 
 
(a) Ora 
1.  The most outstanding of the clashes/attacks recorded in the period under review was 
the clash between the police and the NURTW on 8 December 2009. One of the po-
licemen at the checkpoint on the outskirts of Ora town, towards the border with Kwa-
                                                 
8  Prior his death, the deceased was said to have had a serious misunderstanding with a suspected hood-
lum, who is now at large after allegedly killing a community night guard. However, the cause of the 
old man’s death has not been conclusively established. 
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ra, was reported to have shot a driver dead. The deceased was said to be a leader of the 
NURTW in the town who had gone there to intervene on behalf of one of the members 
that was arrested. Other union members mobilized themselves and, in a reprisal attack, 
killed two policemen. 
2.  On 20 July 2013, goats obstructed a commercial motorcycle that also carried a pas-
senger. The rider died immediately. Competing with goats on roads is a common 
event in this LGA.  
 
(b)  Alagbede Hill 
1.  On 23 October 2013, a motorcycle accident claimed the life of the rider. 
2.  Again, on 18 November 2013 on this hill, a tanker skidded off the road and ran into an 
oncoming bus, damaging it. No life was lost. 
3.  On 22 December 2013, a bus marked Lagos XF507 LND had a break failure and 
killed a passer-by. 
4.  On 24 December 2013, a Toyota Hiace Hummer bus crashed on this hill, killing five 
of its passengers and injuring seven. 
5.  On 3 February 2014, a truck marked YRE320XA and loaded with asphalt skidded off 
the road, but there were no casualties. 
 
(c)  Oke-Ila 
On 26 May 2014, a 60-year old man was found dead at his farm. 
Why are these LGAs neglected by the national press? 
The second main question this research aimed to answer was this: Since all the 
aforementioned incidents actually occurred, why did the press not capture them? 
Interviews conducted among members of the press corps in the State of Osun 
were quite revealing. Some of the factors responsible for such neglect included 
the following: 
 
Inadequate personnel 
It was discovered that of the approximately 22 media correspondents stationed in 
the state to represent various media houses in Nigeria, only one of the media 
houses, the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), has more than one reporter. Thus, 
newspapers, including the Nigerian Tribune, Vanguard, ThisDay, Daily Inde-
pendent, Daily Trust, Newswatch, The Union, Punch, The Guardian, National 
Mirror, Pilot, and The Sun, have only one correspondent each to cover the entire 
state with its 30 LGAs and one area office. The journalists were not always 
aware of many of the things that happened; consequently, they could not report 
them. 
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News judgment 
Reporters, who are the editors in the field, also exercise their privilege to deter-
mine what news is. For instance, one of the participants exclaimed during the 
FGD: 
How do you think I will travel for about four hours to Oke-Ila because one old man died in 
the bush? And, if I should miss another important story, like a minister’s visit to the state, 
you think my editor will be happy? 
 
News value 
Another reason advanced for the seeming neglect of the study areas was that 
some of the happenings were not ‘weighty’ enough to get space in the national 
newspapers. According to one FGD participant: ‘The death of an okada rider 
would be meaningless if I sent it in this era of Boko Haram and, lately, Ebola 
saga.’ He advised that ‘only community newspapers can capture those things ad-
equately’. 
 
Over-reliance on official sources 
Many correspondents covering the state live in Osogbo, the state capital. Many 
of them believe that as all the security agencies are based in Osogbo, the im-
portant incidents will surely land on the head’s table. If such incidents are news-
worthy, the press will surely be invited. 
 
Accessibility problem 
There is also the problem of access, especially to Ifedayo LGA. For instance, 
Oke-Ila, a distance of about 100 km from Osogbo, could take a reporter the 
whole day to visit and come back, using commercial transport. This is because 
the few buses that ply the route have to wait until their seats are filled before 
leaving the bus park. This may take between 30 minutes and one hour, depending 
on the time of the day. In addition, commuters going to either Ora or Oke-Ila 
need to break their trips and have a stopover at Ila. Few vehicles, between one 
and three, ply the Oke-Ila-Ora route, and the passengers need to again wait in Ila. 
However, commercial motorcyclists are filling the gap. Odetoro (2007) identified 
African topography and road geometry, which result in steep slopes, bends, and 
pot-holes, as a cause of difficult accessibility. The windy, hilly, and bad nature of 
the Ila-Ora-Oke-Ila road has always been a menace to commuters; furthermore, 
the hills and bends were not reconstructed when the road was renovated in 2008. 
Thus, journalists will not go if they are not invited for special programs, such as 
the inauguration of projects by the local government or celebrations by certain 
politicians. 
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Uncooperative attitude of security operatives 
When a criminal act is committed, security operatives generally want to conceal 
it to give them time to conclude investigations. Two members of the press attest-
ed to this. They agreed that security operatives would not release information 
voluntarily except when and where they had solved large crimes and wanted to 
boost their egos. One of the journalists observed: 
When you heard such allegation and called them to react, they at times told you they would 
investigate and that situation was under control. At times, they would tell you reporting a 
case like accident could have negative psychological effect. Other offenders also beg them to 
shield their identity. 
This researcher also experienced such attitudes, as many of the operatives 
gave ‘no violence’ responses to all questions posed. Some of them agreed to give 
an official response only after some facts were placed before them. Even then, 
they still craved anonymity. Security operatives consider that the presence of vio-
lence is an indictment of their performance. 
 
Poor pay 
Many journalists are still poorly paid and receive irregular salaries. With their 
meagre and irregular income, it is therefore difficult for many of them to incur 
extra expenses to travel frequently to rural areas for news. 
 
Volume of information 
One journalist said the volume of information at the disposal of the newspapers’ 
headquarters at times ‘displaces my story’. She gave the example of the okada 
accident at Alagbede Hill, which somebody told her about and which she actually 
wrote up and sent to her editor; but it was never published. 
 
Lack of attractive political interest 
The LGAs under review are located in rural areas, except for some parts of Eg-
bedore, which has some of its communities as satellite towns to the state capital. 
Ifedayo, for instance, is located in the remotest part of the state, sharing bounda-
ries with Ekiti and Kwara states. Although it has prominent sons and daughters 
that are politicians, they are based in Osogbo. Aside from a few occasions of po-
litical rallies or meetings they decide to hold at home, such activities are held 
outside the council. 
 
Limited economic interest 
Although Ifedayo has a tourist attraction site, Ayekunugba waterfall, the volume 
of tourists is very low because it has not been properly developed and the road 
leading to the waterfall is bad. Apart from the modern market and the airport lo-
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cated in Ido-Osun, which were still under construction in August 2014, other 
parts of Egbedore were built up for private residential purposes. Perhaps the fact 
that issues of economic interest attract media attention accounts for the partial 
media coverage of the clash between Ido-Osun and Ede over the site of the pro-
posed airport, a clash that led to one death (a man from Ido-Osun). 
As noted earlier, consumers can also act as gatekeepers through selective con-
sumption. For instance, the Daily Sun newspaper of 18 December 2009 reported 
the violent clash between the policemen and members of the NURTW, which led 
to the death of three persons. However, if a consumer did not buy or have access 
to that newspaper, they would not have known of the incident. 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that no society is immune to the occurrence of conflicts; and 
when such conflicts are not properly managed, they can degenerate into violence. 
Disasters are also part of human existence, and they can be controlled or mitigat-
ed only through proper preparedness and effective management. 
As discovered in both Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs, some violent conflicts 
over land disputes that claimed lives could have been avoided with an effective 
EW system. In addition, deaths resulting from road crashes could be avoided if 
road users heeded warnings. Although poor roads can be a major cause of traffic 
accidents, bad practices of driving-such as road hogging, tailgating, and rag-
ging9-also play a significant role (Akinola 2005). For instance, a road safety of-
ficer explained that there was enough ‘road furniture’ to guide motorists using 
the Ila–Ora road, furniture which he said was not being made use of. It was ob-
served, however, that some of this furniture were already covered by bush. A 
typical example of such covered furniture was a large signpost erected by the 
members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), warning road users of 
bends, steep slopes, and the need to minimize speed. 
Despite the inevitability of these occurrences in some cases, the media cannot, 
as might be expected, always capture all these events, especially in rural areas. 
This is a result of a number of factors, ranging from problems of finance, inade-
quate media personnel, accessibility, right news judgment, lack of community-
based print media houses, uncooperative attitude of security operatives, and other 
factors highlighted in the research. 
                                                 
9  Road hogging is the act of driving without adequate consideration for other road users. Tailgating is 
driving too close to another vehicle in a ‘nose-to-tail’ manner. Road ragging is the term used for vio-
lent driving in revenge or retaliation for others’ bad driving. 
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However, effective coverage and documentation of such occurrences could be 
enhanced by having more staff in the media and including community-based 
newspapers (where they exist) in the process of documentation. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to determine the types of fatal incidents in five 
LGAs of Katsina State: Baure, Mani, Kurfi, Matazu, and Ingawa. The research 
also interrogates why these areas are neglected by the Nigerian press. The 
study primarily involved field research (via structured questionnaires) and a re-
view of existing literature on violence, as well as collecting background data 
on the socio-economic, political, religious, and geographical context of Katsina 
State. The study revealed 37 incidents of unreported cases of violence, which 
resulted in 104 deaths in the five ‘invisible’ LGAs of Katsina State between 
2006 and 2014. The causes of these fatalities were road accidents (63.46%), 
drownings (12.50%), famer-pastoralist clashes (6.73%), building collapses 
(4.80%), assassinations (3.84%), fire outbreaks (2.88%), animal attacks 
(1.92%), explosions (0.96%), and electrocutions (0.96%). Kurfi accounts for 
the highest number of fatal deaths in the five LGAs, followed by Ingawa, 
Baure, Mani, and Matazu. Essentially, this study identifies the ineffectiveness 
of press coverage as responsible for the failure of such incidents to make news 
headlines. A critical look exposes the political economy of the media in Nige-
ria, with private owners who underpay journalists and see news organs as polit-
ical platforms to manipulate the unsuspecting masses, to the detriment of poor 
and marginalized groups in rural areas. 
Introduction 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), violence is the intentional 
use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another per-
son, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likeli-
hood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or dep-
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rivation (WHO 2002: 5). Also, according to the first World Report on Violence 
and Health from the WHO (ibid. 3): 
Violence has probably always been part of the human experience. Its impact can be seen, in 
various forms, in all parts of the world. Each year, more than a million people lose their 
lives, and many more suffer non-fatal injuries, as a result of self-inflicted, interpersonal or 
collective violence. Overall, violence is among the leading causes of death worldwide for 
people aged 1-44 years. The human cost in grief and pain, of course, cannot be calculated. 
In fact, much of it is almost invisible. While satellite technology has made certain types of 
violence-terrorism, wars, riots and civil unrest-visible to television audiences on a daily ba-
sis, much more violence occurs out of sight in homes, workplaces and even in the medical 
and social institutions set up to care for people. Many of the victims are too young, weak or 
ill to protect themselves. Others are forced by social conventions or pressures to keep silent 
about their experiences. As with its impacts, some causes of violence are easy to see. Others 
are deeply rooted in the social, cultural, economic fabric of human life. Recent research 
suggests that while biological and other individual factors explain some of the predisposition 
to aggression, more often these factors interact with family, community, cultural and other 
external factors to create a situation where violence is likely to occur. 
The WHO also categorizes violence into three different categories, based on 
the persons committing the acts of violence: self-directed violence, interpersonal 
violence, and collective violence (ibid. 6). 
Violence or violent activities have always been part of life in Nigeria; and, un-
til recently, road accidents and political clashes were responsible for the highest 
number of violent deaths in the country. However, the pattern and trend of vio-
lent activities and their resultant deaths in Nigeria was greatly altered by the 
Boko Haram insurgency, which has thus far accounted for the deaths of over 
10,000 Nigerians, according to the National Security Adviser (NSA), Sambo 
Dasuki (Alli 2014). According to Nigeria Watch’s Fourth Report on Violence in 
Nigeria (2006-2014) (2014: 7): 
Cumulative figures for the years 2006-2014 show that the main causes of violent deaths are, 
in order of importance, accidents, crime, political clashes, ethno-religious fighting, and eco-
nomic issues. In 2014, however, this pattern changed because of the Boko Haram crisis in 
the North-East. On a national level, political clashes, religious fighting, and crime became 
the main causes of violent deaths after emergency rule was put in place in May 2013. 
Thus, the spate of violent deaths has increased dramatically in Nigeria’s north-
ern half since the re-emergence in 2010 of the dreaded Salafist sect, Jama'atu 
Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JASLWJ) (lit. ‘People Committed to the 
Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad’, and better known as Boko Ha-
ram). Over time, the insurgency is proving seemingly as insoluble as it is intri-
cately difficult to understand. Yet, many other factors account for a significant 
number of victims of violence across the country. In fact, there are hundreds of 
cases of violent deaths across Nigeria which have nothing to do with Boko Ha-
ram and which result from accidents, natural disasters, and ethno-religious con-
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flicts. While most of these fatal incidents are reported by the media, some never 
make news headlines. 
Katsina State is one of the northern regions affected by the wave of violence 
occasioned by the Boko Haram crisis. However, it is not one of the areas worst 
affected by the insurgency, compared with Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Kano. 
No Boko Haram attacks were recorded in the five LGAs under review in Katsina 
State. In fact, few fatal incidents were reported by the national press in the region 
between 2006 and 2014. This study attempted to discover why. Was it because 
there were no such cases in Baure, Ingawa, Mani, Kurfi, and Matazu LGAs? Or 
was it a result of shortcomings in the system of data-gathering on lethal violence? 
As expected, the research revealed scores of fatalities in all the five ‘invisible’ 
LGAs, proving the ineffectiveness of news coverage by the national press. 
 
Statement of the problem 
Violent deaths resulting from accidents (motor accidents, fire outbreaks, building 
collapses, drownings), ethno-religious crises, political violence, and various 
crimes (from assassinations to terrorism) are almost daily occurrences in Nigeria. 
Katsina State is no exception. In Baure, Mani, Matazu, Kurfi, and Ingawa LGAs, 
this research revealed many fatal incidents that were not reported by the media, 
showing a huge gap in the capacity of the national press to effectively cover rural 
areas. Although most of these LGAs were not necessarily inaccessible and not 
particularly distant from the state capital, news reporters did not go there owing 
to serious logistical challenges that confined them to cities-or, to be more precise, 
to the corridors of power: Government House, government ministries, govern-
ment departments, and public agencies. 
 
Research questions 
This study responds to two main questions: 
1.  What are the categories of violent incidents that led to death in the five LGAs under re-
view? 
2.  Why are the five ‘invisible’ LGAs neglected by the national press? 
 
Methodology and limitation of study 
After reviewing the existing literature, undocumented violent deaths were identi-
fied through interviews with inhabitants of the five LGAs under review. For easi-
er access to respondents, who may not ordinarily be willing to discuss such a 
sensitive topic, the researcher relied on the leaders of the Nigeria Union of Local 
Government Employees (NULGE) to select ten inhabitants per LGA and admin-
ister a total of 50 structured questionnaires. The investigation also examined why 
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fatalities went unreported by the national press. To answer this question, the re-
searcher reached out to the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ). 
The study faced a number of challenges, which no doubt affected the outcome 
of its findings. First, the researcher could have contacted more respondents in 
other parts of the LGAs but for the limitation in funding. This might have re-
vealed another pattern of unreported violent deaths. Moreover, the investigation 
was significantly constrained by the lack of available data or literature on ‘invisi-
ble’ violence in rural Nigeria, except for a few available press reports in the ar-
chives of Nigeria Watch. Lack of access to adequate literature on the social, eco-
nomic, political, ethnic, religious, and geographical context of Katsina State left 
the researcher no option but to gather what was available to him via the Internet. 
Ethno-religious and geographical context of Katsina State 
According to the official website of Katsina LGA (Katsina, n.d., para. 15-17): 
Katsina was one of the pre-jihad Hausa city states which was conquered and annexed into 
the Sokoto caliphate by Mallam Urnmarun Dallaji in the early part of the 19th Century. After 
the British colonial conquest in 1903, the erstwhile Katsina and Daura emirates became 
Katsina Province of the former Northern Region of Nigeria. Later, Katsina and Zaria Prov-
inces together formed the North Central State under the Gowon regime’s twelve-state struc-
ture. North Central State was left intact in 1976 when the number of states was increased to 
nineteen under the new name of Kaduna State. Katsina State came into existence on the 23rd 
of September, 1987 covering the same area of the former Katsina Province of the defunct 
Northern Region.  
The state now shares borders with Kano and Jigawa states to the east, Kaduna 
State to the south, Zamfara State to the west, and the Republic of Niger to the 
north. Its population is predominantly Hausa-Fulani and Muslim. Some ‘pagan’ 
Maguzawa live in the southern part of the state along the Malumfashi-Kafur-
Bakori axis, although a large majority of Maguzawa have converted to Christian-
ity or Islam. There are also immigrants from the South, mostly of Igbo, Yoruba, 
and Nupe extraction. These are spread across the state and involved in various 
commercial activities. A significant percentage of the Yorubas are found in Fun-
tua town in southern Katsina. They settled there generations ago and have been 
assimilated into the local community, earning the appellation Yarabawan Funtua 
(lit. ‘the Yorubas of Funtua’). 
Socio-economic and political context of Katsina State 
Like other states in northern Nigeria, Katsina’s economy is mainly agrarian, 
which means that a large majority of the residents rely on agriculture as a prima-
ry means of livelihood. These activities include rain-fed and irrigation cultiva-
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tion, as well as poultry farming, cattle breeding, beekeeping, and forestry. The 
state government aims to develop its three major dams of Jibia, Sabke, and Zobe 
for irrigation, but access to fertilizer is still very limited for farmers. According to 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD 2012: 2): 
Poverty is widespread in the country and has increased since the late 1990s. Some 70 per 
cent of Nigerians live on less than US$1.25 a day. Poverty is especially severe in rural are-
as, where up to 80 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, and social services 
and infrastructure are limited. The country’s poor rural women and men depend on agricul-
ture for food and income. About 90 per cent of Nigeria’s food is produced by small-scale 
farmers who cultivate small plots of land and depend on rainfall rather than irrigation sys-
tems. The poorest groups eke out a subsistence living but often go short of food, particularly 
during the pre-harvest period.  
Other than agriculture, the second-largest employer in Katsina State is the 
government. Solid mineral resources are largely underexplored in an oil-
dependent economy, despite the abundance in the region of kaolin, fire clay, ball 
clay, granite, marble, silica, asbestos, salt, nickel, uranium, lead, iron ore, iron 
oxide, gold, manganese, cremstones, and precious stones. 
 
Baure LGA: Socio-economic, political and geographical context 
Baure falls under the northern (Daura) senatorial district of Katsina State. It is 
headquartered at Baure town and was formed from Zango LGA in 1996. The lo-
cal government has a total area of 707 sq km and a population of 197,425, ac-
cording to the 2006 census. It has 12 wards: Baure, Garki, Faski, Maibara, 
Dankum, Yanduna, Hui, Unguwar Rai, Taramnawa, Yanmaulu, Muduri, and 
Babban Mutum. 
The large majority of Baure’s inhabitants are farmers who earn their liveli-
hood through agricultural production, largely crop cultivation alongside the rear-
ing of animals like sheep, goats, and cows. Aside from Yanduna, the wards of the 
LGA have neither a river nor a dam for commercial irrigation farming. Thus, al-
most all the farmers engage in subsistence farming of crops such as millet, beans, 
groundnuts, sesame, and guinea corn. Due to this rural nature, the only major 
market of the LGA is in Garki, once a week on Mondays. Baure is the most 
backward, remote, and inaccessible of the five ‘invisible’ LGAs under review. 
According to respondents, it recorded several fatal incidents in the years under 
study (Table 9.1). 
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Table 9.1 Violent deaths in Baure LGA (2006-2014) 
S/N Date Location Cause Description  
No. of 
deaths 
1 June 2011 Maibawa Motor acci-
dent 
The accident 
was caused by 
the numerous 
pot-holes on 
Baure- Sanda-
mu road. 
6 
2 June 2013 
Chinai, Babban 
Mutum 
Motor acci-
dent 
The accident 
occurred when 
a bus driver 
tried to over-
take a heavy-
duty vehicle. 
7 
3 Aug 2014 Garki 
Building 
collapse 
The building 
collapse was 
caused by a 
heavy down-
pour as well as 
the lack of a 
proper drainage 
system in the 
village. 
5 
Source: Fieldwork, November 2014 
 
Kurfi LGA: Socio-economic, political and geographical context 
Kurfi falls under the central (Katsina) senatorial district and is headquartered in 
Kurfi town. The LGA has a total area of 572 sq km and a population of 117,581 
inhabitants, according to the 2006 census. It was formed from Dutsinma LGA in 
1989 and has ten wards: Kurfi A, Kurfi B, Barkiya, Wurma A, Wurma B, Tsauri 
A, Tsauri B, Rawayau A, Rawayau B, and Birci. 
The major economic activity is agricultural production. Inhabitants rely on the 
Kawara, Barkiya, Wurma, and Tamawa rivers for irrigation farming. In fact, irri-
gation farming of vegetables such as hot peppers, lettuce, onions, and carrots ac-
counts for about 40% of the LGA’s annual cultivation. For the rain-fed agricul-
ture, people produce crops like maize, guinea corn, beans, groundnuts, and sesa-
me. There are four major weekly markets in the LGA: Wurma on Mondays, 
Kurfi on Tuesdays, Birci on Thursdays, and Rawayau on Saturdays. According 
to respondents, the LGA recorded a number of fatal incidents in the years under 
study (Table 9.2). 
  
501890-L-bw-ASC
185 
 
Table 9.2 Violent deaths in Kurfi LGA (2006–2014) 
S/n Date Location Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 Nov 2008 
Yakasai village 
along the Katsina–
Dutsinma road 
Motor acci-
dent 
The accident oc-
curred when a 
Peugeot J5 
rammed into a 
heavy-duty vehi-
cle. While sympa-
thizers were try-
ing to rescue the 
victims, a Nissan 
Urban crashed 
into the crowd. 
13 
2 
July 2010 
 
Kurfi town, near the 
filling station 
Motor acci-
dent 
A cyclist was hit 
and killed by the 
driver of a 
Volkswagen Golf. 
1 
3 Mar 2013 Gwanzo village Execution 
2 alleged armed 
robbers were 
lynched by local 
vigilantes. 
2 
4 June 2013 
Kurfi town, near 
Government Sec-
ondary School 
Motor acci-
dent 
The driver of a 
Volkswagen Golf 
wrongly overtook 
another vehicle 
and rammed into a 
Honda Accord. 
5 
5 Oct 2013 Dalabu Saulawa Drowning 
The victim was 
drowned while 
swimming in a 
river. 
1 
6 Feb 2014 
Along the Kurfi-
Batsari road 
Motor acci-
dent 
The victims died 
as a result of a 
farmer-herder 
clash over water 
and grazing land. 
7 
7 Aug 2014 
Kaukawa, Kurfi 
town 
Drowning 
A boy fell into a 
well and was 
drowned. 
1 
8 Sept 2014 
Kurfi town, near 
Kurfi General Hos-
pital 
Motor acci-
dent 
A motorcyclist 
was drowned 
while swimming 
in a river. 
1 
9 Sept 2014 Wurma village Assassination 
A local trader was 
murdered by a 
gang in his house. 
1 
10 Sept 2014 Yaranda village 
Animal at-
tack 
The victim was hit 
by his ox while 
working on his 
farm. 
1 
Source: Fieldwork, November 2014 
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Mani LGA: Socio-economic, political and geographical context 
Mani falls under the northern (Daura) senatorial district of Katsina State. It was 
one of the first 301 LGAs created in 1976 in Nigeria. Three LGAs (Bindawa, 
Dutsi, and Mashi) were subsequently formed out of it. It is now headquartered in 
Mani town and has a total area of 784 sq km and a population of 176,966, ac-
cording to the 2006 census. It has 11 wards: Mani, Machika, Kwatta, Jani, Mudu-
ru, Tsagem Takusheyi, Bagiwa, Hamceta, Magami, Bujawa Kewayan, and Du-
wan Makau. Like other LGAs, a large majority of the people rely on agriculture 
as a means of livelihood. Many engage in intensive irrigation farming of vegeta-
ble crops such as tomatoes, hot peppers, and onions. On a daily basis, truckloads 
of these perishable foods are transported out of Mani to southern Nigeria. The 
major markets in the LGA are in Mani town, Muduru, and Jani. Mani is the old-
est and most developed of the five ‘invisible’ LGAs. According to respondents, it 
recorded several fatal incidents in the years under study (Table 9.3). 
 
 
Table 9.3 Violent deaths in Mani LGA (2006-2014) 
S/n Date Location Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 June 2011 Kugado village Motor accident 
Two vehicles had a 
head-on collision. 
One of them, a 
Peugeot J5, was con-
veying traders return-
ing from a local mar-
ket. 
7 
2 
June 2014 
 
Gawon Mala 
village 
Motor accident 
The victims included 
a mother and her 2 
children in a motor 
accident between a 
Volkswagen Sharon 
SUV and an un-
named vehicle. 
5 
3 Aug 2014 Magami village Motor accident 
The victims died in 
an accident involving 
a Volkswagen Sha-
ron SUV. 
3 
4 Aug 2014 
Mani town, 
Chima River 
Drowning 
A 26-year old youth 
was drowned while 
trying to fetch water. 
1 
5 Sept 2014 
Jani ward, Dalla-
tu River Drowning 
A village head of 
Turawa was 
drowned. 
1 
Source: Fieldwork, November 2014 
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Matazu LGA: Socio-economic, political and geographical context 
Matazu falls under the southern (Funtua) senatorial districts of Katsina State. It is 
headquartered in Matazu town and was formed from Musawa LGA in 1991. The 
LGA has a total area of 503 sq km and a population of 115,325, according to the 
2006 census. Matazu has ten wards: Matazu A, Matazu B, Gwarjo, Sayaya, 
Karaduwa, Kogari, Rinjin Idi, Dissi, and Mazoji A and B. 
Farmers produce vegetables such as onions, hot peppers, lettuce, and carrots, 
thanks to irrigation schemes around the Fandabuwa Dam and three earth dams in 
Rinjin Idi, Fafu, and Kasharuwa. For the rain-fed agriculture, they produce 
maize, guinea corn, rice, beans, sesame, soya beans, and cotton. Other than agri-
culture, the people of Matazu engage in commercial traditional weaving, black-
smithing, and the manufacturing of tools such as hoes. There are three major 
weekly and bi-weekly markets: Mazoji on Mondays, Matazu on Tuesdays and 
Fridays, and Karadua on Wednesdays and Saturdays. According to respondents, 
the LGA recorded a number of fatal incidents in the years under study (Table 
9.4). 
 
Ingawa LGA: Socio-economic, political and geographical context 
Ingawa falls under the northern (Daura) senatorial district of Katsina State. It is 
headquartered at Ingawa town. It was formed from Kankia LGA in May 1989. 
Ingawa has a total area of 892 sq km and a population of 169,753, according to 
the 2006 census. It has 11 wards: Ingawa, Kandawa Jobe, Manomawa Kafi, Yay-
abi Dore, Dara, Daunaka Bakinkwari, Bareruwa Ruruma, Kurfeji Yankaura, 
Dugul, Yandoma, and Agayawa. 
The people of Ingawa rely largely on agriculture as a means of livelihood. The 
crops cultivated are guinea corn, millet, maize, beans, sesame, cotton, and 
groundnuts. The inhabitants, particularly those of Agayawa, Yandoma, Dugul, 
and Dara, are also engaged in commercial traditional weaving. The major weekly 
markets are in Ingawa on Mondays, Kurfeji on Wednesdays, and Tunas on Sun-
days. According to respondents, the LGA recorded a number of fatal incidents in 
the years under study (Table 9.5). 
 
  
501890-L-bw-ASC
188 
 
Table 9.4 Violent deaths in Matazu LGA (2006-2014) 
S/n Date Location Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 Feb 2010 
Kogon Maidawa, 
Sayawa ward 
Murder 
A farmer on his way to 
his fields was killed 
when he came across a 
madman carrying a hoe. 
1 
2 Feb 2011 Salihawa village Execution 
The alleged ringleader 
of a gang engaged in the 
theft of goats and sheep 
was ambushed and 
killed by the communi-
ty’s vigilantes. 
1 
3 Sept 2011 Sayaya village Drowning 
The victim was in the 
business of helping 
people cross over the 
Sayaya River. One day, 
while swimming, he 
became exhausted and 
was drowned. 
1 
4 Dec 2011 
Dogon Hawa vil-
lage 
Motorcycle 
accident 
A police officer and a 
resident of Karadua 
village collided with 
one another while riding 
on motorcycles. 
2 
5 Feb 2012 
Near Matazu town-
ship market 
Motor ac-
cident 
2 motorcyclists were hit 
by the driver of a 
Volkswagen Golf who 
lost control of his car 
when its tyre burst. 
2 
6 Aug 2012 Karadua village 
Motor ac-
cident 
The victim was hit by 
the driver of a 
Volkswagen Golf while 
trying to cross the Kafin 
Soli-Matazu road. 
1 
7 Nov 2013 
Matazu town, near 
the bridge 
Motor ac-
cident 
The driver of a Toyota 
Starlet hit a motorcycle. 
Both the motorcyclist 
and the passenger of the 
car died. 
2 
8 Aug 2014 
Sabon Sara village, 
Sayaya ward 
Drowning 
A divorcee who went to 
fetch water missed a 
step, slipped back into 
the river and was 
drowned. 
1 
9 Aug 2014 Nasarawa village Drowning 
A boy was drowned 
while fishing. 
1 
10 Oct 2014 Rinjin Idi earth dam Drowning 
4 boys were drowned 
while swimming. 
4 
Source: Fieldwork, November 2014 
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Table 9.5 Violent deaths in Ingawa LGA (2006-2014) 
S/n Date Location Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1. June 2007 
Manomawa Kafi 
ward, Gulbin 
Gari River 
Drowning 
A man was 
drowned while 
trying to recover 
his shoes in the 
river. 
1 
2 June 2007 
Ingawa town, 
Sabon Gari Fire 
A girl died as a 
result of injuries 
sustained from a 
fire outbreak 
caused by a burning 
candle. 
1 
3 Feb 2008 Ingawa town, 
Kofar Yamma 
Fire 
The victim was 
burnt to death after 
he set up a fire to 
warm his body 
during the year’s 
cold season. 
1 
4 July 2010 
Ingawa town, 
Kofar Yamma Electrocution 
The victim was 
electrocuted by an 
uninsulated electric 
cable he mistakenly 
touched while try-
ing to fix the mud 
wall of his shop. 
1 
5 Aug 2010 
Yan Lawal vil-
lage 
Cattle graz-
ing 
A farmer-herder 
clash over water. 
7 
6 Mar 2012 
Ingawa town, 
AUY Petroleum 
filling station 
Explosion 
An attendant died 
while trying to fix a 
fuel pump, which 
ignited an explo-
sion. 
1 
7 Aug 2013 
Ingawa town, 
Kuwait Island 
Drowning 
A boy was drowned 
while swimming in 
a river. 
1 
8 May 2014 Kandawa village 
Motor acci-
dent 
The tyre of a 
Volkswagen Golf 
was shot at by offi-
cials of NDLEA, 
who suspected that 
passengers were 
criminals. 
6 
9 June 2014 Kurfeji market, 
Ingawa town 
Animal At-
tack 
The victim was 
killed by the bite of 
a snake. 
1 
Source: Fieldwork, November 2014 
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Analysis of unreported violent deaths in ‘invisible’ LGAS 
In Baure, Mani, Matazu, Ingawa, and Kurfi LGAs, the study discovered 37 fatal 
incidents, resulting in 104 deaths from 2006 to 2014. Kurfi accounted for the 
highest number of violent deaths (31.73% of the total), followed by Ingawa 
(19.23%), Baure (17.30%), Mani (16.34%), and Matazu (15.38%). As in many 
rural regions of Nigeria, fatalities were caused mainly by accidents such as motor 
crashes, drownings in rivers, electrocutions, fire outbreaks, and animal attacks. 
Of the 37 incidents, 15 were road accidents, accounting for 65.38% of the deaths. 
This finding confirms the argument of Agbonkhese et al. (2013: 90): 
Road accidents have become a normal and re-occurring phenomenon in Nigeria. Although 
both the developed and developing nations of the world have suffered from varying degrees 
of road accidents, the developing countries clearly dominate with Nigeria having the second-
highest rate of road accidents among 193 ranked countries of the world. Deaths from reck-
less driving are the third leading cause of death in Nigeria. In 2012, at least 473 persons 
died from a total of 1,115 vehicular accidents nationwide […] There could be more unre-
ported cases, and as often happens, some of the injured die without making the statistics. 
Second to road accident among the causes of violent deaths in Baure, Mani, 
Ingawa, Kurfi, and Matazu LGAs was drowning in rivers. Thirteen such inci-
dents resulted in 12.5% of the fatalities. Other causes of violent deaths were 
farmer-pastoralist clashes (6.73%), building collapses (4.80%), assassinations 
(3.84%), fire outbreaks (2.88%), animal attacks (1.92%), explosions (0.96%), 
and electrocutions (0.96%). 
Surprisingly, political issues were not identified among the causes of fatality, 
despite Katsina being one of the states affected by the post-2011 election vio-
lence. The five LGAs under review have been largely free of the effects of the 
deadly Boko Haram insurrection. They did not follow the pattern of other re-
gions, where political conflicts constitute the third main cause of fatal violence 
nationwide (Nigeria Watch 2014: 3). However, the absence of such deaths in the 
five LGAs was not because there were actually no politically motivated acts of 
violence, but because these violent activities did not result in any deaths. 
Why did incidents go unreported by the national press? 
Two main factors were responsible for the failure of the national press to report 
fatal incidents in Katsina State: the political economy of the Nigerian media, and 
the semi-rural nature of the five LGAs. These factors are behind the lack of polit-
ical and economic interest in these LGAs. Accessibility was not a challenge in 
the case of Mani, Matazu, Kurfi, and Ingawa, which are easily accessed from the 
state capital. Only the most rural area, Baure, lacks good roads. 
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Ineffective news media coverage as major factor for unreported incidents 
In general, Nigerian journalists are too financially unstable to be able to effec-
tively carry out their duties. Because most of the media cannot sponsor and post 
reporters to the various states of the Federation, they often employ correspond-
ents with appointment letters and identity cards, leaving them to use whatever 
means they can to do their job. Such fulltime or freelance journalists have no op-
tion but to visit government houses or ministries in order to obtain press releases 
and some recompense in the form of cash for writing good reports about politi-
cians. 
According to Abdullahi Izma Yamadi, the chairman of Katsina State chapter 
of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) (personal communication, 8 October 
2014): 
There are problems concerning effective coverage by newspapers because most of the re-
porters are based in the state capital [Katsina] and of course, not only in the state capital 
but in the corridors of power - at the Government House. When you look at the situation crit-
ically, you don’t blame the reporters alone: they share the blame with the proprietors of 
newspapers who just employ these people [the reporters], issue them with identity cards and 
expect them to go and operate on their own. Of course they [the proprietors] shouldn’t ex-
pect effective coverage because they didn’t provide them with vehicles for easier mobility; 
they didn’t give them all the necessary gadgets - and they are not being paid. 
Such reports [unnatural deaths] are reports that don’t fetch a penny; no reporter expects 
to get a penny for reporting such incidents[,] which means they will not have the motivation 
to cover such incidents in remote rural areas. It is only those press releases that are issued 
by government agencies that are accompanied with some financial gratification[,] which is 
why our reporters are always there [in the corridors of power] because that is what they live 
on. So, I believe there are lapses and ineffectiveness in terms of coverage[,] which is respon-
sible for the lack of reported unnatural deaths in the said 5 LGAs of Katsina State. 
In the same vein, S.U. Leman argued (2014: 2): 
The working conditions of journalists are in the most cases inadequate. Journalists working, 
as fulltime and as freelancers, are overall poorly remunerated. They do not enjoy health and 
safety protection. They are not even provided with the necessary equipment to help them pro-
tect themselves in conflicts or civilian unrests. Most media houses are not financially stable 
or strong and those who have the financial capacity to take safety measures do not want to 
invest in the safety of journalists and many are not properly trained. 
 
Political economy of news media ownership and control in Nigeria 
Today, the print, broadcast, and Internet media in Nigeria are largely privately 
owned and controlled. Until its deregulation by the Babangida regime in 1992, 
the broadcast media in Nigeria was dominated by the government. However, the 
print media had long before then remained dominated by the private sector. Ac-
cording to Musa and Mohammed (2004: 243): 
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In relation to the printed press, notably newspapers, private individuals constitute major 
owners. In fact, of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, only 14 own newspapers 
in addition to New Nigerian, Daily Times and Sunday Times owned by the Federal Govern-
ment. In the case of both Daily Times and Sunday Times, government maintains a 60% 
shareholding. The rest of over 42 titles are all owned by private individuals. 
At the moment, whereas Daily Times has been sold to a private investor under 
controversial circumstances, the fate of New Nigerian is deeply uncertain. Some 
of the 14 state-owned newspapers, such as the Triumph, have been closed down. 
Thus, the print media in Nigeria today is unarguably owned and controlled by the 
private sector. 
The deregulation of the broadcast media in 1992 also spurred the proliferation 
of privately owned TV, radio, and cable networks, such as Africa Independent 
Television (AIT) and Ray Power FM in Lagos, Independent Television (ITV) in 
Benin City, Channels Television and Vision FM in Abuja, Desmins Independent 
Television (DITV) and Nagarta Radio in Kaduna, and Freedom Radio and Ra-
hama Radio in Kano. According to Ariye (2010): 
For several decades in Nigeria government could not muster courage to allow individuals to 
own electronic media. The fear expressed then was that radio and television as potent forces 
for mass mobilization should not be insensitively allowed to slip into the hands of private in-
dividuals. But by 1992 President Babangida announced that one of the legacies he would 
want to leave behind was the privatization of the electronic media. He then went on to estab-
lish the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), charging it to ensure that private radio 
and television licenses are issued before the end of his administration. 
However, it is still difficult for journalists to effectively cover the length and 
breadth of the country’s vast land mass. Critically looking at the private media in 
Nigeria, one can clearly see that, historically, very few owners are apolitical. Al-
most all of them are either biased or card-carrying members of one political party 
or another. Thus, they are not neutral and do not serve the interests of the masses. 
Notable examples of media owners who are also politicians are APC’s founding 
leader Bola Ahmed Tinubu (Nation), PDP stalwart Raymond Dokpesi 
(AIT/Raypower), APC presidential aspirant Sam Nda-Isaiah (Leadership), and 
former PDP Abia State governor Orji Uzor Kalu (The Sun). 
Others who do not show any sympathy for a political party may be promoting 
a regional or ethnic agenda. They see their news media outfits as platforms to 
launch themselves into the political arena and win elected positions in Nigeria. 
Musa and Mohammed (2004: 244) also share this belief: 
As usual of Nigerian politicians, some of them found media organizations to boost their 
standing in the polity preparatory to their active participation in partisan politics. At least 
two instances may be recalled here. Chief Mike Ajaegbo, who founded Minaj cable television 
in 1995, later became a stalwart of PDP and successfully contested election as senator of the 
Federal Republic. The other is Mr James Ibori, who established the Diet daily and Sunday 
newspapers, joined PDP and successfully contested elections to become Governor of Delta 
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State. Until they founded their respective media, both Ajaegbo and Ibori were hardly reck-
oned with as politicians either at national, state or local levels. 
Thus, the vision of the majority of the Nigerian media is rarely about the 
masses. Instead, newspapers, radio, and TV stations are a tool for the actualiza-
tion of the personal ambitions, interests, and agendas of their owners. This ex-
plains why the welfare of reporters and their ability to cover remote rural areas 
are not a primary concern. 
Conclusion 
This research investigated the unreported cases of violent deaths in five LGAs of 
Katsina State: Baure, Mani, Ingawa, Kurfi, and Matazu. It showed that the ab-
sence of records of fatalities was a result of shortcomings in the system of data-
gathering by the media. The political economy of the ownership and control of 
the news media in Nigeria explains the ineffectiveness of the coverage of such 
rural areas. Historically, the private media has never been pro-masses but rather 
pro-establishment. Hence, unreported cases of violent deaths in rural Nigeria will 
continue to occur. 
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A study of violence-related deaths  
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Abstract 
This paper highlights the outcome of a study on fatal incidents in four LGAs of 
north-western Nigeria: Gwadabawa, Gudu, and Ilella LGAs in Sokoto State, 
and Sakaba LGA in Kebbi State. Data obtained from 1,083 questionnaires re-
vealed that, since 2006, the year 2011 had the highest number of fatalities. Be-
tween 2006 and 2014, Gudu LGA recorded the highest number of fatalities and 
violent incidents, while Sakaba LGA had the lowest. For the period under re-
view, the most frequent cause of fatal incidents was cattle grazing, followed by 
political clashes. Religion, which is often perceived as a major factor of con-
flict, contributed quite insignificantly to the overall level of violence in the four 
LGAs, with just a few incidents involving the Yan Shi’a, the Tijaniyya Sufi 
brotherhood, and the Yan Izala movement. Finally, the study demonstrates that, 
just as in the urban centres of Sokoto and Kebbi, there are many fatal incidents 
in rural areas - yet these are unreported. Some explanations for this omission 
are discussed in relation to poor road infrastructure. 
Introduction and methodology 
One of the primary concerns of the ‘invisible’ violence project of Nigeria Watch 
is to analyse particular LGAs where fatal incidents appear to have fallen outside 
the radar of press coverage. The issue is to discover whether this omission results 
from a dearth of media reports or from an authentic absence of lethal violence. 
Bearing this framework in mind, the current study investigates ‘invisible’ fatal 
incidents in Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela LGAs in Sokoto State, and Sakaba 
LGA in neighbouring Kebbi State. 
Northern Nigeria now offers the general impression of an entire region in cri-
sis. However, some analytical nuance is required to distinguish areas that are in-
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deed rife with violence from those largely undisturbed. Thus the north-western 
geo-political zone of Nigeria includes a mix of states such as Kano and Kaduna, 
characterized by occasional-to-recurrent crises, and Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kebbi, 
which have relatively low-intensity violence. To fine-tune our focus on selected 
LGAs in Sokoto and Kebbi, two main questions must be asked. First, what is the 
general character of fatal incidents in Gudu, Gwadabawa, Illela, and Sakaba? 
Second, what factors help to make sense of this gap in the recognition and report-
ing of violence in the affected LGAs? 
The paper responds to these questions by starting with a brief description of 
the local socio-political and socio-economic context. With empirical content, it 
then discusses the nature of lethal violence in the selected LGAs. In the next sec-
tion, it sheds light on the factors identified as responsible for the shortcomings of 
reports and records of fatal incidents, while the final part of the paper concludes 
with remarks on the overall research findings. 
In regard to methodology, a total of 1,200 questionnaires were circulated 
across a broad spectrum of residents in the four LGAs. Although not all respond-
ents completed every aspect of the questionnaire, a total of 1,083 returned suffi-
cient data to generate a gender matrix complete with figures and percentages in 
relation to each of the four LGAs. However, to employ further rigour in the dis-
tillation of the received data, questionnaires not containing key indices for anal-
yses (causes and descriptions of violent incidents, numbers of fatalities) were 
separated to generate another set of tables in relation to the four LGAs. There-
fore, the total number of respondents recorded in the gender matrix (Table 10.1) 
does not necessarily match the total number of respondents recorded in Tables 
10.2, 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5. 
A challenge encountered in the study was in relation to questionnaires that ap-
peared to duplicate the same fatal incident, year of event, affected community, 
and cause of violence. While such questionnaires presented nearly the same set 
of data, they tended to contain different figures for the number of fatalities. 
Therefore, such cases were addressed by taking the average of the fatalities rec-
orded, since all other variables remained constant. Furthermore, it is possible that 
there were instances where certain questionnaires presented different causes for a 
single violent incident. It should also be taken into account that the limitations of 
human memory on the part of most respondents limited the generation of data in 
regard to dates of violent occurrences. Consequently, the tables presented for 
each of the four LGAs reflect only the years that incidents took place, not the 
days and months. In all, this study establishes that the overarching pattern of le-
thal violence in Sokoto and Kebbi has been generally underestimated in terms of 
its occurrence rate in rural areas and of the frequency of fatalities. 
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Gudu, Gwadabawa, Illela and Sakaba: A bird’s-eye view 
Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela are among the 23 LGAs in Sokoto State. Popula-
tion distribution figures published by the National Population Commission 
(NPC) suggest that the total population of Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela are 
95,400, 231,569, and 150,133, respectively.1 For reasons that may help to explain 
why violent incidents have received minimal attention from the media, it is im-
portant to note that Gudu LGA is situated in a remote part of Sokoto State and, in 
fact, shares a border with the Republic of Niger. Its capital is a town called Balle, 
but there are a number of other localities. Similar to Gudu, Illela LGA is also sit-
uated far from the geographical centre of Sokoto and shares a border with the 
Republic of Niger. Among the three LGAs, Gwadabawa is the largest in terms of 
population size, akin to Sokoto North for instance. However, demographic fea-
tures do not explain why some LGAs receive little attention as far as violent in-
cidents are concerned. 
Gwadabawa is noted to have played an important role in the historical build-
up of the Sokoto caliphate. This fact is acknowledged by Hugh Johnston, who 
further explains how certain parts of present-day northern Nigeria such as Gwad-
abawa were geographically compact and, in fact, not dissimilar from English 
counties. 2 Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela - and by extension the entire north-
western zone of which Sokoto and Kebbi are a part - owe much of their relative 
order and peaceful milieu to the influence of history and particularly that phase 
associated with the legacy of the 1804 jihad. Although not the main focus of this 
section, there is an important point to be made regarding how the jihad led by 
Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio occasioned not only an Islamic and scholastic revolu-
tion but also the bequeathing of a profound socio-political structure and adminis-
trative organization of the society which we now know as contemporary Sokoto 
State. What appears to be the peaceful character of Sokoto and Kebbi is even 
more significant in light of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, to which other 
northern states such as Borno and Yobe bear witness. It is therefore amidst this 
apparent atmosphere of relative peace and stability in Sokoto and Kebbi that the 
challenge of addressing the phenomenon of unreported violent incidents also 
gains importance. 
Like most of the other LGAs in Sokoto State, Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela 
have their economies based on agriculture and particularly subsistence farming. 
Several crops are cultivated, but the main ones in these LGAs include millet, 
maize, guinea corn, and beans/cowpeas. Cattle grazing remains a common prac-
                                                 
1  National Population Commission (2010), 2006 Population and Housing Census: Priority Table Vol-
ume IV. http://www.population.gov.ng/index.php/publications/141-population-distribution-by-age-
and-sex-2006-census-priority-tables-vol-4. 
2  Johnston, H. (1967), The Fulani Empire of Sokoto. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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tice, which explains why the data in this study underscores how this economic 
activity is fused with the overall portrait of violent incidents. Weaving, dyeing, 
and tanning constitute a main focus of local industries; and although attempts 
have been made by a number of state government authorities to stimulate mecha-
nized agriculture, these LGAs - and indeed Sokoto State - still exhibit a high lev-
el of both relative and absolute poverty in comparison with other states.3 
In terms of religion, Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela, in common with other 
LGAs in Sokoto State, are over 90% Muslim, and the predominant language 
spoken is Hausa (with Fulfulde spoken to a lesser extent). The political landscape 
in Gudu, Gwadabawa, and Illela has maintained quite a competitive character 
over the years and especially during the period (2006-2014) examined in this 
study. A considerable number of the violent incidents identified in the aforemen-
tioned LGAs are attributable to the evolution and contestation involving political 
parties, such as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the four defunct parties 
that later merged to form the All Progressives Congress (APC). These four de-
funct parties, which were once active within the aforesaid LGAs, comprise the 
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), 
the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), and a faction of the All Progressives 
Grand Alliance (APGA). Another party involved in some of the violent incidents 
was the Democratic People’s Party (DPP). 
The socio-political and economic dynamics of Sakaba LGA in Kebbi State are 
largely associated with the larger historical trajectory of Sokoto State. This of 
course can be understood by the fact that Kebbi was carved out of Sokoto in Au-
gust 1991. Of 21 LGAs, Sakaba is among the three least populated LGAs in 
Kebbi State, with a population of 91,728. The other two smaller LGAs are Kalgo 
(with a population of 84,928) and Aleiro (67,078).4 Its comparably low popula-
tion contributes to the perception of Sakaba by the media as unimportant, and its 
geographical location within Kebbi places it at an extreme corner of the state, 
sharing borders with neighbouring Niger. Most people from Sakaba practise Is-
lam and are largely Hausa-speaking. There are also some inhabitants who adhere 
to Christianity or traditional religious beliefs. For instance, traces of traditional 
religious worship can still be found among the Cicipu-speaking people, who are 
ethnically referred to as the Acipu, in the part of Sakaba that shares a border with 
Kontagora LGA in Niger. Subsistence farming and livestock production are 
widely practised in the area. However, the remote communities of the LGA are 
severely challenged by problems of accessibility, especially by car during the 
rainy season. Absent road infrastructure hampers the possibility for farmers to 
                                                 
3  National Bureau of Statistics (2012), Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report.  
http://www.tucrivers.org/tucpublications/Nigeria%20Poverty%20Profile%202010.pdf 
4  National Population Commission (2010), 2006 Population and Housing Census: Priority Table Vol-
ume IV. 
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market their harvests outside Sakaba and explains the tendency for violent inci-
dents to go unnoticed by the media and local authorities. 
 
 
Table 10.1 Demographics of respondents in Gudu, Gwadabawa, Illela, and Sakaba 
LGAs 
LGA Male Female Total 
% Male / 
Female 
Gudu 234 47 281 83.27 / 16.73 
Gwadabawa 217 87 304 71.38 / 26.62 
Illela 155 90 245 63.27 / 36.73 
Sakaba 149 104 253 58.89 / 41.11 
Source: Fieldwork, August–September 2014 
 
 
As noted in the introductory section, Table 10.1 is based on the data from 
questionnaires in which respondents indicated their gender status in the respec-
tive LGAs. While it may not provide the complete gender portrayal of every re-
spondent, it does provide an impression suggestive of the gender ratio in each of 
the LGAs. Thus, if the suggested gender ratio is anything to go by, the most 
striking feature is that there is a much lower response rate from females than 
from males in all the LGAs. However, the lower feedback rate from females is 
not in any way a consequence of fewer women in the LGAs. In fact, according to 
official statistics, Illela LGA, for instance, has a slightly higher number of fe-
males (75,184) than males (74,949). Such a skewed outcome can be understood 
in light of the socio-cultural dynamics which persist in obscuring the ‘visibility’ 
and representation of women in these communities. Furthermore, the marked 
religious context of these communities also shapes the interaction of males and 
females in certain public spaces. This factor no doubt exerted some influence on 
the willingness of certain women to respond and render numerically representa-
tive feedback to the questionnaires. 
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Violent incidents in Gudu, Gwadabawa, 
Illela, and Sakaba (June 2006-May 2014) 
 
Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gudu LGA (June 2006-May 2014) 
S/N Date Community Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 2006 Balle Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Balle farmers 3 
2 2006 Kurdula Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
3 2006 Gwazange Car accident Due to bad roads 7 
4 2007 Balle Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 3 
5 2007 Balle Political crisis 
DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 
5 
6 2007 Kurdula Political crisis 
DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 
5 
7 2007 Gwazange Political crisis ACN vs. PDP supporters 2 
8 2007 Gwazange Political crisis ANPP vs. DPP supporters 1 
9 2007 Dayeji Political crisis ANPP vs. DPP supporters 8 
10 2007 Tunga Political crisis 
Former governor’s 
(Bafarawa) supporters vs. 
incumbent Sokoto State 
governor’s (Wammako) 
supporters 
7 
11 2007 Bachaka Political crisis ANPP vs. DPP supporters 2 
12 2007 Karfe Political crisis 
Internal fighting within 
DPP 
 
1 
13 2007 Kuturure Political crisis ANPP vs. DPP supporters 2 
14 2007 Gurdam Political crisis ANPP vs. ACN supporters 6 
15 2007 Gwazange Crime 
Neighbouring villages 
fought each other 
1 
16 2007 Bangi Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
17 2007 Kurdula Crime 
Family feud involving 
Hussaini and Amina 
2 
18 2007 Balle Crime 
A man against another man 
over marriage matters 
1 
19 2007 Bachaka Car accident Due to over-speeding 8 
20 2007 Filisko Crime Kanwuri vs. Sabon Gari 
communities 
2 
21 2008 Balle Political crisis ANPP vs. DPP supporters 1 
22 2008 Bachaka Political crisis DPP vs. PDP supporters 1 
23 2008 Chalasko Political crisis ANPP vs. DPP supporters 2 
24 2008 Dayeji Cattle grazing 
Fulani and farmers fought 
over allegation of stolen 
cattle 
4 
25 2008 Gwazange Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
26 2008 Bachaka Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
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Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gudu LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
27 2008 Dayeji Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
28 2008 Bachaka Crime Family dispute 1 
29 2008 Kurdula Car accident No description 8 
30 2008 Gwazange Car accident No description 2 
31 2009 Kurdula Political crisis ACN vs. PDP supporters 1 
32 2009 Tunga Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Tunga farmers 3 
33 2009 Rafin Kubu Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
34 2009 Karfe Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 6 
35 2009 Bachaka Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
36 2009 Kurdula Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
37 2009 Tunga Crime Associated with community 
issues 
1 
38 2009 Bachaka Market issue Family feud over economic 
issues 
1 
39 2009 Balle Crime One man with his wife 
against another man 
1 
40 2010 Gwazange Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 1 
41 2010 Rafin Kubu Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 1 
42 2010 Filasko Political crisis CPC vs. PDP supporters 2 
43 2010 Gudu Town Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 3 
44 2010 Balle Political crisis CPC vs. DPP supporters 2 
45 2010 Gurdam Political crisis 
DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 1 
46 2010 Tunga Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Tunga farmers 3 
47 2010 Bachaka Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
48 2010 Kurdula Cattle grazing 
Fulani vs. Hausa communi-
ty 
3 
49 2010 Kurdula Crime 
Violence erupted between a 
couple leading to death of 
the man 
1 
50 2010 Tunga Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Tunga farmers 1 
51 2010 Bachaka Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
52 2010 Gurdam Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers  2 
53 2010 Gwazange Crime Family feud 1 
54 2010 Dorasa Area Crime 
Community vs. community 
over economic issues 1 
55 2010 Gwazange Crime 
Involvement of male and 
female youths 2 
56 2010 Bachaka Car accident Due to bad roads 2 
57 2010 Yakka Crime Parent-to-parent violence 2 
58 2011 Bachaka Political crisis 
PDP vs. DPP supporters 
during electoral campaign 2 
59 2011 Bachaka Political crisis PDP vs. ACN supporters 1 
60 2011 Gudu Political crisis DPP vs. PDP supporters 5 
61 2011 Balle Political crisis 
DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 
2 
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Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gudu LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
62 2011 Balle Crime 
Villagers vs. hooligans in 
town 1 
63 2011 Kokotau Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 2 
64 2011 Balle 
Natural disas-
ter Flooding crisis 1 
65 2011 Yakka Political crisis PDP vs. ANPP supporters 2 
66 2011 Salawa Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 2 
67 2011 
Salawa, Gudun 
Buki Fire 
Fire in the houses of Dan 
Tunau and Suleiman 
 
4 
68 2011 Salawa, Gudun 
Buki 
Natural disas-
ter 
No description 5 
69 2011 Shatoka, Zabarma 
Natural disas-
ter 
No description 2 
70 2011 Karfen Chana Political crisis CPC vs. APGA supporters 2 
71 2011 Gwazange Political crisis DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 
2 
72 2011 Gwazange Market issue 
Two persons clashed over 
ownership of a bag of rice 
in a market place 
2 
73 2011 Tunga Political crisis 
DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 2 
74 2011 Filasko Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 2 
75 2011 Filasko Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
76 2011 Filasko Market issue Business-related conflict 2 
77 2011 Kurdula Political crisis 
DPP vs. PDP supporters 
during rally 
3 
78 2011 Rafin Kubu Political crisis 
ANPP vs. DPP supporters 
during rally 
1 
79 2011 Dayeji Political crisis 
PDP vs. DPP supporters 
during voting campaign 
1 
80 2011 Gurdam Crime Community vs. community 1 
81 2011 Karfe Crime Community vs. community 2 
82 2011 Karfe Political crisis 
PDP vs. DPP supporters 
during voting campaign 
33 
83 2011 Boto Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers  2 
84 2011 Karfen Sarki Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers  1 
85 2011 Karfen Sarki Crime 
Football clash: Gudu United 
vs. Karfen Sarki Stars 
2 
86 2011 Tunga Crime Rapist beaten to death 1 
87 2011 Karfen Chana 
Religious 
crisis 
Yan Izala vs. Yan Shi’a 1 
88 2011 Shiyar Yamma Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
89 2012 Gudun Buki Political crisis PDP vs. ANPP supporters 2 
90 2012 Salawa Crime Conflict between husband 
and wife 
3 
91 2012 Salawa Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
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Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gudu LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
92 2012 Boto Political crisis CPC vs. ANPP supporters 2 
93 2012 Gozange Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 2 
94 2012 Bachaka Political crisis ANPP vs. PDP supporters 3 
95 2012 Bachaka Crime 
Tunga vs. Bachaka commu-
nity clash 
2 
96 2012 Bachaka Market issue Muslim vs. Muslim 2 
97 2012 Bachala Political crisis PDP vs. ACN supporters 31 
98 2012 Bangi Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Bangi farmers 1 
99 2012 Balle Car accident 
Bad roads and over-
speeding 
2 
100 2012 Makuya Fire No description 1 
101 2012 Kokotau Fire 
Explosion in Makepa area 
in Kokotau 
3 
102 2012 Yakka 
Religious 
crisis 
Muslims vs. Christians 9 
103 2013 Balle Political crisis PDP vs. APC supporters 1 
104 2013 Balle Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
105 2013 Gwazange Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
106 2013 Bachaka Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
107 2013 Bachala Political crisis APC vs. PDP supporters 5 
108 2013 Yar Bakwai 
Religious 
crisis Yan Shi’a vs. Sunni 2 
109 2013 Boto 
Religious 
crisis Tijaniyya vs. Yan Izala 6 
110 2013 Karfen Sarki Crime Bakin Gari vs. Chikin Gari 
communities 
2 
111 2013 Chalasko Crime House of Dan Mamman vs. 
family of Saraki 
3 
112 2013 Chalasko Market issue Buyer vs. seller 2 
113 2013 Filasko Crime Conflict over a girlfriend 1 
114 2013 Kurdula Cattle grazing 
Hausa–Fulani clash for 
three days before police 
intervention 
2 
115 2013 Huda 
Natural disas-
ter 
Windstorm 1 
116 2013 Bangi 
Natural disas-
ter 
Water erosion between 
Kokotau and Bangi towns 
3 
117 2014 Karfe Political crisis APC vs. PDP supporters 2 
118 2014 Karfe Cattle grazing 
Fulani vs. farmers, over 
missing cow 
7 
119 2014 Balle Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
120 2014 Balle Political crisis APC vs. PDP supporters 6 
121 2014 Balle Car accident 
Collision between two mo-
torcycle riders, leaving one 
dead 
1 
122 2014 Balle Car accident Due to bad roads 2 
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Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gudu LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
123 2014 Balle 
Natural disas-
ter Heavy rainfall and floods 1 
124 2014 Tunga Cattle grazing 
Fulani vs. farmers, over 
allegation of stolen cattle 1 
125 2014 Kurdula Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
126 2014 Kurdula Car accident Due to bad roads 2 
127 2014 Garin Gabas Crime 
Armed gang invaded com-
munity 1 
128 2014 Makuya Car accident 
Due to over-speeding and 
bad roads 2 
129 2014 Shetallo 
Religious 
crisis Tijaniyya vs. Yan Izala 2 
130 2014 Bachaka Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
131 2014 
Bachaka 
 Car accident Due to bad roads 1 
Source: Fieldwork, August-September 2014 
 
 
Based on the data presented in Table 10.2, there were at least 131 violent inci-
dents in Gudu LGA between 2006 and 2014, resulting in a total number of 367 
fatalities. These unreported incidents affected at least 39 different wards and 
communities within Gudu. The top three causes of violence were political crisis 
(45 incidents), cattle grazing (33), and crime (23). The three least frequent causal 
factors of violent incidents were market issues, fires, and religious crises. Matters 
related to sorcery and land issues did not appear at all as causes. Returning to one 
of the leading three causes, political crises caused the greatest number of inci-
dents, particularly in 2007 and 2011, which both happened to be election years in 
the country. Similar to a number of other states, political tensions usually rise in 
Sokoto before, during, and after elections. 
 
 
Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwadabawa LGA (June 2006-May 2014) 
S/N Date Community Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 2006 Tungar Zaki Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 7 
2 2006 
Tungar 
Shanu 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
3 2006 Kola Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
4 2006 Kaura Huchi Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
5 2006 
Lukuwa Tu-
du 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
6 2006 Chimola Cattle grazing Hausa vs. Fulani 1 
7 2006 Gidan Kaya Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
8 2006 Buzan Lega Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
9 2006 Tajaye Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Hausa 1 
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Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwadabawa LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
10 2006 Gigane Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
11 2006 Here village Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
12 2006 
Tungan 
Shanu 
Land issue 
Land struggle led to violence 
between members of the com-
munity 
3 
13 2006 Gidan Kaya Crime 
Armed robbers murdered an 
individual 
1 
14 2006 Asara Sorcery 
Community members arrested 
and killed a suspected sorcerer 
1 
15 2006 Gwadabawa Car accident 
A lorry ran into an electric pole 
and exploded, electrocuting two 
individuals 
2 
16 2006 Gwadabawa Crime 
A fight broke out between 
Gwadabawa youth and the 
National Drug Law Enforce-
ment Agency (NDLEA) 
1 
17 2006 Gwadabawa Crime 
A Yoruba woman threw her 
child into a well 
1 
18 2006 Gwadabawa Land issue Inheritance battle 1 
19 2006 Zangiru Crime 
Execution of armed robber by 
community 
1 
20 2006 Darma Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
21 2006 
Tungar 
Bugaje 
Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 2 
22 2007 Dangero Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
23 2007 Tungar Zaki Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 8 
24 2007 Kagoye Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Hausa 1 
25 2007 Kagara Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
26 2007 Chimola Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
27 2007 Buzan Lega Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
28 2007 
Mamman 
Suka 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
29 2007 Tsolawa Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 5 
30 2007 Kulalo Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
31 2007 Gwadabawa Car accident 
A fatal accident involving two 
cars in a head-on collision 
25 
32 2007 Male Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 3 
33 2007 Rugar Mande Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
34 2007 Kola Crime 
Asariya group vs. Gubudiyya 
group during gathering in the 
town 
1 
35 2007 
Tungar 
Shanu 
Political crisis 
Allocation of government pro-
jects by the ruling party DPP 
led to a disagreement with PDP 
(opposition) 
3 
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Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwadabawa LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
36 2007 Gwadabawa Political crisis 
DPP’s LGA chairman allegedly 
prompted the PDP opposition 
party into violent demonstra-
tions owing to complaints of 
injustice 
1 
37 2007 
Tungar 
Kwangi 
Political crisis 
Opposition ANPP complained 
of violation of ‘sharing formu-
la’ by PDP 
3 
38 2007 Chimola Political crisis 
A complaint of election rigging 
caused a brutal fight between 
PDP and DPP supporters 
4 
39 2007 Gidan Kwano Political crisis 
PDP complained of violation of 
‘sharing formula’ by ANPP, 
leading to violence 
3 
40 2007 Tungar Dillu Political crisis 
Election result opposed by PDP 
supporters 
1 
41 2008 
Dan Gero 
Salame 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
42 2008 Tungar Zaki Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 5 
43 2008 
Tungar 
Shanu 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
44 2008 
Chimola 
(Tajaye) 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
45 2008 Asara Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
46 2008 Atakwanyo Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
47 2008 Gidan Karna Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
48 2008 
Tungan Mani 
Dan Kasari 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
49 2008 Kalaba Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
50 2008 Dan Sitti Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
51 2008 Dan Burunje Car accident 
A motorcyclist collided with a 
car at a sharp bend in the road 
3 
52 2008 Gidan Kaya Political crisis 
Alleged election rigging 
pitched DPP against ANPP 
supporters 
1 
53 2008 Tudun Doki Political crisis 
Political rally of ruling DPP led 
to violence with opposition 
ANPP 
1 
54 2009 Tungar Barga Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
55 2009 
Tungar 
Shanu 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
56 2009 Lahodu Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
57 2009 Kagoye Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
58 2009 Kwalango Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
59 2009 Ranganda Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
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Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwadabawa LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
60 2009 Gwadabawa Car accident 
A car crashed owing to faulty 
wheels 
2 
61 2009 Gwadabawa Car accident 
A commercial motorcyclist and 
passenger were crushed by a 
car 
2 
62 2009 Mammande Crime Armed robbery attack 11 
63 2009 Matse Other accident A tree fell on a man 1 
64 2009 Chimola Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
65 2010 Millela Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
66 2010 
Kwank-
wanawa 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
67 2010 
Tungar Mal-
lam 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
68 2010 Hunchi Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
69 2010 Mammande Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
70 2010 
Gorgawo 
village 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
71 2010 Takalmawa Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
72 2010 Here village Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
73 2010 Lukuwa Rafi Natural disaster 
Gworonyo Dam over-flowed, 
flooding villages situated close 
to a river 
9 
74 2010 Yar Tunga Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 1 
75 2011 Lukuwa Natural disaster 
Gworonyo Dam over-flowed, 
flooding villages along a river 
2 
76 2011 Tungar Tudu Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 3 
77 2011 Burdi Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 1 
78 2011 
Kwank-
wanawa 
Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 3 
79 2011 Millela Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
80 2011 Mammande Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
81 2011 Darna Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
82 2011 Dan Fanga Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
83 2011 Tunga Zaki Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
84 2011 Salame Car accident 
A car ran into a mud house, 
killing the driver 
1 
85 2011 
Tungar Ma-
dugu 
Political crisis 
Supporters of the ruling DPP 
clashed with the opposition 
ANPP 
3 
86 2011 Salame Political crisis 
ANPP supporters attacked the 
convoy of the LGA chairman 
1 
87 2012 Kiliya Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
88 2012 Tungar Zaki Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
89 2012 Kola Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
90 2012 Dan Fanga Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
91 2012 Chanca Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
92 2012 Tsolawa Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
93 2012 Jihadi Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
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Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwadabawa LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
94 2012 
Tunga 
Bugaje 
Other accident 
A weak wall fell on the occu-
pants of a house 
5 
95 2012 Tungar Zaki Car accident 
A motorcyclist lost control and 
crashed through a broken 
bridge 
4 
96 2012 Tungar Jeje Car accident 
A driver lost control of his car 
and died 
1 
97 2012 Dan Burunje Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
98 2012 Gangada Political crisis 
Campaign rally involving vio-
lence between DPP and PDP 
1 
99 2012 Mele Political crisis 
Opposition ANPP complained 
of violation of ‘sharing formu-
la’ by PDP 
2 
100 2013 
Kwank-
wanawa 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
101 2013 Dangero Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
102 2013 
Tungar 
Bugaje 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 3 
103 2013 Kagara Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
104 2013 Asara Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
105 2013 
Tungar Dan 
Dolo 
Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 2 
106 2013 Salame Market issue 
Dispute regarding the location 
of a market caused violence 
1 
107 2013 
Tungan 
Bugaje 
Other accident 
A dilapidated mud house col-
lapsed, killing its occupants 
3 
108 2013 Salame Car accident 
Head-on collision involving 
two cars led to the death of one 
of the drivers 
1 
109 2013 Gwanja Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
110 2013 Mammande Religious issue Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 1 
111 2013 Gwadabawa Car accident A truck crushed a motorcyclist 1 
112 2013 Kuliya Religious crisis Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 3 
113 2014 Kaime Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
114 2014 Gwadabawa Other accident 
A person fell into a well and 
was found dead after two days 
1 
115 2014 Salame Car accident 
A motorcyclist crashed into a 
ditch 
1 
116 2014 Salame Car accident 
A car crashed through a bridge, 
killing its driver 
1 
117 2014 Salame Car accident 
A car driver lost control and 
crashed into a market, killing 
one individual 
1 
118 2014 
Tungar 
Shanu 
Car accident 
A motorcyclist died following 
collision with a stationary car 
1 
119 2014 
Tungar Mai 
Komo 
Car accident 
A motorcyclist lost control and 
died following collision in a 
crowded area 
1 
120 2014 Salame Other accident A child fell into a well 1 
Source: Fieldwork, August-September 2014 
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Compared with Gudu, Gwadabawa LGA experienced a slightly lower number 
of violent incidents (120) and fatalities (253) across 68 wards and communities 
between 2006 and 2014 (Table 10.3). The predominant cause of violent incidents 
was cattle grazing (68 incidents),5 followed by car accidents (15) and political 
crises (12). Sorcery, market issues, natural disasters, and land issues constituted 
the least frequent causal factors linked with violent incidents in the LGA. In 
terms of years, 2006, followed closely by 2007, witnessed the highest number of 
violent incidents, among which the number of conflicts involving farmers and 
Fulani cattle herdsmen were considerable. Although religious crisis was associat-
ed with only eight violent incidents, all involved clashes between the Yan Shi’a 
and the Sufi brotherhood known as the Tijaniyya. This significant number of in-
cidents involving the Yan Shi’a exceeds the number in Gwadabawa LGA and, 
indeed, fits a broader pattern of religious-related crisis involving the group in 
some other parts of Sokoto State, such as in Sokoto North and Sokoto South 
LGAs.6 
 
 
Table 10.4 Violent incidents in Illela LGA (June 2006-May 2014) 
  
                                                 
5  Some of the interviews conducted at the Sokoto State Police Command Headquarters helped to con-
firm the seriousness of issues arising from cattle grazing in several parts of the state. As the tables 
show, nearly all the incidents involve clashes between Fulani herdsmen and Hausa farmers. 
6  There have been a number of past violent incidents involving Yan Shi’a members, such as clashes in 
2005 and 2007, as well as more recent encounters in November 2014 during a Yan Shi’a procession in 
Sokoto metropolis in Sokoto South LGA. Fieldwork for this study coincided with the period when a 
Yan Shi’a procession took place; and although there were no reported fatalities, some individuals 
were injured. 
S/N Date Community Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 2006 Gaidau Political crisis 
Two opposing political parties, PDP 
and DPP, clashed over differences 
in interest 
3 
2 2006 Illela Araba Sorcery Conflict between husband and wife 1 
3 2006 
Gidan Hamma, 
Gidan Katta 
Fire accident Explosion 1 
4 2006 Illela District Crime 
Incident involving the Hausa vs. 
Adarawa community 
1 
5 2006 Illela Stadium Crime 
Incident involving the Araba vs. 
Amarawa football clubs 
1 
6 2006 Gidan Kwanni Crime 
Incident involving the Nigerian 
army against armed robbers 
5 
7 2007 Kan Wuri Political crisis DPP vs. ACN supporters 2 
8 2007 Gidan Katta Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 2 
9 2007 Zugana Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 5 
10 2007 Tudun Gudali Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 1 
11 2007 Gidan Ayuba Political crisis PDP vs. ANPP supporters 3 
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Table 10.4 Violent incidents in Illela LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
  
12 2007 Yar Kwalbati Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 1 
13 2007 Illela District Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 1 
14 2007 Gidan Hamma Political crisis PDP vs. ANPP supporters 1 
15 2007 Gidan Kwanni Natural disas-
ter 
Flooding (water) 5 
16 2007 Yar Marina Religious crisis Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 2 
17 2007 Danbar Dikko Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Fulani 6 
18 2008 Sandaga Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 3 
19 2008 Central Market Market issue 
Conflict over land matter in the 
market 1 
20 2008 Illela Araba Fire accident Explosion 3 
21 2008 Illela Central 
Natural disas-
ter 
Flood occurred owing to lack of 
drainage 1 
22 2008 Nasarawa 
Natural disas-
ter 
Heavy rain caused flooding and 
deaths and left people homeless 3 
23 2008 Dan Boka 
Natural disas-
ter Flooding 3 
24 2008 Kan Wuri Religious crisis Yan Shi’a vs. Yan Izala 5 
25 2008 Illela Religious crisis Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 2 
26 2008 Yar Tsakkuwa Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
27 2008 Anbarura Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 11 
28 2008 Illela Central Land issue Fulani vs. Hausa  3 
29 2009 Munwadata Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Hausa 10 
30 2009 Gidan Ayuba Fire accident The house of a family caught fire 2 
31 2009 Yar Marina Market issue Conflict over market transaction 2 
32 2009 Dan Boka Religious crisis Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 1 
33 2009 Amarawa Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Fulani 2 
34 2009 Tudun Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Hausa 5 
35 2009 Hura Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
36 2009 Gidan Ayuba Crime Hooligans attacked strangers 4 
37 2009 Dan Bar Dikko Crime 
Community defence against armed 
robbers 4 
38 2010 Kalmano Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 3 
39 2010 Danba Fulani Fire accident Explosion in a village 3 
40 2010 Dan Birema Religious crisis Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 4 
41 2011 Illela Araba Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 1 
42 2011 Ambarura Political crisis PDP vs. ACN supporters 2 
43 2011 
Gaidau Chi-
wake 
Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 1 
44 2011 Tudun Gudale Fire accident Explosion incident 1 
45 2011 Gidan Hamma Fire accident Fire disaster in a village 1 
46 2011 Tambagarka Market issue Hawkers vs. traders in market stalls 5 
47 2011 Illela District Religious crisis Yan Shi’a vs. Yan Izala 3 
48 2011 Ambarura Religious crisis Qadiriyya vs. Yan Izala 1 
49 2011 Danbar Dikko Religious crisis Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 2 
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Table 10.4 Violent incidents in Illela LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
  
50 2011 Kalmalo Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Hausa 2 
51 2011 Dan Kuda Crime 
Amarawa vs. Kalmalo football 
clubs 
1 
52 2011 Amarawa Crime 
Supporters of Real Madrid vs. 
Barcelona football clubs 
3 
53 2012 Kara Political crisis PDP vs. CPC supporters 2 
54 2012 
Tudun 
Gudale 
Political crisis PDP vs. ACN supporters 1 
55 2012 
Gidan Ham-
ma 
Natural disas-
ter 
Heavy rain 8 
56 2012 Amarawa 
Religious 
crisis 
Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 5 
57 2012 Illela District 
Religious 
crisis 
Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya, involving 
the police 
4 
58 2012 Yar Marina Crime 
Yar Marina vs. Madatsawa football 
clubs 
2 
59 2012 Illela Car accident Due to bad roads 1 
60 2012 
Gaidau Chi-
wake 
Car accident Due to bad roads 3 
61 2012 Yar Kwalbati Car accident 
Motorcycle accident between 
Kwalbati and a market 
1 
62 2013 Amarawa Crime Armed robbers vs. residents 1 
63 2013 Madatsa Political crisis PDP vs. DPP supporters 3 
64 2013 Gidan Katta Political crisis PDP vs. APC supporters 2 
65 2013 Illela Political crisis PDP vs. APC supporters 1 
66 2013 Dan Boko Political crisis PDP vs. APC supporters 1 
67 2013 Illela Araba Political crisis DPP vs. APC supporters 1 
68 2013 Machesare Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 1 
69 2013 Illela Fire accident Incident occurred in a market 2 
70 2013 Illela Nasara Fire accident Fuel station gutted by fire 3 
71 2013 Illela Araba 
Oil distribu-
tion 
Oil distribution led to violence in 
town 
1 
72 2013 Zugana Fire accident Fire incident killed one individual 1 
73 2013 Kalmano 
Natural disas-
ter 
Flooding 3 
74 2013 
Illela Yar 
Kara 
Natural disas-
ter 
Flooding 1 
75 2013 
Illela Yar 
Kara 
Religious 
crisis 
Yan Shi’a vs. Nigerian Army 10 
76 2013 Illela Araba Political crisis PDP vs. APC supporters 1 
77 2013 Illela Araba 
Religious 
crisis 
Yan Shi’a vs. Tijaniyya 3 
78 2013 Kalmano Cattle grazing Hausa farmers vs. Fulani nomads 11 
79 2013 Ambarura Cattle grazing Fulani vs. Nigerian Police 1 
80 2013 Danba Land issue Fulani vs. Hausa 4 
81 2013 
Illela Wood 
Zone 
Crime 
Commercial motorcyclist vs. angry 
mob 
3 
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Table 10.4 Violent incidents in Illela LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
Source: Fieldwork, August-September 2014 
 
 
In spite of a higher population than LGAs such as Gudu, Illela experienced a 
lower level of violent incidents and fatalities between 2006 and 2014 (Table 
10.4). There were 103 unreported violent incidents resulting in 291 fatalities 
across at least 53 wards and communities. However, similar to Gudu, political 
crisis was the main cause of lethal violence, followed by 15 incidents associated 
with car accidents, which exactly matches the situation that transpired in Gwada-
bawa. As observed in Gudu and Gwadabawa, religious crisis again did not rank 
among the top three causes of fatal incidents in Illela. In fact, crime caused more 
violence in the LGA. Market and land conflicts, as well as issues pertaining to 
sorcery, were the least frequent causal factors of violent incidents. The year 2013 
was the most violent year in Illela, measured by number of fatalities as well as 
82 2013 Kalmanu Political crisis 
Local government staff vs. Kal-
manu community 
2 
83 2013 Sanke Crime 
Hooligans vs. commercial motor-
cyclist 
1 
84 2013 Illela Stadium Crime 
Gaidau Chiwake football club vs. 
Gidan Hamma football club 
1 
85 2013 Dogon Karfe Crime Armed robbers vs. community 2 
86 2013 Kwanni road Car accident Due to bad roads 2 
87 2013 Ambaruru Car accident Due to bad roads 1 
88 2013 Karangiya Car accident Due to bad roads 1 
89 2013 Kanwuri Car accident Due to over-speeding 3 
90 2013 Tuddun Wada Car accident Due to over-speeding 1 
91 2013 Dogon Karfe Car accident Due to bad roads 10 
92 2013 Dan Boka Car accident Due to bad roads 3 
93 2014 Illela Araba Political crisis PDP vs. APC supporters 1 
94 2014 Illela Town Car accident 
Car owner, a relative, and three 
other victims 5 
95 2014 Amarawa Land issue Fulani vs. farmers 2 
96 2014 Dogun Karhe Car accident Fatal car crash 12 
97 2014 Illela Araba 
Natural  
disaster 
Flooding 1 
98 2014 Gidan Hamma 
Religious  
crisis 
Yan Izala vs. Tijaniyya 1 
99 2014 Illela District Crime 
A criminal stole a Kasea motorcycle 
and was later killed 
1 
100 2014 Kara Crime 
Hooligans (Area Boys) vs. commu-
nity elders 
1 
101 2014 Gidan Katta Car accident Due to bad roads 5 
102 2014 Chiwaki Car accident Due to bad roads 3 
103 2014 Dogon Karfe Car accident 
Fatal auto crash on the way from 
Illela to Dogon Karfe 
10 
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frequency of incidents, the principal causes of which were political crisis (involv-
ing mainly the PDP and APC) and car accidents (due mainly to bad roads). 
 
 
Table 10.5 Violent incidents in Sakaba LGA (June 2006-May 2014) 
S/N Date Community Cause Description 
No. of 
deaths 
1 2006 Makuku Crime 
Attack led to the death of 6 
people 6 
2 2006 Laraba Sorcery 
Cult member vs. commu-
nity 4 
3 2006 Jan-birnin Crime 
Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 1 
4 2006 Doka Sorcery Act of witchcraft 1 
5 2006 Jan-birnin Crime 
Armed gang and commu-
nity 4 
6 2007 Unguwar Yamma Sorcery 
Ritual incident involving a 
man and his elder brother 2 
7 2007 Doka Sorcery Act of witchcraft 2 
8 2007 Makuku Crime 
Armed gang against mem-
bers of the community 8 
9 2008 Doka Sorcery 
An alleged witch was 
killed by members of the 
community 
1 
10 2008 Dirin Daji Crime 
Cult member vs. commu-
nity members 
2 
11 2008 Makuku Crime 
Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 
7 
12 2009 Unguwar Yakkorau Sorcery Witch vs. community 2 
13 2009 Doka Sorcery Victim of witchcraft 1 
14 2009 Jan-birnin Cattle grazing Fulani vs. community 2 
15 2010 Diri Yakkoro Sorcery 
A alleged witch killed 
somebody and was later 
also killed 
2 
16 2010 Sakaba gari Crime 
Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 2 
17 2010 Laraba village Crime Police vs. armed robbers 3 
18 2010 Agale town Crime 
Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 2 
19 2011 Yakkorau Diri Sorcery 
Woman killed by a group 
of people 2 
20 2011 Rabe Land issue Fulani vs. Kambari 5 
21 2011 Yakkorau Crime 
People killed during an 
armed robbery attack 9 
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Table 10.5 Violent incidents in Sakaba LGA (June 2006-May 2014), continued 
22 2011 Dirin Daji Crime 
Armed gang vs. police and 
also involving community 
members, during a robbery 
incident 
7 
23 2011 Shiyar Land issue Communal violence over a 
plot of land 
6 
24 2011 Makuku Crime Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 
9 
25 2012 Yakoro Sorcery An alleged witch killed a 
man 
2 
26 2012 Rabe Land issue 
Clash over land claims 
involving a Fulani indi-
vidual 
3 
27 2012 Dankolo Crime Robbery incident 1 
28 2012 Dankolo Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 5 
29 2012 Jan-birnin Crime 
Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 
2 
30 2013 Unguwar Wade Land issue 
Farmland destroyed by a 
Fulani man 
4 
31 2013 Adeyi Crime 
Gang vs. community dur-
ing a robbery incident 
1 
32 2013 Sakaba Crime Armed robbery incident 2 
33 2014 Unguwar Wade Land issue 
Fulani cattle breeders 
claimed and destroyed 
land of Dakarkaru farmers 
5 
34 2014 Dankolo Land issue Fulani cattle breeders vs. 
Dakarkaru farmers 
6 
35 2014 Rabe Land issue Fulani vs. Kambari 5 
36 2014 Rabe Crime Armed gang vs. communi-
ty 
5 
37 2014 Sakaba gari Cattle grazing Fulani vs. farmers 5 
Source: Fieldwork, August–September 2014 
 
 
In Sakaba, the only LGA in Kebbi State examined in this study, a total of 37 
violent incidents led to 136 fatalities in 20 wards and communities. The data ob-
tained revealed only four categories of unreported violent incidents: crime, sor-
cery, land issues, and cattle grazing. Crime and sorcery ranked as the top two 
factors that resulted in violent incidents, while issues caused by political crises, 
religious disputes, and car accidents were unidentified. As noted in the introduc-
tory part of this paper, the limitations of human memory - for instance, the ability 
of Sakaba respondents to recall violent incidents relating to politics, religion, and 
car accidents - should not be entirely ruled out. Nevertheless, the fact that not a 
single incident within these categories was cited by any respondent underscores 
that they were not factors considered conspicuous enough to have caused any 
violent deaths during the period under investigation. In fact, as pointed out earli-
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er, certain parts of Sakaba are known to be severely affected by the problem of 
inaccessibility with cars. Hence, it is possible to understand the absence of motor 
accident fatalities in the LGA. Finally, the number of violent incidents and fatali-
ties was highest in 2011, with approximately two-thirds of the total number of 
deaths attributed to crime - and specifically to armed robbery attacks. 
Explaining ‘invisible’ violence in Gudu,  
Gwadabawa, Illela and Sakaba LGAS 
Accounting for unreported violence in the four LGAs requires an understanding 
of a number of factors. The first relates to the physical location of some commu-
nities in the most far-flung geographical areas of a state. In the case of Sokoto, 
for instance, there is little dispute over the fact that in geostrategic terms it is sit-
uated far from the so-called centre of the country. In addition to harsher climatic 
conditions in the Sahel, this in a sense also influences the predisposition of peo-
ple to prefer to migrate in search of economic opportunities in more cosmopoli-
tan and industrial cities and states of Nigeria. Illela, for instance, happens to be 
one of the LGAs located in an extremely distant part of Sokoto State, and in fact 
it shares borders with another country (Niger). These factors together offer a per-
fect excuse to media organizations that may claim justification for not exploring 
such LGAs; but, at the same time, these organizations miss opportunities to re-
port violent incidents when they do occur. 
A second factor relates to the issue of inaccessibility, which is closely linked 
to the preceding factor but in an infrastructural context. In Sakaba, statistics thus 
show a complete absence of car accidents, because of the lack of tarred roads. In 
Illela LGA - where car accident was the second-most significant factor of lethal 
violence - nine out of a total of 15 such incidents were attributed to bad roads. 
A third issue identified by respondents was the perceived insensitivity of local 
government officials and political representatives in a position of accountability 
towards the affected people. Some more critical respondents underscored the 
need for more effective representation of their communities in the political 
sphere. Compounding these challenges is also the manner in which these LGAs 
are perceived in terms of their economic worth in the eyes of the media as well as 
other stakeholders in the polity. If the people of these LGAs are not held in high 
regard by those accountable to them at the political level, this is also reflected in 
the attitude of media entities, who on their part are less willing to spend money, 
time, and energy in reporting from these rural regions. The study nonetheless 
found that there were a few instances where state and national media indeed re-
ported violent incidents in some of the four LGAs under review. But such report-
ing falls short of providing sufficient details. It simply conveys basic information 
501890-L-bw-ASC
216 
 
linked with the entire state, without mentioning the specific wards or communi-
ties affected. Several of such incomplete media reports can be found on the web-
sites of various media organizations. 
Conclusion 
The data analysed for each of the four LGAs under review clearly shows a range 
of factors accounting for fatal violence, including cattle grazing, political crisis, 
crime, and car accident. Particular years were also exceptionally violent, such as 
2011 and 2013. Gudu LGA in Sokoto State recorded the highest number of fa-
talities as well as violent incidents, while Sakaba LGA in Kebbi State had the 
lowest. Although religion was linked to certain clashes involving the Yan Shi’a, 
the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood, and the Yan Izala movement, it accounted for 
few incidents in all four LGAs. Worthy of note is that the overall data draws at-
tention to an alarming level of lethal violence in oft-neglected rural areas of So-
koto and Kebbi states. 
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Postscript: The next challenge:  
Statistics as a tool for human security 
 
 
From the North to the South and the West to the East, many rural LGAs in Nige-
ria experience fatal incidents that are ignored by the media … and by the security 
forces. In remote parts of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, however, the Boko 
Haram insurgency has shown how dangerous such a vacuum can be. Today, the 
science of maintaining law and order is still in its infancy in Nigeria. The army 
does not publish records of its operations, and the police make no use of statistics 
to improve their performance. Moreover, citizens rarely request the release of 
such data. 
In addition, Nigerian readers seldom find comments on the number of homi-
cides nationwide or the body count of the Boko Haram crisis in the North-East, 
except for a few cases on the spot, such as the controversy over the death toll of 
another massacre in Baga, in January 2015. Unlike South Africa, crime statistics 
are not discussed in the media or in Parliament. Police press conferences some-
times provide small amounts of information, but figures are inconsistent and 
many analysts rely on their own perceptions without trying to substantiate their 
findings with hard facts. Among the general public, there are simply no debates 
on the methodology, the use, and the utility of statistics on violence. 
This book represents an innovation: it is the first to introduce a discussion on 
such issues in a coherent manner, relying on a database that fills the lacunae in 
data from the security forces. The selection of chapters presented clearly demon-
strates that, despite many challenges in the most populated country in Africa, it is 
quite possible to use statistics to improve our analysis of Nigeria. Indeed, it also 
confirms that it is necessary to do so in order to avoid stereotypes and the bias of 
emotional reactions to violence. Finally, it shows that combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches is the best way to refine our understanding of human se-
curity. 
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analysis 
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Most of the academic literature on violence in Nigeria 
is qualitative. It rarely relies on quantitative data 
because police crime statistics are not reliable, or not 
available, or not even published. Moreover, the training of 
Nigerian social scientists often focuses on qualitative, cultural, and political issues. There is thus 
a need to bridge the qualitative and quantitative approaches of conflict studies.
This book represents an innovation and fills a gap in this regard. It is the first to introduce a 
discussion on such issues in a coherent manner, relying on a database that fills the lacunae in 
data from the security forces. The authors underline the necessity of a trend analysis to decipher 
the patterns and the complexity of violence in very different fields: from oil production to cattle 
breeding, radical Islam to motor accidents, land conflicts to witchcraft, and so on. In addition, 
they argue for empirical investigation and a complementary approach using both qualitative and 
quantitative data. The book is therefore organized into two parts, with a focus first on statistical 
studies, then on fieldwork.
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